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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with relations between the state and society in the rural 
communities of the district of Massingir, close to Mozambique’s southern border with 
South Africa. Based on 17 months of fieldwork, it explores how the changing relations 
between the neighbouring states have affected the social, economic, and political lives 
of the residents of this borderland. It addresses issues concerned with labour migration, 
local politics, and the recent development of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
(GLTP).
There has been a long history of male labour migration from this region to the 
goldmines in South Africa. While this migration has been of economic importance to 
the people of Massingir, it has also become deeply embedded in their social and cultural 
lives, signifying the transition from adolescence to manhood. However, cross-border 
relations deteriorated when Mozambique gained independence and the mining industry 
reduced its dependence on foreign labour. This thesis argues that, despite recruitment 
cutbacks, the social and economic pressures remain for the young men of Massingir to 
migrate. Unable to cross the border legally, they cross illegally and attempt to find 
temporary employment.
Migration has been important in constructing the ethnic Shangaan identity of this area. I 
argue that, although ethnic identity is sharpened whilst people are away, it is equally 
important to consider how it is consolidated at home. The domination of the Frelimo 
party in this region has been key in this. I demonstrate that Frelimo has been able to 
maintain its popularity and sustain single-party rule in Massingir, despite the official 
shift to pluralist democracy. I argue that the recent development of the GLTP is a threat 
to local livelihoods and Frelimo’s popularity has been diminished by its involvement in 
the project. I demonstrate that residents have used political processes to pressurise the 
state into recognising their concerns.
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Map 1: Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and the regional fieldwork setting
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Map 2: Fieldsite and Limpopo National Park
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1. Introduction 
Paying Mandela’s brideprice
Seven kilometres north of the village of Mavodze there is a pool in the Shingwedzi 
River where the men come to fish and the young boys water livestock during the dry 
season. Behind the trees that shade the river are the mixed fields of maize, pumpkin and 
melon that, in a good year, provide the villagers with much of their food. I had been 
living in Mavodze for little less than a week when Fernando, a local man who was later 
to become my field assistant, asked if I was interested in spending a day in the 
Shingwedzi valley. I spent the morning badgering my new and unsuspecting informant 
for information while he fished in the pool. Having lunched on Fernando’s catch, he 
suggested we should walk along the river and visit his fields. Fernando’s field was 
much like the others in the valley. It was late October 2001 and the dead maize plants 
fi-om the previous year still stood in the parched soil, bleached yellow by the long dry 
season. A high fence of thorny branches surrounded Fernando’s plot of land, built to 
keep wandering livestock firom eating the crops. However, on one side of the field a 
huge gap had been tom through the fence. Several posts had been ripped out of the 
ground and branches lay scattered on the ground. “Shit,” Fernando exclaimed, running 
over to his damaged fence. He looked down at the tracks in the dust and shook his head, 
“Elephants,” he said, “Nothing can stop an elephant. It was Mandela’s elephants that 
did this.”
Earlier that month the former South Afiican President Nelson Mandela had opened the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, a massive conservation project that would link 
South Afiica, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, forming the largest conservation area in the 
world. A ceremony had taken place on the Mozambique-South African border, some 80 
km further up the Shingwedzi River from Fernando’s field, where Mandela had opened 
a symbolic gate in the border fence and had witnessed the relocation of 40 elephants 
from the Kruger National Park to Mozambique’s newly created Limpopo National Park. 
During the press conference that followed the elephant release, Mandela joked that with 
the transfer of the South Afiican elephants he had finally paid his lobola (bride price) 
for his Mozambican wife, Graca Machel. “In my home village I am often
14
%Photo 1: Fishing in the Shingwedzi River
%
Photo 2: Goats drinking from the Shingwedzi River during the dry season
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asked why my wife still keeps her original surname. I tell them it is because I haven’t 
paid my lobola, but today that has finally happened” (cited in ANC 2001).
The 1998 wedding between Mandela and Machel was a potent symbol of the new era in 
Mozambican-South African relations that had developed following the end of apartheid. 
Graca Machel was the former Mozambican first lady and widow of Samora Machel, the 
country’s first president and legendary leader of Frelimo’s liberation struggle against 
Portuguese colonialism. Nelson Mandela was the hero of the fight against apartheid: the 
leader of the ANC, the first freely elected president of a truly democratic South Africa 
and one of the most respected statesmen in the world. Their marriage symbolised the 
hope for a better future for Southern Africa: a future without white minority rule, a 
future without the interferences of the Cold War superpowers, and a future of peace and 
regional cooperation.
The dismantling of the system of apartheid in South Africa, culminating in the 1994 
elections, heralded massive changes across the Southern African region; nowhere more 
so than in Mozambique. In the early 1990s the apartheid government withdrew its 
support of the Renamo rebels that had been engaged in a brutal civil war against the 
Mozambican government since the late 1970s. Without its major sponsor, Renamo was 
forced to the negotiating table and a peace process was successfully implemented in 
1992 followed by multiparty elections two years later. With peace in Mozambique and 
the ANC in government in South Africa, cooperation between the two countries 
blossomed over the following decade. Bilateral approaches have been discussed relating 
to an array of issues including transport policies, migration and labour issues, energy 
supply and environmental protection (IRIN 2003). Such cooperation has not been 
limited to the inter-govemmental level but has also occurred in the business sector; 
there has been over US$1.33 billion of private South African investment in 
Mozambique since 1985 (IRIN 2004). The transfrontier park (involving both 
government and private finance) that Nelson Mandela had been opening when he joked 
about paying his brideprice in October 2001 was just one of the many ventures that 
were being realised across the Mozambique-South Africa border.
For Fernando, struggling to rebuild his fences in the Shingwedzi Valley, Mr Mandela’s 
elephants were not a sudden introduction to this changing regional situation. Having
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lived in the Mozambique-South Africa borderland for most of his life, Fernando had 
personal experience of the effects of the changing cross-border relations. Like hundreds 
of thousands of other young men from southerly Mozambique, Fernando had migrated 
across the border and worked underground in the gold mines of South Africa at the 
heart of the capitalist system that had fuelled the apartheid regime. When Mozambique 
had gained independence from the Portuguese and the socialist Frelimo government 
came to power, Fernando was drafted into the army. He had fought against the UDI 
Rhodesian army’s attempts to destabilise the newly independent country. A decade later 
he was part of a civilian militia that fought against the Renamo rebels, sponsored by 
apartheid South Africa, which had crossed the border and repeatedly attacked the 
villages of the Shingwedzi Basin. For Fernando and the other residents of Mavodze the 
impact of Mandela’s elephants and the creation of the Transffontier Park were another 
way in which their lives were being affected by their proximity to the border and the 
actions taken by the Mozambican state and its neighbours.
This thesis explores how the changing relations between the neighbouring states have 
affected the people living in the Mozambique-South Africa borderland. It examines how 
labour migration from southern Mozambique to the South African goldmines developed 
on the basis of cordial cross-border relations that existed during the colonial period. 
This relationship cooled following Mozambican independence in 1975, resulting in a 
reduction in the number of Mozambicans being recruited into the mining industry. The 
thesis argues that the long tradition of men migrating to the gold mines was socially, 
culturally and economically important to the households of the Lower Shingwedzi 
Basin and, although the retrenchments to the mining industry limited the legal 
opportunities for migration, the young men of this region have continued to cross into 
South Africa as illegal migrants. The development of the Transfrontier Park that Mr 
Mandela was opening in October 2001 is a symbol of the new post-apartheid era of 
regional cooperation that signifies the removal of boundaries between the different 
states. I argue that for the villagers like Fernando the park constitutes a threat to their 
livelihoods and, paradoxically, is creating a more impenetrable border through which to 
cross to find work in South Africa. The residents’ response to the park has to be 
understood in terms of the local political situation in Massingir. After independence, the 
Frelimo party was able to rapidly generate grassroots support and successfully pursue its 
nationalist policies. Frelimo has been able to maintain complete dominance of the local
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political sphere despite Mozambique’s transition to a multiparty democracy at the end 
of the civil war. This local popularity has been threatened by the Frelimo government’s 
involvement in the creation of the Transfrontier Park. The thesis explores how the 
residents have been able to appropriate the appointment of a new community leader as a 
political response to the Mozambican state’s involvement in the Transfrontier Park. 
Tying all these themes together, the thesis is ultimately concerned with concepts of 
citizenship, sovereignty and statehood in a border region.
Living in a borderland
Fernando had been bom and brought up in the Olifantes Valley, only 25km from the 
Mozambique-South Africa border. During the time I spent conducting fieldwork 
Fernando lived in the village of Mavodze and supported his family through agricultural 
production and selling fish from the local rivers. Although he was settled in 
Mozambique during this period, he had spent much of his life crossing into South 
Afiica and working in the mining industry. Members of his family had fled across the 
border seeking refuge in South Afiica during the war and he had crossed to visit them 
on numerous occasions. Many of his material possessions, including the fishing nets we 
had used that morning, had been purchased on the other side of the border. Even his 
leisure time was shaped by the neighbouring state, as Fernando was —  like most of the 
villagers — unable to receive the signal from Mozambican radio stations and relied on 
the South Afiican stations that broadcast across the border. During my 17 months of 
living in the villages of Massingir I came to understand the extent to which the lives of 
the residents of this region are shaped by their proximity to the international border.
Traditionally anthropology has been more concerned with the cultural and symbolic 
boundaries between groups of people than with the geo-political borders that shape the 
world (Donnan & Wilson 1994:5). Anthropologists have tended to concentrate on the 
processes of the formation of the boundaries that create and divide peoples along, for 
example, ethnic lines (Barth 1969) or according to the notion of symbolic communities 
(Cohen 1985; 1987). Anthropological interest in borders and borderlands, in the 
physical sense, has been a more recent phenomenon. Many of these contemporary
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studies, conducted in Africa and elsewhere, have tended to concentrate on the classical 
anthropological concern of identity.
The anthropology of borders, Donnan and Wilson argue, “is part of the wider social 
science of class, ethnic, religious and national identity, but it is an anthropology 
specifically concerned with the negotiation of identity in places where everyone expects 
identity to be problematic” (1994:12). Borderlands have been regarded as the zones in 
which divergent political, economic and social systems meet, coexist and conflict. The 
study of such cultural melting pots, Donnan and Wilson suggest, provides unique 
insight into the way in which identities are constructed. Similarly, Daphne Berdahl uses 
her work in the former East Germany to argue that the process of boundary formation is 
a means of understanding the dynamics of identity formation and expression. She 
argues that crossing borders “is an act of definition and declaration of identity” 
(1999:4). By concentrating on localised studies of identity in borderlands, ethnographers 
have been able to explore the way in which international borders are understood and 
experienced by the populations living on either side. When looking at how the people in 
the Mexico-US borderlands negotiate the border, Martinez suggests that all 
borderlanders share a similar identity, arguing that the “influence of the border makes 
the lives of border peoples fimctionally similar irrespective of location, nationality, 
ethnicity, culture and language” (1994:xviii; see also Heyman 1994:51). While agreeing 
that people in border regions share similar structural constraints and processes, Donna 
Flynn disputes that all border populations respond to these in the same way (1997:312). 
Nevertheless, she argues that the Shabe people living near the Bénin-Nigeria border 
forge a collective and distinct ‘border identity’ or ‘border culture’ (1997:311).
Although Flynn argues that the Shabe identity is based solely on their proximity to the 
border, elsewhere in Afiica a shared ethnicity has often been considered as the basis of 
construction of such a transfrontier identity.^ A salient feature of international 
boundaries throughout the continent is their disregard for the ethnic boundaries of the 
people living on the ground. The geo-political borders are seen to artificially divide 
groups of people that share an identity founded on ethnicity (see Phiri 1985; Miles
‘ For good examples outside Africa see Wilson & Donnan (1998).
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1994): a feature clearly to be seen in the case of Mozambique and South Africa where 
the border neatly divides the Shangaan ethnic group in two.
Fernando and the other residents of the Massingir villages trace their origins back to a 
group of Nguni, led by Soshangane, who fled the expansion of the Zulu leader Chaka in 
the early 19^  ^ century. The Nguni crossed the Lebombo Mountains in 1821 and 
conquered the Tsonga people, forming the Gaza Empire that at its height dominated all 
of what is now Southern Mozambique (Theal 1915; Junod 1927 [1912]; Smith 1970). 
The Nguni introduced their own language and customs and mixed with the local Tsonga 
to such an extent that the whole group became known as the Shangaan (van Warmelo 
1974:68). When the international border between South Africa and Mozambique was 
agreed in the 1860s the Shangaan were split: part of the group were recognised as living 
in South Africa, others in Mozambique.
While the people living in both Mozambique and South Africa consider themselves 
Shangaan, this does not undermine the significance of the border. In a study of the 
Hausa on the Nigeria-Niger border, William Miles notes that divergent value systems 
arise on either side of the boundary and become deeply entrenched over time (1994). 
Like the Hausa, the Shangaan on either side of the Mozambique-South Africa border 
share a language, a similar culture and a common history, but differences have emerged 
from living in different states and thus experiencing vastly different political systems 
and economic circumstances. To discuss the people living in this area in terms of 
sharing some sort of ‘border identity’ is to gloss over these important variations and the 
effect they have on people’s lives. Fernando and the other residents of the Mozambican 
villages near the South Afiican border were ethnically Shangaan, but it was always 
made clear that they considered themselves Mozambican Shangaan. People made 
frequent journeys across the border and the neighbouring state was an important 
influence over many aspects of their lives, yet, in spite of this familiarity. South Afiica 
was always considered a foreign land.^ It was a place where one might go to work or to 
engage in some other activity, but Mozambique was always home.
 ^ Similar sentiments are shared by the Ghanaians living near the Togolese border, who frequently travel 
between the two countries but still ultimately consider themselves as Ghanaians (Nugent 2002:7)
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This is not to argue that the Mozambican Shangaans are a homogenous group. 
Elsewhere in Gaza Province a hierarchy exists between those people who trace their 
descents back to the Nguni conquers and to the Tsonga who were conquered. The 
residents of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin considered themselves as descendents of the 
Nguni conquerors and contrasted themselves to the other Mozambican Shangaans living 
nearer the coast. However, people did not express this contrast in terms of the Nguni 
invasions of the early 19^  ^ century, but discussed it in terms of Portuguese 
colonialisation and linguistics. As a result of closer contact with the colonial power, 
those living further south had incorporated more Portuguese vocabulary into their 
language. The residents of the villages where I conducted fieldwork all spoke a dialect 
of Shangaan that had appropriated numerous English words and phrases. While my 
informants could easily communicate with people living to the south, they considered 
their dialect to be superior because of its closer ties to South Africa, where Soshangane 
had originated, rather than to Portugal, the colonial power that defeated ‘their’ Gaza 
Empire.
Although my informants retained this sense of ‘Mozambican-ness’, they would use 
whatever resources were available to avoid problems whilst visiting South Africa, 
including ethnicity. Just as Mexican truckers crossing into the United States 
strategically play upon the ambiguities of the border to reformulate and mobilise ethnic 
identity to their advantage (Alvarez & Collier 1994:607), my informants were able to 
use their Shangaan identity to claim residence on both sides of the Mozambique-South 
Africa border. Many people possessed both Mozambican and South African identity 
cards and would produce which ever one was appropriate depending on which country 
they were in.  ^ Some of my older informants left Massingir and went to South Africa 
when they learned they might be eligible to receive a pension on that side of the border. 
Such behaviour does not indicate that the identity of this borderland population was 
shaped by deterritorialization and displacement, as suggested by Gupta and Ferguson 
(1992:18), nor does it show that the residents have formed a ‘border culture’. Rather it 
demonstrates the opportunistically flexible approach borderland residents took to their 
official identity, whereby people would expediently switch official documentation
 ^ Similarly, Stephan Hofstatter observes people having both South Afiican and Mozambican identity 
papers living on the South African side o f the border (2004)
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whenever they felt it appropriate; as Liisa Malkki observes, “identity is always mobile 
and processual” (1992:37).
Making use of Malkki’s observations, Harri England argues that, if identities are 
inherently flexible and processual, then “identity itself should hardly be the ultimate 
subject of analysis” (2002:24). Rather than concern himself with the current 
preoccupation with the concept of identity in borderlands, England concentrates on the 
administrative and social forces and power relations that shaped the peoples* 
experiences in the Mozambique-Malawi borderland during and shortly after the 
Mozambican civil war. In a similar vein he is also critical of the concept of a ‘border 
culture’. England subscribes to the ideas of Robert Alvarez who argues that a notion of 
a border culture essentialises individual traits and behaviours and often obliterates the 
actual problems and conditions faced by the people living in a borderland (1995:450). 
Working on the Mexico-US border, Alvarez argues that attempts to define a border 
culture have been socially misleading and have obscured the social-cultural processes of 
the people living in this borderland.
Rather than attempting to analyse the experiences of Fernando and the other residents of 
the villages of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin in terms of a ‘border culture’ or ‘identity’, 
in this thesis I position myself alongside England and Alvarez to look at how the lives 
of these people have been shaped by the specific social, economic, and political 
processes taking place within the historical context of the borderland. As the border is a 
symbolic and politico-jural boundary between the Mozambican and South African 
states, this approach must consider “the very concrete material consequences of the 
actions of states for local populations” (Hann 1995:136).
States and the borderland
Part of the way in which the Mozambique-South Africa border is understood and 
experienced today stems fi*om the manner in which it was originally created. The history 
of African borders in general differs from that of their European and American 
counterparts. The European borders, Nugent argues, developed fi-om spheres of
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influence of neighbouring centres that, over time, solidified to become fixed boundaries 
between states (2002:3). The American model was one of a rolling fi*ontier where 
settlers gradually expanded beyond the boundaries imposed by the colonial powers. In 
contrast the borders in Afiica were created by competing European powers —  often not 
even present on Afiican soil —  that divided the continent between them (Nugent 
2002:4).'  ^ In this case, the Mozambique-South Afiica border, through which Mr 
Mandela had released his elephants, was created in an agreement between the 
Portuguese and the Boer Republic of the Transvaal signed in 1869. This treaty 
recognised the Portuguese possession of Delagoa Bay (Maputo) and established the 
border of the Transvaal as the ridge of the Lebombo Mountains as far north as the 
Limpopo River (Newitt 1995:327).^
While the 1869 treaty defined the borders between the two states, the agreement was 
concerned with far more than simply the demarcation of fi'ontiers. The Boers, having 
broken away fi*om the British and established the Republic of the Transvaal, were 
looking to end their dependence on the British for access to the coast and the ports of 
Durban and Cape Town. In the 1869 treaty, the Transvaal and the Portuguese not only 
defined the extent of their territory, but also agreed transport links and access to the port 
at Delagoa Bay in return for favourable customs duties and tariffs. Although this 
agreement was subsequently revised, most notably to allow access to Mozambican 
labour following the discovery of gold in the Transvaal, its basic principles have defined 
international relations between Mozambique and South Afiica^ for much of the last 100 
years. Mozambique has been able to generate revenues from the South Afiican trade 
using the port facilities in Maputo and through a system of labour migration organised 
by South Afiican industrial interests that were granted sole access to recruit throughout 
Mozambique’s southern provinces.
Although many of these boundary negotiations occurred in Europe, it is not the case, as is commonly 
thought, that the colonial map o f Africa was carved out at the Berlin West Africa Conference o f  1884-5. 
The boundaries long predated the Berlin conference and had been gradually crystallised during the period 
of ‘informal empire’, when the network o f trading posts, missions and the slave trade expanded inland 
firom the European coastal strongholds (Mbembe 2000). Formal recognition o f these unofficial territorial 
claims was based on individual treaties negotiated between the powers concerned, not an arbitrary map- 
making session in Berlin (Katzenellenbogen 1996:21).
 ^ The northern and western borders o f Mozambique were finally established, after much negotiation, in 
the Anglo-Portuguese treaty o f  1891 (see Hammond 1966; Axelson 1967; Newitt 1995).
^ The Transvaal was annexed by Britain in 1900 and became the founding province o f the Union o f South 
Africa in 1910.
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These treaties and agreements between the two states shaped not only the diplomatic 
relations, but also the lives of the people inhabiting borderlands. If we return to the 
example of Fernando, he had migrated to South Africa to work in the gold mines, as had 
his father before him. As a result of the inter-state relations, initiated by the 1869 treaty, 
hundreds of thousands of young Mozambicans have crossed the border, searching for 
work in South Africa. This thesis examines how this labour migration has affected 
social and economic relations among the people living in the borderland and shows how 
the process has been shaped by the changing relations between the South African and 
Mozambican states. Yet the case of Fernando and the elephants also demonstrates that 
the relationship between Mozambique and South Africa has not always been one of 
mutual cooperation. The elephants that destroyed Fernando’s fence may have been a 
part of an intergovernmental conservation project, but one of the objectives of this 
transfrontier park was to rebuild peace and generate trust after almost two decades of 
conflict and tension that existed between the apartheid state and the Frelimo government 
that came to power after independence. The Mozambique-South Africa border also 
symbolizes this more menacing history of the two nations.
Elsewhere in Afiica borders have frequently been characterised as flexible, weak and 
porous in comparison to the fixed and clearly defined boundaries of nation states 
elsewhere in the world (see Donnan & Wilson 1994; Wilson & Donnan 1998b; Englund 
2002). This view stems, in part, from the manner in which they were established. As we 
have seen above, most African borders were created through negotiations between 
foreign powers. While we have seen that in many cases the ethnic and social boundaries 
of the people living in the area were ignored during such negotiations, in many cases 
these borders also fail to correspond to physical features on the ground. As a result most 
Afiican borders are poorly marked and readily crossable (Griffiths 1996). This does not 
apply in the southern African setting, where — despite the fact that many of the borders 
do not conform to any natural physical features — the uneasy relations between 
apartheid South Afiica and the ‘Frontline States’^  have created some of the most 
fortified borders on the continent.
 ^ The ‘Frontline States’ was the term given to the black independent southern African states that were 
unified in their hostility to white minority rule in South Afiica. This movement consisted o f Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This group
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By no stretch of the imagination could the Mozambique-South Afiica border be 
described as either poorly-defined or easy to cross. The entire length of the boundary is 
fenced. During the apartheid era this was electrified firom the Swaziland border to 
Komatipoort and carried a lethal current that was responsible for more deaths in 36 
months than the Berlin Wall was throughout its entire history (Griffiths 1996:76; de la 
Hunt 1998). The northern section of the border fence has never been electrified, yet this 
is not to say it is any easier crossing into South Afiica in this region. The Kruger 
National Park follows the border from the end of the electric fence as far as Zimbabwe. 
This park, the size of Israel, constitutes a buffer zone the effectiveness of which derives 
fi-om its being populated with dangerous animals, most notably lions, and patrolled by 
armed guards.
Despite these efforts of the apartheid state, this thesis demonstrates that Fernando and 
many of the other residents of Mavodze and the surrounding villages, avoiding 
electrocution, attack or capture, continued to migrate across the border into South 
Afiica. While people were able to slip through the gaps in the border, this does not 
imply that the border was in any way ineffective. Even those Afiican borders that 
conform to the most stereotyped image of a highly porous and invisible fi-ontier 
succeed, Jeffrey Herbst argues, in their primary function of preserving the integrity of 
the state (2000:253). Borders demarcate the territorial and political limits of nation 
states and thus require policing. As we have seen, the South Afiican state has been 
particularly vigorous in maintaining its frontier with Mozambique.
While borders have long been considered the territorial limit of the power of the state, 
much recent literature challenges whether this remains the case. It argues that, in the age 
of globalisation, international and regional organisations such as the United Nations or 
the European Union are applying increasing pressure on states to weaken their borders 
(Donnan & Wilson 1994:2). In this way sovereignty is being unbundled and moved 
away from the nation-state and into global and supra-national arenas and institutions 
(Hansen & Stepputat forthcoming; Sassen 1996:1-30). The Great Limpopo National
went on to form the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC, later SADC) in 
1979.
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Park, which Nelson Mandela opened with the elephant release, appears to be an 
example of this process occurring in southern Afiica. The project is underpinned by an 
ethos of regional cooperation and its fimding, rather than being linked to any single 
national source, is channelled through the Southern Afiican Development Community 
(SADC). The park’s design requires the dropping of the national border fences and 
ultimately a committee of representatives fi*om the participating states will jointly 
manage the whole area. This seems to substantiate the theory that borders are becoming 
less important and are being gradually dismantled. I argue in the thesis, however, that, 
although the fences are being removed, for the villagers of the Shingwedzi Basin the 
creation of the Limpopo Park has in fact solidified the border. As we have seen, the 
fencing in this northern section of the Mozambique-South Afiica border, even during 
the apartheid era, was never the major obstacle for people attempting to cross. The 
major problems were, and still are, the animals and the armed patrols in Kruger National 
Park on the South Afiican side of the border. At one level the Transfi*ontier Park is 
dismantling the border fences, but it is also bringing animals and armed patrols to the 
Mozambican side of the border. People attempting to cross the border will not only have 
to contend with these threats on the South Afiican side, but will also face them closer to 
home. The effects of globalisation can be deceptive: national states are in fact holding 
on to the powers needed to define their political boundaries (Trouillot 2001:133). I 
maintain that the Great Limpopo Transfi-ontier Park is an example of such a deception: 
the fences may be falling, but the two states are maintaining and enforcing their own 
political boundaries with perhaps even greater effectiveness than before.
Understandings of the state
Thus far I have argued that to understand the experiences of the Mozambican villagers 
living near the Mozambique-South Afiica border we must move away from the 
anthropological interest in merged borderland identities and instead concentrate on the 
divisive role of the two states — despite their plans of co-operation — in this border 
region. Both the South Afiican and Mozambican states have been integral to the 
development of the border and continue to play an active role in the way it is 
experienced and understood by those living in its vicinity. Considerations of the state
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are not only important in terms of discussing the border: they also concern a broader 
theme that runs all the way through this thesis. In addition to analysing the role of both 
states in the practice of labour migration firom southern Mozambique to the South 
Afiican gold mining industry the thesis also explores how the state operates at a local 
level in the border villages, examining how the lives of the villagers have been affected 
by actions and policies of the local state representatives. The thesis explores how the 
post-colonial one-party state established a presence in this border region and how it has 
been able to maintain this domination in spite of the shift to pluralist politics that has 
occurred at a national level. It examines how the village residents, countering these 
techniques of domination, have strategized to engage with the local state and how they 
have been able to appropriate political processes that are being debated at a national 
level in an attempt to protect their local interests.
For anthropologists, ‘the state’ has been a notoriously problematic subject of study. As 
long ago as 1940, Radcliffe-Brown dismissed the concept fi'om the field of 
anthropological investigation, arguing that the term ‘state’ was a source of mystification 
and that the analysis of government and politics were amply sufficient to grasp the 
political (1940a). Subsequent attempts to bring the state back into the field of social 
analysis have dealt with the concept as a distinct entity that is set apart firom society and 
everyday life, and as such it has remained of little interest to anthropologists (Evans et 
al 1985; Migdal 1988).
Jonathan Spencer’s recent criticism of modem anthropology’s neglect of the state and 
politics in general (1997) is part of a growing literature within the discipline that aims to 
redress this situation. Much of this work emphasises that state and society, rather than 
being distinct categories, are interconnected in numerous ways. For Timothy Mitchell 
the “edges of the state are uncertain, societal elements seem to penetrate it on all sides, 
and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to determine” 
(1991:88). While dismissing the notion of a state that is abstract from society is helpful, 
the problem of how to conceptualise the state remains. If the state is not an empirical 
given, as Radcliffe-Brown argues, where and how can anthropology encounter the state, 
if at all (Trouillot 2001:126)? Following in the Marxist tradition, Ralph Miliband argues 
that the ‘state’ stands for ... a number of institutions which, together, constitute its 
reality and which interact as part of.what may be called a state system” (1969:48). If we
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understand that the state is not a discrete unitary actor but a system that consists of 
multiple agencies staffed by individuals, anthropology is well equipped to study this 
‘everyday’ state.
For the people of Mavodze and the surrounding villages the estado (state) was a broad 
and inclusive term that referred to numerous individuals and institutions operating at a 
number of different levels. Within the village, residents would interact with local state 
officials on an everyday basis. These local state representatives besides being the village 
secretary or the president of the locality were also someone’s kinsman, a neighbour, a 
drinking companion or a victim of misfortune in much the same way as everyone else. 
These individuals were familiar and therefore approachable. People could engage with 
this local state in their own terms and with a sense of confidence that allowed them to 
present their views and opinions in a fi’ank and honest manner. This local state was a 
site where individuals interacted with one another on a daily basis.
Thus at the village level Miliband’s notion of the state system initially appears to be an 
adequate tool of analysis. However, this local understanding of the state is only half the 
story. While the local state was considered to comprise familiar individuals, as the 
representatives working for state institutions became more remote fi-om the villagers’ 
daily lives, they appeared to become amalgamated into a monolithic institution. For 
example, the village residents had little to do with the staff of the district administration 
in Massingir on a one-to-one basis and subsequently conceived of the various people 
working at this level as a single entity: the district administration. As the degree of 
unfamiliarity and distance increased to the provincial administration and then national 
government in Maputo, so the state was increasingly discussed as an abstract and 
monolithic entity.
These levels of gradually increasing abstraction in villagers’ understanding of the state 
question whether Miliband’s analysis of the state system is sufficient. Paul Abrams 
acknowledges that the concept of the state system allows the empirical investigation of 
how the various institutions and individuals are clustered together and how they relate 
to each other (1988:69). Yet Abrams maintains that Miliband remains trapped in the 
reification of the state. For Abrams the state is an ideology. He argues that in 
considering the state we must distinguish between the state-system and the state-idea.
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The state-system consists of the institutional practice experienced on a day-to-day basis 
through the interaction of individuals at a local level. The state-idea reifies this system 
to the extent to which it takes on its own identity and becomes progressively divorced 
fi*om political practices.^ The state-idea is, therefore, a mask that obscures the state- 
system: it prevents the observation and study of political practice and, as social 
scientists, our task is to demystify this process. For the residents of the Mozambique- 
South Afiica borderland this ‘illusion’ perpetrated by the ‘state-idea’ was complete. 
They were too distant to be able to unpick the individual components of the state 
institutions that they did not deal with on a regular basis and saw them as a single 
monolithic entity. Rather than demystifying this, in this thesis I show that, to understand 
the effect of the state on the lives of the people living in this border region, we must 
understand how they perceived the way the state operated.
One of the consequences of this way of seeing the state is that the villagers understand 
the state as a far larger and all-encompassing institution than it actually is. If we return 
to the incident with the elephants and Fernando’s fence, the local residents understood 
the new park to be part of the estado (state).^ In fact a conglomeration of different 
parties were responsible for the design, fimding and implementation of the transfi-ontier 
project, including the World Wildlife Fund, the International Conservation Union, the 
World Bank, South African NGOs, an oil company, the Afiican Wildlife Fund, the 
Dutch government and the German development bank (KfW). Despite the large number 
of interested parties, in the eyes of the villagers all of these organisations were part of 
the state.
While the Transffontier Park was the most recent example of this blurring of boundaries 
between the state and other institutions, this thesis demonstrates that it is not a new 
phenomenon. The system of migratory labour, discussed earlier, has been operating for 
over 100 years. This is a relationship that has been constructed between Mozambique 
and South Afiica for their mutual benefit. However, while the migrants see the system
* Timothy Mitchell subscribes to Abrams’ approach but argues that, instead o f viewing the state-system 
and state-idea as two distinct objects o f analysis, they are better seen as two aspects o f the same process; 
each reinforcing the other (Mitchell 1999). I return to this argument in the conclusion.
® For a long time it was unclear to villagers whether it was part o f the Mozambican or South African state. 
This is explored in Chapter 5.
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in terms of state interests, the labour system also reflects the interests of the mining 
companies. Another similar example of the amalgamation of different institutions into a 
single construct of the state occurs in relation to NGOs and state service provision in 
rural areas. For a long time, and especially since the 1992 peace accord, different 
national and international organisations have been implementing development projects 
in the border region. Again, the local people understand many of these to be the work of 
the state. This thesis looks at these examples and examines how the Frelimo state has 
used the blurring of these boundaries for its own advantage in terms of generating and 
sustaining local support.
The village of Mavodze and the local state
While the villagers of Mavodze, my primary fieldsite, were not always completely 
familiar with the aspects of the state that existed outside their immediate surroundings, 
very few of them had any doubts about the workings of the local state. If we trace the 
village’s recent history we can see that, in part, this understanding reflected the fact that 
Mavodze was quite literally created by the state: the physical structure of this new 
village reflected the way in which the local political system was organised.
Portugal had claimed sovereignty over Mozambique ever since Vasco da Gama had 
circled the Cape of Good Hope and landed on the Ilha da Mozambique in 1498. 
Although it staked a claim to the territory, in reality the European power had little 
influence outside of its coastal strongholds until the late 19* century. It was not until the 
defeat of the Gaza Empire and the capture of its last ruler, Ngungunyane, in 1895 that 
the Portuguese \vere able to consolidate control over southern Mozambique. The 
Portuguese authorities co-opted the local chiefs, or régulas, to administer rural areas, 
collect taxes and govern according to customary law. This system was introduced in 
Massingir in the early part of the 20* century and later a Portuguese administrator was 
installed in Mavodze. The administration remained in Mavodze until the construction of 
Massingir Town began in the 1970s, when it was transferred to this larger centre.
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During the colonial period the name Mavodze referred to a wider area, rather than to the 
specific village that exists today. People lived in dispersed homesteads along the 
Olifantes River, cultivating subsistence maize crops and the colonially-introduced 
cotton cash crop in the fertile valley soils. Livestock were grazed on the higher ground 
to the south and many residents recall hunting zebra, giraffe, antelope and buffalo in the 
surrounding area. In 1972 the Portuguese began construction of the Massingir Dam, 
flooding the Olifantes valley in order to provide flood control and irrigation for the 
commercially important Lower Limpopo Valley further downstream. The dam was 
completed in 1976, but by this time the Frelimo nationalist liberation movement had 
succeeded in overthrowing the Portuguese and Mozambique had gained independence.
The struggle for Mozambican independence began in the early 1960s with the founding 
of Frelimo in neighbouring Tanzania. The armed struggle largely took place in the north 
of Mozambique and had little effect on the lives of the residents of Massingir. The 
liberation war continued until 1974 when a military coup in Lisbon caused a change in 
the government of Portugal and initiated negotiations with the nationalist movements in 
the Portuguese colonies. Mozambique became an independent nation on 25*^  June 1975.
Independence more or less coincided with the completion of the Massingir Dam when 
the local population had to move due to the flooding of the Olifantes River Valley. 
Representatives of the new Frelimo government offered to help with the move and 
proposed building a village on the top of the steep escarpment, overlooking the 
population’s former homesteads. In contrast to what happened in many other areas of 
the country, the local population showed no resistance to villagisation and embraced the 
idea with enthusiasm. Frelimo, assisting with the reconstruction of the homes destroyed 
by the Portuguese colonial government’s dam-building project, were perceived as 
saviours.
The decision to site the village on the top of the plateau was taken in part due to the 
disastrous flooding that affected southern Mozambique in 1977, when over 300 people 
were killed and over 400,000 made homeless (Christie & Hanlon 2001:10). Many of 
these people were living in the fertile river valleys and Frelimo used the policy of 
villagisation to relocate homesteads to areas that were less prone to flooding. This 
decision appeared to be vindicated in 2000 when floods again swamped the region.
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Mavodze, sited on higher ground, survived the floods unscathed. However the villagers 
continue to depend on the fertile soils of the river valley for agricultural production. 
While several farmers who were caught in their fields at the time of the flooding had 
climbed trees to avoid the rising waters, a more serious consequence was the loss of 
much of the 1999-2000 maize harvest. Nevertheless, the fact that no lives were lost was 
largely due to the population being resettled in the villages on higher ground.
While there were various pragmatic reasons for the construction of this particular new 
village, the founding of Mavodze was also a part of the Frelimo government’s larger 
policy of villagisation of the Mozambican countryside. Rapid rural development would 
be initiated by the building of communal villages where it would be easier for the state 
to provide health services, education, water and agricultural extension services (Hanlon 
1990). This policy was accompanied by a complete overhaul of the administrative 
system. At the 1977 Congress Frelimo announced its formal transition from a liberation 
movement to a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. The armed struggle against the 
colonial regime had succeeded and a new era devoted to building a socialist 
Mozambique was underway. At the village level the grupos dinamizadores (activating 
groups) that were designed to “safeguard and consolidate the gains of the revolution” 
(AIM 1978:43) were replaced by a party cell structure. The household, maintained 
Frelimo leader Samora Machel, would always be “the first cell of the party” (Urdang 
1984:31). Groups of households would form a block that was headed by a block 
secretary. The block secretaries looked towards the head of the bairro (ward) for 
leadership. Several bairros formed the village that was run by a village secretary. The 
villages were arranged in clusters or localities each headed by a president. Groups of 
these localities formed an administrative post run by a chefe do paste. These chefes 
were controlled by a district administration. This system continued upwards from the 
district level to the provincial administration and then on to the central government in 
Maputo. People were aware of this political structure because it was mapped onto the 
physical layout of the communal villages. The village of Mavodze had been divided into 
four bairros. The houses in these bairros were arranged in a grid pattern and were 
grouped into different blocks (see Map 3). This structure had become so internalised
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that people were able to describe the organisation of the political system from the 
household to the office of the President in Maputo/^
Frelimo’s villagisation of the rural areas was initially a politically motivated campaign 
that aimed to “bring socialism to the countryside” (AIM 1978:42). However, as conflict 
began to spread through Mozambique in the late 1970s, moving people into the 
communal villages became less of an ideologically based policy and more of a military 
tactic (see Hanlon 1990:127-129). It was easier for the army to protect civilian 
populations, and for the government to limit local support for insurgents, if people were 
living in fixed settlements rather than in dispersed homesteads. As we have seen, this 
was not the case in Massingir where the villages were created shortly after 
independence. Nevertheless, while the village of Mavodze was constructed as part of 
Frelimo’s political programme and not as a direct response to military action, the village 
and its residents did not escape the ravages of Mozambique’s long civil war.
The Mozambican civil war has been subjected to thorough analysis elsewhere (see 
Hanlon 1990; Arabamsson & Nilsson 1995; Englund 2002; Finnegan 1992; Geffray 
1990; Hall & Young 1997; Roesch 1992; Vines 1996) and is not the central concern of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, any contemporary account of life in Mozambique would be 
inadequate without considering the way in which the war affected the local population. 
The Mozambican conflict, as William Finnegan notes, was a “complicated war” (1992) 
and the way it was conducted and its effects varied throughout the country. Instead of 
glossing over the differences, in the introduction to his excellent book Harri Englund 
demonstrates the importance of highlighting the regional variation by analysing the 
nature of the conflict as it occurred in four different provinces (2002:13-21). Rather than 
repeat this analysis, 1 will concentrate on how the conflict was experienced in the region 
where 1 conducted fieldwork.
The residents of Massingir were affected by post-colonial conflict on two different 
occasions. The first occurred in the late 1970s when Rhodesian forces attacked the 
settlements and infrastructures in the Limpopo Valley as part of the Smith regime’s
While people were familiar with the political structures, they were not always quite so aware o f  which 
individual held which specific office (see Chapter 4).
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Photo 3: The chefe do paste in the administrative post
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response to Frelimo’s support of the Zimbabwean nationalist movements. Many of the 
local residents were recruited into the army and fought against this conventional force. 
When Smith was overthrown this fighting ceased and the region remained untouched by 
conflict until 1987.
The second occasion of conflict had more profound consequences for villagers’ self- 
identification as Frelimo, and for their positive view of the Mozambican state. By the 
late 1980s Renamo, a movement initially set up by Rhodesian Special Forces as a 
destabilisation force and later supported by the apartheid regime in South Afiica, had 
penetrated into Massingir fi-om bases within South Afiica. In December 1989 Renamo 
launched a surprise raid on Mavodze. Two people were killed and the surviving 
villagers fled into the bush; others sought refuge in South Afiica or in more secure areas 
of Mozambique. The Frelimo government responded by distributing weapons and 
training civilian militias. Much of the population remained in the Olifantes valley, 
defending themselves and their property fiom repeated Renamo attacks.
The villagers of Mavodze were extremely proud of the fact that many of them remained 
in the area and fought on the side of the Frelimo armed forces. The state’s policy of 
weapons distribution and training civilians to protect themselves further boosted 
Frelimo popularity in this region. Rather than the civilian forces assisting the military, 
the villagers saw the war in terms of Frelimo helping them to protect themselves fiom 
Renamo attacks. This experience further bolstered Frelimo’s political standing in the 
region. This was demonstrated in the post-war 1994 elections when Frelimo dominated 
the polls throughout Gaza Province, and were overall winners of the national ballot.
The strength of local popular support for Frelimo had been founded on the positive 
interactions that had occurred between the residents and local state representatives, the 
state system that people were familiar with. This had been experienced when Frelimo 
had assisted people in resettling as a consequence of the Portuguese flooding the valley 
and through the local state assistance during the war. Following the end of the war, 
Frelimo’s local support base has begun to shrink. Rather than dealing with the local 
state system, the lives of the residents of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin are increasingly 
being affected by the more abstract and remote national state. Alarmed by actions of 
this unfamiliar monolithic idea of the state —  particularly the creation of the Limpopo
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National Park —  the residents are responding with local political action that no longer 
favours Frelimo.
Mavodze today: local livelihoods
While much of Mavodze was destroyed during the war, the village was rebuilt and 
repaired with the assistance of numerous international organisations and, by all 
accounts, the overall layout had changed little from the time of its construction to the 
period when I lived there (see Map 3). The village was divided into four residential 
bairros by the main dirt roads and a large central clearing. This central space contained 
the school building, the small health clinic, the administrative post office and the houses 
of the six teachers, nurse and chefe do poste (local administrator). In addition to these 
state amenities there was also the village borehole with a solar-powered pump that 
provided water for half the village on a daily basis. There were two small barakas 
(kiosks) that sold matches, cooking oil, soap, biscuits and other household items. When 
the fridges were working, the cold beers and soft drinks on sale at either one of the 
kiosks attracted a crowd of young men who spent the evenings chatting, comparing 
bicycles and gambling on card and draught games. There was a large caju (Amarula) 
tree that provided shade for a number of wooden benches where village meetings took 
place on a regular basis. Close to the school there was a dusty football pitch where, after 
vigorous shooing of the livestock, the inter-village football matches were played every 
fortnight. Several hundred metres to the south was the village dip-tank where each week 
the cattle from the surrounding villages were treated against ticks.
Mavodze had a population of just over 2500 living in 166 households. Families lived in 
small open compounds that usually contained a couple of houses, a grain store with a 
cooking area beneath it, a long-drop toilet and a large shady caju (Amarula) tree. The 
majority of the buildings were made from local materials, with mud and log walls and a 
roof of either corrugated metal sheeting or thatch. Several of the more affluent families 
in the village had built concrete houses with glass windows, fitted doors, concrete floors 
and one even had a solar panel (although this was broken for much of the time I lived in 
the village). While some of the families preferred to keep their cattle and small
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Photo 4: The school building in the central square of Mavodze
Photo 5; The solar-powered water pump in the centre of Mavodze
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tPhoto 6: Administrative Post of Mavodze
Photo 7: The Dip Tank in Mavodze
38
ruminants in the household compound, the majority of livestock-owners had corrals at 
the edge of the village or in the bush near the rivers and watering holes, where herd 
boys or other family members looked after the animals.
As much of the evidence in this introduction has indicated, the residents of Mavodze 
and the surrounding area engaged in a variety of activities to support themselves. With a 
population density of three people per square kilometre (Detry 2001), there was no 
shortage of land in the district and every household was involved in some level of 
agricultural production. The vast majority of families (over 93% in Mavodze) also 
owned livestock, mainly cattle, goats and poultry. Yçt while cultivation and animal 
husbandry were important, we have also seen how the villages’ proximity to the border 
and the policies of the Mozambican and South African states have resulted in a long 
history of local residents being involved in cross-border migratory labour. Rather than 
consider these as separate modes of production, anthropologists working in nearby 
Lesotho have demonstrated how these are connected through the household 
developmental cycle (Spiegel 1980; Murray 1981; Ferguson 1990). Historically in 
southern Africa, waged migrant labour has not been a lifelong career but part of a man’s 
and a household’s life cycle. The local manifestations and effects of this have varied 
throughout the region, but in Mavodze a young man would find waged employment, 
save his remittances, and return home to ‘retire’ and engage in agricultural production. 
The following two chapters of this thesis examine how this has operated in Massingir 
and how it has changed over the last two decades.
One of the most important aspects of migratory labour is that it provides the wages with 
which to purchase cattle. While animals are initially required for lobolo (bridewealth), 
having got married a young man will also want to continue to invest in cattle to 
establish his own herd. Cattle, as Ferguson notes, are not necessarily important as means 
of generating an income, but act as stores of wealth (1990:124). Migrant labourers 
would invest much of their salaries in cattle, and a herd would become an important 
source of economic, social and cultural capital.
People were reluctant to part with a head of cattle unnecessarily. During my 17 months 
in Massingir I never witnessed or heard of a farmer slaughtering a cow for consumption 
and it was only in times of great crisis that they would reluctantly consider the sale of an
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Photo 8: A homestead in Mavodze
Photo 9: A homestead in Mavodze
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animal. This unwillingness to part with animals was compounded by the fact that many 
farmers were attempting to rebuild their herds following the war. Most households had 
lost animals during the Renamo raids on the village in the late 1980s and early 1990s.^  ^
This occurred throughout the province and the number of cattle in Gaza fell from 
418,000 in 1981 to only 50,000 in 1992.^  ^The desire to rebuild the herds was not only 
an economic consideration, for, as has been noted elsewhere in Africa (see Herskovits 
1926; Ferguson 1990), cattle-ownership also has important cultural significance. In the 
villages of the Shingwedzi basin, cattle ownership and care were primarily male 
domains and a successful herdsman gained social prestige. Cattle were important in 
terms of creating and maintaining social relations, most notably through the exchange of 
cattle as bridewealth at marriage, or generating political support through the loaning of 
teams to families without their own animals.
Cattle were of fimdamental importance to the household agricultural activities. There 
were no fimctioning tractors in the village of Mavodze and people relied entirely on 
animal traction for draught power. With a low population density, the amount of land 
people could bring into production was dependent on their access to oxen for ploughing. 
Cattle reproduction rates in Massingir were low due to a combination of a limited 
knowledge of husbandry techniques, poor veterinary facilities and the absence of 
nutritional supplements. The notable exceptions to this were two farmers who had a 
sufficient number of animals to generate an income from cattle-breeding. One 
household owned over 120 animals and the other over 400 head of cattle. Herds of this 
size in Mavodze were exceptional, with the average family owning only 8.7 animals.
As a means of coping with the erratic and localised rainfall experienced in the region, 
households tended to cultivate a number of fields in different localities. For the village 
of Mavodze most of the families had at least one field in the Shingwedzi river valley, 
but many also cultivated land in other areas on higher ground or near other villages. 
During the dry season farmers were able to engage in flood retreat cultivation along the 
banks of the Olifantes River, growing maize and other crops on the moist fertile soils
** It was rumoured that the reason the family that owned over 400 cattle had survived the Renamo raids 
was that one member had fought with rebels in return for protection during the fighting. At the end o f the 
war that son had fled to South Africa and remained in self-imposed exile.
Information collated from documents held at the Province Livestock Services, Xai Xai.
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Photo 10: Young boys with cattle
Photo 11: Cattle being taken to the diptank in Mavodze
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that were gradually exposed as the water level of the reservoir dropped. The total 
amount of land cultivated by each family ranged between 1 and 10 hectares, depending 
on access to animal traction. Those that did not own cattle could hire teams from other 
villages, either for a cash payment of between 50,000-75,000 MZM per day (US$2.17- 
3.26) or in exchange for providing labour in the fields of the owner. Only 27 of the 
families I spoke to in Mavodze did not own a team of cattle, but of these only 2 were 
unable to hire animals from elsewhere and were only able to cultivate a small amount of 
land by hand. In their work in Lesotho both Murray (1981) and Ferguson (1990) 
describe the decline in agricultural production and the increased dependence of 
households on waged labour in South Africa. I was unable to gather the historical data 
required to compare this to the situation in Massingir. However, from the figures that 
Ferguson provides, it would appear that agricultural production in Mavodze was of far 
greater importance to livelihoods than it was in his region of Lesotho. Ferguson notes 
that in a good year in Lesotho the average household would produce enough food to last 
3.7 months (1990:124). In Mavodze people reported that in a good year they would be 
able to produce enough food to see their family through to the following harvest. Even 
during two years of drought that occurred during my fieldwork, which residents claimed 
were the worst since 1983, most households were able to produce at least three months’ 
worth of food. Although the amount produced depended to a great extent on the rainfall, 
it was always assumed that households would produce most of their staple foodstuffs 
themselves. People were very reluctant to purchase food with cash. Money was used to 
buy other essential household items, invest in livestock and to pay for medical hills; 
spending money on food was considered wasteful.
Agriculture, then, was of key importance to the livelihoods of the villagers of the Lower 
Shingwedzi Basin and agricultural activities occupied much of their time. The 
agricultural calendar revolved around the rainy season that usually began in late 
November and lasted until late February or early March. In September and October both 
men and women undertook the task of preparing the fields and clearing the weeds and 
bushes that had accumulated over the previous months. With the arrival of the first rains 
the men began the ploughing using teams of oxen, the women and children followed the 
cattle, scattering the seeds saved from the previous year in the newly ploughed furrow. 
The women were usually responsible for weeding and protecting the crops from 
livestock and wildlife until the harvest the following March. Maize and groundnuts
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Photo 12: Flood retreat cultivation in the Olifantes Valley
Photo 13: Flood retreat maize cultivation in the Olifantes Valley during the dry
season
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Photo 14: Ploughing in the Shingwedzi Valley
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Photo 15: Woman without cattle cultivating a field in the Shingwedzi Valley
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were the principal crops, but pumpkins, cassava, beans, melons and sweet potatoes were 
also grown.
Migrant labour, livestock-keeping and agricultural production were the three main 
economic activities of the people of Massingir. However, these were by no means their 
only source of income. As we saw in the opening section of this introduction, Fernando 
earned an income from selling fish that he caught in the Shingwedzi River, but he was 
an exception. Most of the other fishermen in the area were not local residents but had 
come from elsewhere in the province to fish in the lake behind the Massingir Dam. 
These fishermen lived in encampments near the water and would catch fish, salt it and 
sell it in Maputo. More common ways for the residents of Mavodze to earn money were 
through brewing local beer, hunting, the sale of mats and other handicrafts, working as 
hired agricultural labourers for some of the more affluent villagers, thatching and 
building houses, and selling local medicines. The other notable activity that many of the 
poorer families engaged in was the World Food Programme’s (WFP) ‘food for work’ 
initiative. As I mentioned above, the 2000 floods destroyed much of that year’s crop and 
were followed by two years of low rainfall. The World Food Programme sponsored a 
public works project whereby poorer families were paid with international food 
donations to do such tasks as clear the local roads or keep areas of the village clean. 
This programme was in operation for much of the time that I was in the field.
Researching the borderland
I spent 17 months in the field, from September 2001 to January 2003. The majority of 
this time was spent in the district of Massingir. I had become familiar with this region in 
1997-8 while working for Vetaid, an international NGO that was implementing an EU 
funded agricultural support project in partnership with the government livestock 
services in southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane. At this time there was a great 
deal of discussion among government officials and international donor community 
about the role that so-called traditional authorities played in political life in the rural
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areas^ .^ My interest in this issue developed as I noticed the content and rhetoric used in 
many of the discussions contrasted with my own observations of life in the villages in 
which I had been working with the livestock project. Although I was unable to 
investigate this further at the time, it formed the basis of my application to undertake 
doctoral research two years later. Another reason for choosing to return to Massingir 
was its proximity to the South Afiican border and I was aware that migration across it 
played an important part of the lives of the residents. I had had a long term interest in 
issues associated with migration having worked with refugees fi*om the Horn of Afiica 
in Cairo in 1994-5 and then having studied migration as part of a Masters degree at the 
University of Edinburgh. While Massingir was an appropriate site to investigate some 
of the theoretical issues in which I held an academic interest, it was also a region of 
spectacular natural beauty in which I could happily envisage living for 17 months'" .^
My primary fieldsite was the village of Mavodze, in which I lived for much of my time 
in Massingir. Although I was based in one village, the fieldwork was not confined to a 
single setting. During the course of their daily lives, the villagers frequently travelled to 
neighbouring villages and the district capital and on many occasions I would 
accompany them. I adopted a methodology that involved ‘following the people’ and 
therefore the research could be seen to adhere to what Marcus terms multisited 
ethnography (1995). I am reluctant to embrace such terminology, however, as I cannot 
envisage any valid ethnographic account that — according to Marcus’s definition — 
would not be multi-sited. While I often accompanied informants on their travels in and 
around the district of Massingir, I did not go with them when they crossed into South 
Afiica. My thesis is concerned with the lives of people in Mozambique and, although I 
collected accounts of their experiences in South Afiica, I carried out very little research 
there myself.
My own experience o f this debate began during a series o f consultative workshops that were organised 
to discuss the implementation o f the 1997 Land Law, These were attended by government officials and 
representatives o f other interested organisations (see also Kloeck-Jenson 1997).
The outstanding natural beauty o f the region was undoubtedly one o f factors that brought about the 
creation o f the Transfrontier Park. However, as I make clear in later chapters o f  this thesis, when planning 
this research I was unaware o f the proposed development o f the GLTP.
My decision not to conduct research in South Africa was based on a number o f factors. One o f the 
major considerations was that many o f my informants crossed the border illegally, using an extremely 
dangerous route through the Kruger Park. I was unable, not to mention unwilling, to accompany them. As 
illegal immigrants it would have been difficult and time-consuming to locate them on the otiier side o f the 
border and any attenpt to work with them there may have attracted unwelcome attention from the South
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Like many anthropologists, when I first arrived in my fieldsite I was greeted with what 
appeared to be a mixture of distrust and casual indifference. After inspecting my various 
documents, the chefe do paste (the local administrator) and the village secretary 
regretted that there were no spare houses that I could rent and suggested that I should 
use a tent until more permanent accommodation could be arranged. Apart fi*om the more 
daring of the curious village children, the population either viewed me with suspicion or 
ignored me completely. In keeping with the arguments made above, the general 
consensus among the residents was at first that I was from Maputo and worked for the 
Mozambican state. When it became clear that this was not the case I was identified as a 
white Zimbabwean farmer who had been evicted off the land, a relative of the last 
colonial administrator, an agent of Renamo or a member of the South Afiican armed 
forces. My repeated denials were rarely accepted and my inadequate explanations of 
what I was doing only served to heighten people’s scepticism. In some despair I recalled 
a piece of advice given by a professor during a methodology seminar. “Do nothing,” he 
had said. “Do nothing for the first few weeks except walk around the village.” With 
seemingly few other options, I heeded this advice and walked around different parts of 
the village, twice or three times a day. Initially this made little difference, but after a 
while people would greet me and occasionally call me over to speak with them. Matters 
gradually improved over time, but the most significant change occurred when I decided 
to build a house.
I was still living in what the manufacturers had the audacity to call a two-man tent and, 
by the time the rainy season had arrived, it had sprung several leaks. There was no sign 
that the chefe do poste had managed to arrange any other accommodation. I therefore 
asked one of the men with whom I had grown quite friendly for some advice on how to 
build a mud hut and he suggested we should build it together. The process took about 
three weeks of what I considered to be hard work. We selected and felled the trees, then 
transported them into the village. These were chopped to size and bound together to
African authorities. Data collected from Mozambicans living and working in South Africa would have 
produced interesting comparative material but I do not feel the absence o f this detracts from the 
arguments made in • this thesis. There are a number o f recent and on-going studies looking at 
Mozambicans and/or Shangaan on the South African side of the border (see for exançle Rodgers 2001; 
Niehaus 2002; Golooba-Mutebi 2003), but very little work has been done on the Mozambique side o f the 
border. This thesis seeks to make a start at addressing this imbalance.
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form the walls. I bought six sheets of metal for the roof that were wired to the wooden 
frame. A neighbour’s wife coated the walls with mud and when it was finished I looked 
at my new accommodation with a sense of accomplishment. This was not to last. One 
evening my pride and joy was exposed to its first rainfall. I looked on in horror as in 
less than two minutes most of the mud unceremoniously fell off the back wall; I had 
forgotten to account for an overhang to allow the water to drain off the roof. While I 
silently cursed my fiiend for not explaining this, the other residents found the whole 
incident hilarious. People walking past would stop, have a laugh and inform me that I 
should have built an overhang. The word spread and residents used to come from 
neighbouring villages just to laugh at the house. Some months later I even met a man in 
a South African casino who had heard the story of my house.
Although the house did little to improve my living standards, the reaction from the 
villagers ‘broke the ice’. People began to accept the fact I was living in the village and 
many took an interest in what I was doing. My disastrous attempts at building a house 
not only made me approachable, but also signified that I was different from the other 
outsiders who visited the village. I had invested in a house and the residents now took 
seriously my intentions to stay in Mavodze for almost a year and a half. This was 
demonstrated when my neighbour walked past my house one afternoon and asked if I 
was going to the village meeting that one of the NGOs had arranged. I said I wasn’t as I 
was still reluctant to associate with any of the development projects working in the area. 
He responded, “Come on. You should come. It concerns you too. You live here as well 
now”.
The house was not only useful in terms of building relationships with the residents, but 
also was ideally situated to observe and research the political life of the village. It was 
constructed in the centre of Mavodze in the space that was usually the exclusive domain 
of the school, administration, public meeting place and other state institutions.^^ It stood 
close to the Frelimo Party Office and only a couple of hundred metres from the 
administration building. This provided an ideal vantage point to observe the comings 
and goings of the village leadership and the visits of other state representatives from the 
district capital or elsewhere. In this way I was able to attend the larger and official
I was able to organise this by promising the house to one o f  the schoolteachers upon my departure.
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Photo 16: My house in Mavodze
Photo 17: With my field assistant in the Olifantes Valley
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public political meetings and also, crucially, note the informal gatherings and passing 
discussions conducted by the different leaders. The questions and interviews that were 
based on these observations provided detailed data on the everyday workings of the 
state and the interactions between the local state officials and their constituents. It was 
only through being able to participate in and observe these political activities taking 
place on my doorstep that I was able to follow the process of appointing a new 
community leader and fully understand how the local representatives of Frelimo were 
able to maintain their domination over much of the political life in the village. Much of 
the information about the political side of village life was gathered through participation 
in formal village meetings and the observation of the unofficial encounters and informal 
discussions of the village leadership. Some other methodologies were employed when 
investigating the residents’ labour migration to South Africa. With the aid of a research 
assistant, life histories of many of the older miners were recorded. Many of these 
interviews began as one-to-one sessions but developed into useful group discussions, as 
other former miners would join and contribute accounts of their experiences to the 
conversation. Investigating the experiences of the current migrants was often more 
problematic, as many of the young men were absent from the village for long periods of 
time. Those who were present were conscious that their migrations were often illegal 
and were suspicious of my questions. Over time I was gradually able to build 
friendships with some of these young men by providing transport for the village football 
team’s away fixtures and by lending out my toolkit that was in high demand for fixing 
motorbikes and bicycles. While the older men reacted favourably to partially- structured 
discussions, I was able to learn more from the younger migrants during informal 
conversations and general ‘banter’.
The activities and presence of the personnel working for the Limpopo National Park 
increased during the 17 months spent conducting fieldwork in Massingir. Due to the 
hostilities felt by the local residents towards the project and the general confusion that 
existed about the future of the villages, I was inundated with peoples’ opinions and 
views about the park wherever I went. On my travels I would also frequently encounter 
the project staff and was able to discuss the progress of the park with them. It became 
increasingly clear that the interests of the local residents were inadequately represented 
in the processes of project design and management. I was invited to attend a number of 
different meetings and workshops as an independent observer. This role allowed me to
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express some of the opinions and concerns of the local residents — though these were 
barely heeded — and also gain a better understanding of the organisation and 
management of the park and the role of the different institutions involved in the project.
It was obvious from my first visit to Massingir that ownership of a vehicle would make 
conducting fieldwork in the area considerably easier and so I purchased a second-hand 
Land Rover pickup truck in South Afiica. As much as possible, I avoided using the 
vehicle in and around the village, partly because of the limited range of the fuel tanks, 
but also because many places were unreachable except on foot, we would meet other 
people while walking and people would often point out items or places of interest along 
the way (see Brody 1981). But when travelling further afield, I often gave people a lift. 
My informants were effectively trapped as they were confined to the cab of the truck for 
long periods of time with an anthropologist asking innumerable questions. Interestingly, 
I had experienced great difficultly in finding out about the events that occurred during 
the civil war. I was reluctant to pursue questions on such a sensitive subject in the 
village, but once in the car people would talk about it for hours. Having experienced this 
transformation several times, I asked one man why this was. He explained that travel 
within Mozambique during the war was extremely dangerous. People would rarely use 
the roads and only if accompanied with a military escort. This contrasts with the ease of 
travelling by car today, thus, my informant told me, car journeys remind people of the 
war.
After three months in the village, and as I began to feel the residents were increasingly 
taking me into their confidence, I employed a research assistant. Fernando was a village 
resident whom I had met in my first week of fieldwork. He had been happy to answer 
my questions and would patiently explain whatever was going on. Over time I had 
become increasingly dependent on him for information and advice and we eventually 
formalised the relationship. Although Fernando assisted with village surveys and 
collecting genealogical data, his main job was to act as an interpreter. I was relatively 
fluent in Portuguese when I arrived in Massingir, having learned the language when 
working in Mozambique in 1997-8 and having undertaken a refresher course in London 
in 2000.1 could therefore work independently with the villagers who spoke Portuguese; 
mainly the village leaders and the large number of men who had served in the army. As 
my Shangaan improved I was able to talk to and understand far more of the residents.
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However, while I could work without the assistance of Fernando if required, my 
proficiency in Shangaan was restricted to general conversation and throughout my time 
in the field I felt more confident working with a translator. This limitation obviously 
shaped my research and my relationships with informants, especially during the early 
stages of fieldwork. Nevertheless, as a consequence of my good working relationship 
with my field assistant and my ever-increasing knowledge of Shangaan, the data I 
collected was accurate, representative and reflected the views and opinions of the 
residents of Mavodze and the surrounding villages.
In the village I carried out most of my research through participant observation and 
informal, open-ended individual and group discussions. I felt awkward attempting to 
use a tape machine to record information, as it appeared to make informants 
uncomfortable, and so I opted to make brief notes during or after conversations which I 
would write up as a field diary at the end of each day. After several months I began 
using a camera as a part of my work. I distributed copies of all the photos taken and was 
subsequently invited to different events and ceremonies to act as photographer.
I also recorded 25 detailed genealogies and undertook a formal survey of 113 of the 166 
village households. By using these more structured techniques I was able to build 
detailed sociological picture of the village. However, in addition to gathering 
quantitative data, the process of conducting household and genealogical surveys 
stimulated conversations with informants of a far broader nature than the specific 
questions that I was asking. For example, when asked questions for the genealogical 
survey my informants would begin talking about their sons who had migrated and were 
working in South Africa. The older men would often compare the situations that their 
sons were facing with their own experiences of migrating to work in the South Afiican 
gold mines. Equally, when agricultural production for the household survey, people 
would be eager to discuss how the creation of the Limpopo National Park would limit 
their access to land in the future or how the animals that had been relocated fi*om South 
Afiica were damaging their crops. In keeping with the arguments I make in this thesis, I 
have not presented the statistical findings of the surveys or provided an analysis of inter­
household differentiation. Instead, I have used much of the ethnographic material 
gathered fi’om the discussions that were taking place while the structured interviews
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were being conducted, as I felt these were the issues that the village residents were most 
concerned about.
I made every attempt to get a pluralist perspective on life in and around Mavodze, but 
the female voice is significant in its absence from this thesis. In part this reflects the 
difficulties in getting access to female informants for the male ethnographer in this area. 
In Mavodze there were very few opportunities when I was able to speak with a woman 
alone. Most would ask that I come back when their husbands or other male relatives 
were present. On such occasions the male relations tended to dominate the conversation. 
This is an important and significant gap in my work. It meant that I was unable to look 
at many of the interesting issues of the household division of labour, the role of women 
in the households of migrant male labourers and issues concerning children and 
childhood. The thesis, then, overridingly represents the male point of view: perhaps not 
entirely inappropriately since it is largely concerned with the experiences of the male 
residents of the borderland.
Finally, throughout this thesis I have changed many of the names of the residents of 
Mavodze. While every effort has been made to maintain ethnographic integrity, this has 
been done in recognition of current tensions and sensitivities that surround the political 
situation in Massingir in terms of the South Afiican border, the creation of the National 
Park and the political changes that are occurring as a result of these. The place names 
have been preserved because the geographic location is important to many of the events 
recounted in the thesis.
Outline of the chapters
The central concern of this thesis is to explore how recent changes to the regional 
political landscape of southern Afiica have affected the lives of the residents of the 
Mozambique-South Afiica borderland. The underlying argument is that the changing 
nature of the different states, in this case mainly the Mozambican state and South 
Afiican state, cannot be considered in isolation; any analysis must be sited within a 
broader regional historical perspective. The end of apartheid in South Africa and the end
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of single-party socialism in Mozambique were not sudden events but gradual processes, 
the affects of which were certainly not constrained to the geographical boundaries of the 
states concerned. This thesis examines three interconnected themes: the historical 
importance and changing characteristics of labour migration from Massingir to South 
Africa; relations between local residents and the state in successive colonial, post­
independence socialist and democratic eras; and the impact on regional inhabitants of 
the recent creation of a transfrontier conservation area.
Chapter 2 examines the matter of labour migration from the villages of southern 
Mozambique to the South African gold mines. As a result of agreements between the 
Portuguese colonial authorities, the South African state and the South African mining 
companies, for over a century hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans have crossed the 
border to work in the mines of the Witwatersrand. In this chapter, using material 
collected from the life histories of former miners, I argue that for the families living in 
the border villages of Massingir this migration has not only been important in economic 
terms, but has also developed into a rite of passage through which adolescent boys 
become socially recognised as men: going to work in the mines was a crucial point of 
individual transition for miners. It was also the means through which new conjugal 
families and households were formed. Thus this rite of passage holds significance for 
the entire village.
In the late 1970s the South Afiican mining industry underwent considerable 
restructuring and one of the effects of this was a drastic reduction in its use of foreign 
labour. Chapter 3 examines why this change occurred, showing that it was partly as a 
result of the global economy but also a response to political changes that were 
happening throughout southern Afiica. The chapter explores the consequences that this 
cutback in mining recruitment had on the villagers of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin: 
historically a source of much of the mining labour. I argue that the changing recruitment 
policies have resulted in a small minority of villagers being able to maintain a role in 
the mining industry. Rather than being short-term unskilled employees such as those 
discussed in Chapter 2, the current miners are trained, experienced and relatively well- 
paid. I argue that these ‘career miners’ are becoming an economic elite, or mining 
aristocracy, in the border villages where I conducted fieldwork. While the minority have 
been able to secure such jobs, the doors of the mining compounds are closed to the vast
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majority of the young men of Massingir. Although the job opportunities no longer exist, 
the social and economic pressures for them to go to South Afiica remain. This new 
generation of migrants is forced to cross into South Afiica illegally to try and find work. 
The route they take leaves them exposed to the dangers of the Kruger National Park and 
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse once they arrive in South Afiica. The changing 
nature of labour migration has resulted in increasing insecurities and tensions in the 
home villages.
Given this dependence on South Afiica the question arises as to why the villagers of this 
borderland assert their Mozambican identity so strongly. In Chapter 4 I examine how 
Frelimo, the nationalist movement that fought against Portuguese colonialism, was able 
to rapidly generate local support in this area immediately after independence. I argue 
that the party was able to build upon this support base by assisting the villagers during 
the war against the South Afiican-backed Renamo. This chapter argues that, in spite of 
Mozambique’s shift to multi-party democracy at the end of the war, Frelimo has 
maintained its domination of local politics in Massingir and, in effect, continues to 
operate as single-party state.
Chapter 5 returns to the development of the Limpopo National Park, with which I began 
this introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated the way in which the system of labour 
migration was initially developed on the basis of cordial relations between Mozambique 
and South Afiica, and then was reshaped in light of how these relations deteriorated 
after Mozambican independence. Following the end of the Mozambican civil war and 
the ousting of the apartheid government in South Afiica, relations between the two 
states have improved. The development of the Limpopo National Park is a sign of this 
new cross-border cooperation. However, just as the use of foreign labour was of interest 
to the gold-mining industry, this chapter argues that the creation of the new park has 
been a result not only of improving bilateral relations between the two states, but also of 
pressure fi"om a variety of other interested groups from both within the region and 
abroad.
One of the stated objectives of the National Park is to benefit the local residents. 
Chapter 5 argues that, far from being of benefit, the development of the park threatens 
the residents’ livelihoods and entire way of life. I argue that the park is not only
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interfering with local agriculture and livestock production, but is also hampering the 
important migration to South Afiica. The park is being publicised as bringing down 
Africa’s borders and fences, but this chapter demonstrates that, although this might be 
the case for animals and rich tourists with their four-by-fours, for the residents of 
Mavodze and the surrounding villages the park is paradoxically strengthening the 
international border and creating a far more difficult barrier through which to pass to 
find work in the neighbouring state. Unsurprisingly the park is far firom popular among 
the people living within its borders. In Chapter 5 I outline some of the measures that the 
residents have adopted as a means of protesting against the development of the park.
In Chapter 6 I consider how this has become a political issue. The party’s supporters in 
the villages of Massingir have regarded Frelimo’s involvement in the creation of the 
park as a betrayal. They were —  coincidentally —  provided with an opportunity to 
express these sentiments by the national government’s creation of new leadership 
positions in rural areas, known as the autoridades comunitarias (community leaders). 
This position was created as a consequence of ongoing debates concerning Frelimo’s 
marginalisation of so-called ‘traditional leaders’ in favour of their modernising party 
system after independence. A decree was passed to facilitate the creation of local rural 
authorities. I argue that in Massingir the election of the candidates for this new position 
had little to do with concepts of modernity or tradition, but reflected the residents’ move 
away from supporting Frelimo and their concerns to have a leader that they felt could 
adequately represent their interests against the growing threat of the Limpopo National 
Park.
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2. Of Mines and Men: Labour migration as a rite of passage 
Introduction
One afternoon in July 2002 most of the residents of Mavodze were gathered under the 
large Amarula tree in the centre of the village. After six months of discussions, 
negotiations and political drama, the village had finally selected the new community 
leader. When the decision was announced an argument broke out between one of the 
unsuccessful candidates and a number of the other men. The former régulo, the chief of 
the village during the Portuguese colonial period, began lambasting the newly appointed 
leader for being a South Afiican and not from this area. Apparently, the new leader’s 
father had been bom on the other side of the border and had only come to Mozambique 
when his grandfather had died in a mining accident and his grandmother had returned to 
her paternal home here in the village. This provoked an uproar among the other men 
gathered around the tree. “Of course Joao [the newly elected leader] is one of us,” one 
man replied, “he is one of us because of his link to South Afiica.” Many of the other 
men agreed, stating that it made no difference that Joao’s father had been bom on the 
other side of the border, his grandparents had gone to South Afiica to work in the gold 
mines and therefore he was one of them. Indeed, they seemed to be suggesting the 
South Afiican link counted positively in his favour. Once the discussion had died down 
and the crowd had dispersed, I asked one of my informants what had been going on. He 
explained.
We are all connected to South Afiica. There is not a man in the village that hasn’t been 
to Joni;^  ^that is what we do. If Joao has connections with South Afiica, he must be one 
of us. That old man [the former chief] doesn’t know what he is talking about. Even he 
worked in the mines when he was younger.
For the last 150 years labour migration has been an important feature of life in the 
southem provinces of Mozambique. Almost every man I spoke to in the villages where I 
was conducting fieldwork had, at some point, worked in neighbouring South Afiica.
Literally referring to Johannesburg, but used locally as a generic term for South Africa.
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Since the 1850s men have been crossing the border, finding employment initially on the 
sugar plantations of Natal and the diamond fields around Kimberly and then, following 
the discovery of gold in the 1880s, in the mines of the Witwatersrand. The profitability 
of the South Afiican gold mining industry depended on the supply of cheap labour from 
neighbouring countries and as a result the mining companies, through their employment 
agencies, actively recruited throughout the region. Hundreds of thousands of 
Mozambicans left their home villages to work in the harsh and dangerous conditions of 
the mines of the Transvaal.
In this chapter I consider the reasons for this migration, showing its basis not only in the 
labour needs of the mining industry as mediated through state agreements, but also in 
the perpetuation of border villages’ marriage and family structures. I examine how the 
South Afiican gold mining industry depended on a ready supply of cheap labour and 
how the mining companies had to recruit labour fi-om across the southem Afiican 
region. In the case of Mozambique, I argue that this labour recmitment cannot be 
understood without exploring the relationships and dependences that existed between 
the Portuguese colonial government and the South Afiican state. Labour recruitment 
was one of the key aspects of the relationship between these two states: I show the role 
that the states’ policies and actions played in the migration of hundred of thousands of 
miners from the rural areas of southem Mozambique, and consider how the process of 
migrating to the gold mines is understood and discussed by the residents of the 
Mozambican border villages that have historically been the source of much of this 
labour. I argue that the process of migration to the gold mines has become incorporated 
into the social and cultural lives of the people of Massingir. For Mozambicans as for 
men firom other parts of South Afiica’s ‘labour reserve’, working in the South Afiican 
mines is understood as a rite of passage and a transition into manhood. Through leaving 
the villages, working in the gold mines, and retuming with the appropriate goods, 
miners have split fi-om their patemal homesteads, established their own homesteads, and 
continued the patrilineal system.
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Labour migration, the Tsonga/Shangaan and anthropology
The experiences of labour migrants and the effect migration had on the societies that 
they left behind have been two of the classic concerns of the anthropological literature 
on Southem Afiica; Mozambique has been no exception. However, it is interesting to 
note that perhaps the most famous ethnographer of the region, the Swiss missionary 
Henri-Alexander Junod, pays only scant attention to the subject. Although he was living 
in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) during the years 1889-95 and 1907-21 and 
witnessed the development of the labour system that recmited the men to work in the 
expanding industrial centres in the South Afiica, Junod barely mentions migrant labour 
in his ethnography (1927[1915]). Nevertheless the historian Patrick Harries argues that 
labour migration was of key concern for Junod: although it is not addressed in detail in 
his work, Junod’s concern about the widespread recmitment of Mozambican labourers 
was the driving motivation for his research (Harries 1981). Junod saw industrialisation 
as a threat to Tsonga rural culture and, as an anthropologist, considered his mission was 
to record these traditional customs and beliefs that he felt were facing extinction. This 
‘salvage anthropology’, Harries argues, dovetailed with the interests of a broader range 
of critics of industrialisation to whom the cormption and squalor associated with the 
mines and urbanisation contrasted with their perception of the natural harmony and 
equilibrium of tribal societies in rural Africa (1994:xii).
In his two-volume monograph The Life o f a South African Tribe (1912; second edition 
1927) Junod meticulously documents the customs and beliefs of the Tsonga/Shangaan. 
His remarkable record describes a homogeneous rural tribe that was politically divided 
into patrilineal clans but united through language and shared customs. For Junod the 
patriarchal family formed the basis of Tsonga social life and their villages were simply 
enlarged families, presided over by a headman. Junod describes these villages as being 
engaged in mainly agricultural and livestock production with very little reference to any 
forms of waged labour.
The patrilineal relations of the Tsonga described by Junod were made famous by the 
debate over the analysis of their joking relationship. The problem was that the 
relationship between a man (ZS) and his mother’s brother (MB) was characterised by
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extraordinary disrespect, yet all other relationships were highly respectful and 
deferential. Junod, influenced by the evolutionist paradigm, explained this by arguing 
that the Tsonga had once been a matrilineal group and therefore the ZS would have 
inherited from the MB. The indulgent relationship was a vestige of this past. Radcliffe- 
Brown rejected this explanation, as there was no proof to substantiate it (1940b). He 
suggested a functionalist explanation, arguing that the MB-ZS relationship should be 
understood in the context of the other social relations. In Tsonga society a man’s 
relationship with his father is characterised by control, while relations with his mother 
are warm and indulgent. The ZS-MB relationship is an extension of the latter. For 
Radcliffe-Brown the joking relationship expresses the ambiguity of people joined by 
one set of ties (marriage) and divided by others (lineage). Like Junod, Radcliffe-Brown 
does not seem to have considered the effects on social structure of wage work.
Although Junod concentrated his research on documenting the customs and traditions of 
the Tsonga and considered migrant labour an inappropriate subject of ethnographic 
investigation, subsequent anthropologists working in the broader region did begin to 
research the experiences of the men that were being recruited to work in the industrial 
complexes of Southem Afiica. These included the scholars at the Rhodes-Livingstone 
Institute (and later the Manchester School) whose research concentrated on the causes 
and effects of migrant labour in rural areas. While Junod regarded industrialisation and 
labour migration as threatening the traditional cultures and social fabric of traditional 
Afiican societies, many of the following generation of anthropologists concluded that 
this was not the case. For example, fi*om his work on the Mambwe people of Northern 
Rhodesia in the 1950s, William Watson argued that the wage labour remittances were 
raising the standards of rural life and labour migration was acting to stabilisé tribal 
society (1958). He argued that the migrants’ wages preserved Mambwe family life and 
reinforced the political authority of the traditional chiefs. Similarly, Van Velsen 
suggests that Tonga migrants retuming to Lake Nyasa were “actively stimulating the 
traditional values of their rural society” (1961:240); thus the overall effect of waged 
labour was to increase the social coherence of the Tonga villages.
The argument that migrant labour had a stabilising influence on rural societies ignores 
the exploitation and suffering that the Afiican workforce had endured. Francis Wilson’s 
powerful critique of the mining industry in the early 1970s demonstrated that while the
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mining companies had earned vast profits, the working conditions for the Africans 
remained atrocious and in real terms the miners were earning less than they had in the 
1880s (1972a). Other historically-informed studies have criticised the accounts of Junod 
and those like Watson and Van Velsen for the timeless image that they present of 
African societies. Colin Murray challenges this entire approach, arguing that migrant 
labour cannot be “regarded as an extraneous or incidental phenomenon whose ‘effects’ 
can be analysed with respect to the integrity or otherwise of a traditional system” 
(1981:173-4). Rather it must be seen as a process of fundamental transformation that 
has been occurring in southem Africa over the last 100 years. Using the example of 
bridewealth in Lesotho {bohali\ Murray argues the continued importance of this 
institution among Basotho migrants must be understood in terms of the relations 
between the migrants and their rural kin: '"Bohali is a mechanism by which migrants 
invest in the long-term security of the rural social system, and by which rural kin 
constitute claims over the absent earners” (1981:148). Thus the importance of 
bridewealth among Basotho migrants should not be conceived as labour migration 
bolstering or destroying traditional society, but as an indicator of the way that the 
economic and social aspects of migrant labour are inextricably connected.
In Mozambique Patrick Harries is also critical of the images of timeless traditional rural 
societies that are presented in the work of scholars such as Junod. He argues that such 
work was instrumental in constmcting an ethnic identity that previously had not existed 
(1989). Harries shows that the Swiss missionaries, including Junod, played a part in 
conceptually amalgamating a diverse variety of groups, speaking a range of dialects, 
into a single ethno-linguistic ‘tribe’ known as the Tsonga or Shangaan. Harries 
demonstrates that Tsonga/Shangaan identity was consolidated and emerged as a new 
culture through the process of men migrating to work in the South African mines. The 
mining system was structured through ethnic segregation and the men from southem 
Mozambique were housed and worked together as Shangaans. In his later monograph, 
Harries shows that, in their encounters with other Africans and Europeans in the mines, 
the Mozambican migrants were exposed to new ideas, beliefs and commodities. These 
new experiences were incorporated into the miners’ lives, reshaping social relations
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when they returned home (1994)/^ This chapter concentrates on how the former miners 
of the border villages of Massingir have experienced the process of migrant labour and 
how they consider going to the mines as essential in the transition from adolescence to 
manhood. Before moving on to discuss how this is expressed through the narratives, 
rituals and everyday social relations in Mavodze and the surrounding villages, I must 
first outline how the systematised recruitment of labour developed and consider the role 
of the South African and Mozambican states in this process.
The South African mining industry and Mozambican migrants
Labour migration has been a feature of life in the rural areas of southem Mozambique 
for over 150 years. In accounting for its origins and perpetuation, the classic economic 
‘push’ factors have certainly played some part. The region has low and erratic rainfall, a 
lack of ground water in the interior, and suffers from frequent droughts. This lack of 
water makes cultivation difficult and the presence of tsetse fly (until recently) limited 
the potential for livestock production. In the early 19*^  century constrained agricultural 
production was further dismpted by repeated Nguni incursions and by the 1820s 
southem Mozambicans were switching to migrant labour in order to support their 
families (Young 1977). The Portuguese colonial regime consolidated its control of the 
southem provinces by the late 1890s and began to accumulate considerable revenues 
from the labour migrations. As it became an increasingly important source of funds the 
colonial state introduced more coercive ‘push factors’, such as forced labour and hut 
taxes, to maintain the flow of migrant workers. This is discussed in more detail below.
South Africa was the obvious destination for the Mozambican migrants. At this time the 
South African plantations in the Cape and Natal suffered perennial shortages of 
agricultural labour. While African labour migration went some way to meet this
Similarly, Isak Niehaus demonstrates how Shangaan ethnicity in the South African lowveld has been 
reconfigured and has assimilated some o f the characteristics o f neighbouring groups, especially the 
Basotho (2002). However, Niehaus’ analysis only applies to the South African Shangaan. He makes no 
mention o f the far larger population living in Mozambique and, as was made clear in the introduction, I 
am wary o f applying a single analysis to populations on both sides o f the border because it would fail to 
take into account their contrasting historical contexts.
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demand, it was only through importing labourers from the Indian sub-continent that the 
labour shortage in the agricultural sector was alleviated (Wilson 1972b: 1). However, 
this was to prove to be a temporary solution, as the demand for labour in South Africa 
increased dramatically with the discovery of diamonds at Hopetown in 1866. By 1874 
over 10,000 black workers were employed in the diamond mining industry (Wilson 
1972b:2). While a limited number of Mozambican labourers were employed in the 
diamond and agricultural sectors (see First 1977; Katzenellenbogen 1982), the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 was to change the region forever. 
Demand for labour soared; within 13 years over 100,000 black workers were employed 
in the gold-mining industry (Wilson 1972b:3) and the mining companies were forced to 
recruit from across southem Africa.
The major gold deposits in South Africa are of low-grade ore found in narrow, heavily 
faulted reefs that extend to considerable depths. Extraction requires either 
mechanisation or the use of a labour-intensive mining system. When the deposits were 
discovered the gold price was fixed and the cost of imported machinery was out of the 
mining companies’ control, so labour costs were the only means of influencing 
profitability; the mining companies, therefore, decided upon a labour-intensive, rather 
than a capital-intensive, system. The companies realised that only through mutual 
cooperation could they keep the labour costs to a minimum, and therefore, in an attempt 
to centralise labour recmitment, they came together to form the Witwatersrand Chamber 
of Mines in 1889. The mining companies and the Mozambican government were 
interested in exploiting, expanding and regulating the existing movement of workers 
from Mozambique to South Africa. The Chamber of Mines did not want a free labour 
market to push up the cost of labour and the Mozambican government saw labour 
exportation as a means of increasing revenue. In 1896 an official agreement was signed 
between Mozambique and the Chamber of Mines giving the Rand Native Labour 
Association, later the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela^®), the 
monopoly over labour recmitment throughout the southem provinces of Mozambique.
For a detailed account o f the early history o f labour migration to South Africa in general see van Der 
Horst (1942), for the Mozambique-South Africa migrations in particular see Harries (1994),
Like Katzenellenbogen, I refer to Wenela rather than WNLA or WENELA when discussing the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association to “convey some measure o f the extent to which the 
Association has become more than just an impersonal organisation ... [and has] acquired a personality o f
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Controlling the system of labour recruitment was not only a priority of the mining 
companies. It was also of fundamental importance to the Mozambican and South 
African governments. The gold-mining industry has dominated the South Afiican 
economy for the last 100 years, providing the country’s principal source of foreign 
exchange and vast amounts of revenue through taxation (Jeeves 1985:3). The 
profitability of the mining companies has, therefore, been of interest to the state in terms 
of revenue, but also, as the apartheid system of government became more entrenched, 
the continued externalisation of labour became a key political concern. The South 
Afiican economy remained heavily dependent on mineral extraction and the 
government feared that the unionisation of the workforce in this crucial sector could 
threaten the apartheid system. This could not occur if the majority of the labour force 
originated outside South Afiica and was employed on only temporary contracts. If there 
were any serious problems a foreign labour force could simply be repatriated.
Equally, the system also benefited the Portuguese government in Mozambique. Through 
a system of deferred pay, the Mozambican state was able to generate important revenues 
fi-om the migrating miners. The miner’s salaries were paid in gold to the Portuguese 
government. This gold was sold on their behalf by the South Afiican government, 
fetching the open market price. The miners themselves received their salaries in escudos 
calculated at a fixed official rate of exchange. The difference between this fixed rate and 
the gold price on the free market represented a considerable profit for the Mozambican 
government. The Portuguese state also benefited fi-om this transaction. The miners only 
received 60% of their first six months’ salary while they were in South Afiica (First 
1983:25), while the remainder of the wages were paid through the Wenela offices when 
the miner returned to Mozambique. The miner received no interest on this sum that had 
been held in trust. The accumulation of hundreds of thousands of salaries provided a 
large interest-free credit to the Portuguese colonial state. The system of deferred 
payments also ensured that the miners spent the majority of their wages in
its own.” (1982:7) ‘Wenela’ is also used in the Association’s own literature and the term is commonplace 
throughout Mozambique.
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Mozambique, usually in Portuguese-owned trading posts/^ Thus, the colonial state 
derived funds from the miners’ salaries through three different methods.
In addition to these revenues, the Portuguese were also able to benefit from the profits 
generated by the South African traffic moving through the port of Lourenço Marques. 
The port was the closest seaport to the South African industrial heartland of the 
Transvaal. The South African state needed access to the port in order to trade and the 
Portuguese were able to tax this freight as it was moved through their territory.
In 1909 and 1928 relations between the South African and Mozambican states were 
formalised by conventions agreeing that economic relations between the two countries 
were to be based upon the exchange of mineworkers, railway traffic quotas and 
favourable customs duties. The Portuguese allowed an annual recruitment of 100,000 
labourers from southem Mozambique, the system of deferred pay remained in place, 
and the port at Lourenço Marques was guaranteed between 50-55% of all competitive 
zone traffic.^^ The ‘Mozambique Convention’, as it became known, remained in place 
for 35 years and its principles continued to be the basis of economic relations between 
the two countries until Mozambique gained independence in 1975. Mozambique and 
South Africa were dependent upon each other’s resources and, as Wilson noted in 1972, 
“there is a close symbiotic relationship between the two [states] so that any attempt by 
either side to break the economic ties.. .would be disadvantageous to both” (1972b:l 12).
This cooperation between the two states resulted in hundreds of thousands of 
Mozambicans leaving their homes to work in the South African gold-mining industry. 
While generations of Mozambican men have flocked to the gold mines, the 
opportunities for this legal migration have been dramatically reduced following changes 
made to the mining industry during late 1970s and 1980s (see table 1). Although 
Mozambicans are still employed as miners, the experiences of many of the younger
Although the system o f deferred pay was an attempt by the Portuguese state to ensure that returnees 
would purchase consumer goods in Mozambique, there was a broader range o f items on offer in South 
Africa and these were considerably cheaper than those on sale in Mozambique. As a result migrant 
labourers preferred to purchase as many consumer items as possible in South Africa and would use the 
deferred pay for the purchase o f other goods such as food and cattle. This continues today, as many goods 
are still cheaper to buy in South Africa than in Mozambique.
For further details see Katzenellenbogen (1982:144-156).
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generation of migrants differ considerably from those of their fathers. I discuss the 
experiences of this younger generation as they attempt to find work in the mines and 
elsewhere in Chapter 3. In this chapter I concentrate on the experiences of the retired 
miners that live in the border villages of the district of Massingir.
Table 1. Number of Mozambicans at work in South African gold mines, Selected 
Years 1903-1975
Year Number % of total black workforce
1903 49,470 73
1920 90,792 43
1936 88,404 28
1945 78,806 24
1956 102,900 30
1961 100,200 24
1970 93,203 25
1975 102,470 29
Sources: Katzenellenbogen (1982:159); Webster (1978:165); Isaacman & Isaacman (1983:33).
The miners’ tales
As a young man, Ernesto Nkuna was one of the many who made the journey from 
Massingir to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. He now lives with his son at the far 
end of bairro three in the village of Mavodze. In the afternoons he usually sits with 
some of the other old men drinking beer in the shade of the large tree in his son’s 
courtyard. Ernesto was bom in the Olifantes Valley during the colonial era before the 
constmction of the village that exists today. He laughed when I asked him his age and 
said that he had absolutely no idea. However, after a lengthy discussion with his fiiends 
Ernesto estimated that he was between 55 and 60 years old. Ernesto explained that he 
had been living in his father’s homestead in the valley when he first left to work in the 
Transvaal. “I was still a kid when I first went to he said, “but in those days all the
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boys went to work in the mines. It was before I was married and in the time of the 
Portuguese. We had to pay their taxes or they would force you to work in their fields. 
One time I could not go back to the mine because my father was sick. The Portuguese 
came and said that I would have to do chibalo (forced labour). It was terrible because 
they beat us and paid us virtually nothing. It was much better working for the English in 
South Afiica.”
When his father said he was old enough, Ernesto had gone to the Wenela recruitment 
office in the valley and had asked for a job. “The office is still there,” he said “but it is 
now a ruin.”
It was closed when the dam flooded the valley and now the bush has come back and 
covered it. When I was young it was very busy; people would come from all over the 
district to get a job. Wenela sent a group of us to Lourenço Marques where we caught a 
train to Komatipoort and they sent us to a mine near Johannesburg. On other occasions 
we could go straight through Pafuri and get to the mines without having to go through 
Komatipoort; that route was much quicker.
Ernesto was initially part of a drilling team but later took a more highly-skilled job after 
training as a winch operator at one of the deep mines on the reef. “Working 
underground was hard and very dangerous,” he said. “There were many accidents and 
sometimes people got hurt or killed. In the lower levels of the mine there were strange 
noises and it got very hot. At the end of the shift we were all tired and would go back to 
the compound to sleep. We did not have to cook because they had big kitchens that 
would give us food; this food was great and on Sundays they even gave us drinks.” One 
of the other men sitting with Ernesto nodded in agreement and began reciting the entire 
weekly menu that he been served at the last mine in which he had worked, some thirty 
years earlier.
The mining contracts were usually for 12 months and on completion each miner was 
issued with a ‘bonus card’. This card guaranteed the miner a new contract if he returned 
to the mine within 40 days of leaving. Ernesto said that he received a part of his salary 
in South Afiica and the remainder he collected at the Wenela office on his return to 
Mozambique. “With my money I bought some clothes and food in South Afiica and had
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to pay taxes to the régulo (colonial chief), but I kept most of the money to buy cattle. 
When I was younger I had worked as a pasture boy and had been given some animals as 
payment for this work, but I did not have enough cattle to get married. I used my money 
from the mines to buy cattle and pay the lobolo (bridewealth) to my wife’s father. I had 
to pay 15 head of cattle. After I was married I had to go back to Joni so I could get more 
animals, move out of my father’s house and build my own homestead.”
Ernesto served nine contracts in total at seven different mines. These contracts had not 
been served consecutively as Ernesto had returned to Mavodze for periods of up to four 
years in between jobs. He explained that he had worked in South Africa when he needed 
money. “When I had saved money,” Ernesto told me, “I would spend time here. I am a 
farmer and I made my fields and lived with my family. If there was no rain or I needed 
money, then I went to Wenela and they organised work in the mines.” He stopped 
migrating in the early 1970s because a Portuguese company began recruiting workers to 
construct a dam on a nearby river. With forced labour regimes a thing of the past, the 
logic of comparison had now switched, working in favour of local employment. “It was 
much better working on the dam,” he said, “They paid us money and we could live near 
our families. The work was hard but it was much better than the mines.”
Ernesto’s story was typical of the life histories that I collected from the older men in 
Mavodze. Almost every man whom I met in the village had gone to work in the mines. 
Of the 113 households that I surveyed, each had either at least one male member 
working in South Africa, or one who had worked there and had since returned. The 
accounts of the other older men were similar to Ernesto’s: all were recruited by Wenela 
and worked in the gold mines; most said that their motivation for migrating was to earn 
money and avoid the Portuguese system of forced labour; all said that they first went as 
‘boys’ before they were married; most men would spend their earnings on cattle for 
marriage; all would talk about how tough the work was; most, having got married, 
returned to the mines and earned more money with which to establish an independent 
homestead; and all returned home to raise cattle and farm.
Despite the favourable comparisons with local labour that had originally driven 
Mozambicans to the mines, the working conditions there were far from appealing. 
Workers would spend long periods of time, often over 12 months at a stretch, away
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from home. Mining was hard physical labour in the most uncomfortable of 
environments: deep underground digging in cramped, hot and poorly lit shafts. There 
were the constant dangers of rockslides, explosions, flooding or tunnel collapses. 
Dunbar Moodie describes working underground as an experience of danger and fear that 
gave rise to a culture in the mining compounds dominated by this fear and a sense of 
pride. He cites a Sotho miner who said, “Working in the mines is an agonising painful 
experience ... [it] is an extremely dangerous place.” (1983:180) Accidents were so 
frequent that Moodie commented that every miner he had spoken with could recount 
stories of injuries and near-accidents (1983; see also First 1983). This was certainly the 
case for the former miners who had returned to Mavodze. It was a popular pastime for a 
group of men to sit around the fire attempting to out-do each other with tales of 
increasingly more gruesome accidents that they had witnessed during their times in the 
mines. The details of these stories were often wildly exaggerated, but this did not 
diminish the message underlying the narratives. A former lift-operator frequently told 
one ghastly anecdote. He had worked at the controls of one of the lifts in a deep mine. 
At the end of each shift he would stop the lift at each level to bring the workers up to 
the surface. A bell would ring to warn the miners that the lift was about to move. At the 
end of one shift some men were still crowding into the lift after the warning bell had 
rung. Working on the surface, the operator had no way of knowing if the men were all 
onboard. On this occasion, when he brought the lift to ground level one of the miners 
had become stuck between the lift cage and the shaft and his right arm had been tom 
off.
Given that the mines were such terrifying environments in which to work, one might 
wonder, why so many people migrated to find employment in the Transvaal. In 
discussing the economics of migrant labour a number of classic anthropological studies 
of areas from which the mining industry recmits workers have shown that the export of 
labour was enabling rural communities to feed a larger population and maintain a higher 
standard of living than would have been otherwise possible. For example Gluckman 
writes, “Many Lozi and other Barotse have to go out to work in white country for their 
money income. [The] lack of export crops and commodities and high rates of 
transport.. .make this essential” (1941:113). In Botswana, Schapera also attributes 
economic necessity as the underlying cause of labour migration to the gold mines 
(1947). However, with regard to Mozambique, Wilson states, “the situation is not quite
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so straightforward” (1972a:128); it was not clear whether the 100,000 workers annually 
recruited by Wenela came forward because the economic opportunities were better in 
the gold mines or because the Portuguese labour policy forced them to leave their 
homes.
The poorly developed capitalist sector in Mozambique was unable to compete with its 
regional neighbours and, unable to attract workers, had to resort to coercive recruitment 
polices (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:34). The Portuguese colonial government’s native 
labour code of 1899 provided the legal framework for a system of forced labour, known 
as chibalo, that continued to operate in Mozambique in various guises until 1975.^  ^
Chibalo required six months of labour from every able-bodied African man.^ "^  Chibalo 
labourers were required for work in agricultural plantations, on road-building schemes, 
in public building construction, in laying and repairing railroads, in the ports, as 
domestic servants or for any other public or private tasks (Hanlon 1990:18-19). The 
working conditions were brutal. Labourers were not entitled to food or lodging, could 
be subjected to repeated beatings, and received little or no renumeration (Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983:34). Those who refused to work were whipped and beaten, and those 
who fled did so at the risk of having their wives and daughters taken hostage and 
sexually abused (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:42).
With such conditions it is little wonder that the men like Ernesto Nkuna sought to avoid 
forced labour and opted instead to work in the gold mines. While the chibalo system 
certainly increased the numbers migrating, it is also important not to underplay the 
economic advantages of working in South Africa. Marvin Harris notes that a man could 
earn more than twice as much working in the gold mines than he could in Mozambique 
(1959; see also Rita-Ferreira 1960). The relatively poor opportunities for agricultural 
production, discussed above, made the remittances from labour migration important to 
the livelihood strategies of southem Mozambican households. Thus, like elsewhere in 
the region, men migrated to the gold mines for the better economic opportunities that 
South Africa had to offer. Unlike elsewhere in the region these migrations were
C h i b a l o  was officially abolished in 1961 when Portugal joined the ILO, but in practice forced labour 
continued in Mozambique until Independence in 1975 (First 1983:xxvii)
Women were legally exençt from c h i b a l o ,  although in practice many were forced to work as well 
(Ross 1925:40).
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systematically encouraged and sustained by the deplorable labour policies of the 
Portuguese colonial state. The economic rationale for Mozambicans leaving for the gold 
mines is undoubtedly important but at the same time one cannot ignore the role which 
inter-state relations^^ have played in shaping the system of migrant labour in the 
southem Afiican region.
While the broader stmctural reasons for the migration to the gold mines could be 
glossed in terms of what used to be called ‘push and pull factors’, if we return to the 
story of Ernesto we can also begin to understand how labour migration has become 
integrated into the social and cultural life of the rural communities from which the 
migrants come. The former miners repeatedly referred to themselves as ‘boys’ or ‘kids’ 
when they first leave for South Afiica. These ‘boys’ signed up at the Wenela 
recruitment centre and departed to serve their contracts in the mines. Having endured 
and survived the dangers in South Afiica, they returned as men and with their earnings 
were able to purchase cattle with which to get married. In the cases of the majority of 
the miners whom I spoke to, they would return to serve several more contracts and use 
their earnings to purchase more cattle, consumer goods, tools and building materials 
with which to establish their own homesteads, independent of their fathers. This pattern 
has been repeated by generations of Shangaan from Massingir: not only had Ernesto’s 
son been a gold miner but his father had spent time in the mines, as had his father before 
him. It is more than likely Ernesto’s great-grandfather had also migrated to work in 
South Afiica.^^ As generations of males left Mozambique as ‘boys’ and returned to 
establish their own households, the migration across the border has come to signify — 
or achieve — the transition from adolescence to manhood.
There is a danger in this reproduction-centred analysis to treat the state and the mining capital in an 
undifferentiated and functionalist manner, thus underplaying the divisions between the different groups 
(James 1992:11; see also Burawoy 1976). While I am aware o f the conflicts and differences that existed 
between the Mozambican and South African states, and between both o f these and the various mining 
corrqjanies as well as the plantation-owners, my informants in the villages o f Massingir saw them as 
undivided and monolithic. The state and mining conq>anies were institutionally intertwined at every stage 
of the miners’ migration to South Africa: from the motivation for migrating, the means o f recruitment and 
their experiences in the mines, how they received their wages, to how they returned home. For the miners 
of Massingir, the state and the mining conqjanies were so closely coimected that the two would often be 
discussed as one entity.
Similarly, Ruth First notes that many o f die miners she interviews come from families that have a 
history o f supplying labour to the South Afiican gold mining industry (1983:86-107).
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This pattern repeats one that has become familiar in other parts of South and southem 
Africa. David Coplan, for example, demonstrates its significance in the case of men 
from Lesotho (1994). In an analysis of the practices of the Xhosa of the Eastern Cape, 
Patrick McAllister (1980) demonstrates that the rituals and symbolic actions associated 
with migrant labour conform to Van Gennep’s rites of passage (1960 [1909]). 
McAllister argues that the Xhosa he was studying were inherently conservative and that 
the only way in which they could come to terms with the effects of migration was to 
ritualise it. Analysing the rituals in terms of Van Gennep’s model of separation, 
transition and incorporation, he argues that through these rituals the Xhosa are able to 
protect their culture from new values or ideas that may have threatened the home 
stmcture and ideology. Thus, the ritualisation of migration mitigates it as an outside 
threat and ultimately reinforces Xhosa conservatism. In the next section of this chapter 1 
suggest that McAllister’s use of Van Gennep’s model may provide a useful way to look 
at the migrations from Mozambique to South Afiica.^^ In doing this, 1 am more 
interested in the phases of separation and reintegration than in that of liminality, as my 
research concentrated on the rural communities that supply the migrant labour rather 
than directly examining miners’ lives. 1 argue that at one level the rites associated with 
departure from Massingir are, like those of McAllister’s Xhosa, concerned with 
conforming to and sustaining the dominant patriarchal social order of the home 
community. However, this is not the primary focus of the migrant on his return. Instead, 
the actions and practices of reintegration emphasise the dependent relationships between 
the migrating men and women who have remained at home, and their mutual obsession 
with material goods.
Leaving for the mines: ritual farewells
The first time that 1 heard about the various rites associated with people’s trips across 
the border was while trying to establish the use of a small hut that stood in the comer of 
one informant’s household. Standing about three feet high, it was clearly too small for
In this chapter I distance myself from Van Gennep by discussing rites and rituals in a far more secular 
manner than that implied in his classic text.
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habitation by either humans or other livestock. Was it to house chickens, I wondered? 
My informant, Jaime, laughed, saying that nobody would be so stupid as to build such a 
house for chickens, they can sleep in the trees. No, this was an Ndumba house. An 
Ndumba house is the site where families can consult their ancestors. Jaime explained 
that a family would construct an Ndumba house when the male head of the household 
died. If a family member wishes to consult this dead relative about an issue, he would 
make an offering of food, drink or tobacco, place it within the Ndumba house and ask 
for their ancestor’s help. Ndumba houses should be full-size huts, but Jaime had not had 
enough time or money to build one; this was a temporary measure. Although men were 
permitted to sleep in the hut, there are strict rules that prohibit women from doing so, 
although they could enter to make an offering. I asked Jaime what sort of things people 
consulted their ancestors about. He gave the following examples:
When a boy decides that it is time to go to South Africa he will go hunting. He will kill an 
animal and keep some of the meat. He will then go and buy some escalabisha [beer] and 
some of the tobacco that his father used to smoke. He will take this meat, drink and 
tobacco into the Ndumba house and put the meat and tobacco on the ground. He will pour 
the escalabisha onto the ground around the offerings. He will say, “Father, it is time for 
me to go to Joni. I am going to find work.” He will ask his father for good health, a safe 
journey and to watch him while he works underground. The boy may sleep in the 
Ndumba house on the night before he starts his journey. If he does this then he will not 
get harmed when he goes to South Africa.
It is the same after a marriage, a girl will take her new husband to her father’s Ndumba 
house. They will offer drinks and she will present her husband. She will tell her father 
that she is going to leave his household and go and live with her husband’s family. She 
will ask for good health. They will leave and go to her husband’s house.
The first example used by Jaime in attempting to explain the Ndumba house was that of 
a young man going to South Africa. I subsequently discovered that people would 
contact their ancestors via the Ndumba house for any number of reasons, such as 
whether to sell a cow or not, when to start planting seeds, or asking for more rain. It is 
not inconsequential, however, that Jaime chose to emphasise the story of the young man 
going to the mines. I consistently found that people would use South Africa as a 
medium of explanation for a myriad of topics, both in response to my own questions
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and when explaining something to someone else. Men would start an explanatory 
sentence with “When I was working in South Africa ...” or when talking to young boys, 
a person would begin “When you go to work in South Africa ...” Labour migration to 
the gold mines is embedded in all aspects of peoples’ lives.
The juxtaposition between the male and female in Jaime’s explanation is also 
interesting. He immediately follows the example of the young man wishing to leave his 
father’s homestead to seek work in South Africa, with that of a recently married young 
girl wanting to leave her paternal household to reside with her new husband. Marriage is 
seen as the means by which a girl becomes a woman and, in Massingir, travelling to 
South Africa in search of labour is the process by which a boy becomes a man. By using 
both in his explanation, Jaime is implying that, just as every woman is expected to 
marry, every young man will to go to the gold mines. And the two are connected, as I 
will show further on.
The Ndumba house was not the only site where migrants would make pre-departure 
offerings to the ancestral spirits. I returned to Ernesto Nkuna’s house and relayed 
Jaime’s story, Ernesto nodded and confirmed that he had made, not only an Ndumba 
offering, but also a second offering at a Leadwood tree. This tree was in the valley and 
is now covered by the dammed Olifantes River, but before the building of the dam the 
tree had stood on the route to the Transvaal. Ernesto explained that miners and other 
labour migrants would leave an offering of tobacco at the base of the tree and ask the 
ancestors to grant them a safe journey and to ensure that they would return home safely. 
On their way back from South Africa the migrants would return to the same tree and 
leave a small deposit of money to offer thanks for the ancestors’ protection while they 
were away. Ernesto described how the ground around the tree gleamed as the sun 
reflected off the coins that previous returnees had left. “Nobody would take any 
money,” he said, “Nobody would touch it, they knew that that money was for our 
ancestors. That money was to protect us.”
I suggest that these different offerings that the departing miners made to the ancestors 
can be understood in terms of the pre-liminal phase of a rite of passage. Indeed, Van 
Gennep notes similar departure rituals being performed in a number of societies as far 
apart as Nepal and South America (1960 [1909]: 15-25). These pre-liminal rites allowed
75
a more gradual progression into the liminal phase of Van Gennep’s schema, which in 
this case can be equated to the period spent working underground and living in the 
mining compounds. Returned miners would often talk about their experiences in South 
Afiica, highlighting the hardships and dangers that the miners experienced 
underground. Men would recount gruesome injuries, like the one mentioned earlier, 
occasions when tunnels collapsed or flooded, explosions that had occurred 
underground, or people they knew who had died. When I began discussing life on the 
mines on a one-to-one basis, the stories lost much of the bravado and heroism they’d 
had when told in a group context, instead exposing the extremely harsh physical nature 
of the work. The miners worked 10-hour shifts, six days a week, often in shafts no more 
than a metre high, lying on their backs to drill at the rock face. The environment was 
hot, deafeningly noisy and thick with dust. Heavy loads and equipment had to be carried 
and there was a constant fear of rock falls or explosions. “Working in the mines,” one of 
my informants surmised, “is tough. It is a hard, hard life. Mining is not work for boys, it 
makes you a man.”
We can see that once again my informant was emphasising that dangerous mine labour 
was a part of the transition from adolescence into manhood. If we look again at the rites 
carried out by the migrants before they left Mozambique, we can see that these pre­
departure rituals served as insurance policies against the dangers that the miners would 
face in South Africa. They offered libations and tobacco to the ancestral spirits and in 
return received protection during their time away. While this was one way in which men 
talk about these offerings, I suggest in consulting the ancestral spirits, giving them food, 
drink and tobacco, and then sleeping in the sacred Ndumba house, a young man was 
concerned with more than simply protection. By carrying out these rituals he was 
reinforcing the social fabric of the community and was placating the dominant 
patriarchal social order. The offerings were made to the migrant’s father (if not alive) 
and/or his patrilineage (if he was). In doing the rituals associated with departure, the 
young man demonstrated that, although he was departing for the mines, he remained 
committed to his home, his family and the traditions of his home society. Much like the 
example of the Xhosa in South Africa, the rituals of farewell that were made by the 
migrating men in Massingir also endorsed the kind of conservatism that McAllister 
spoke of.
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The analysis of labour migration to South Africa as a rite of passage is my own, as the 
residents of Massingir did not discuss the issues in these terms. However, while there 
was no explicit comparison, the two concepts were certainly connected, for whenever 
my informants discussed more typical male rites of passage it was always in relation to 
migration or South Africa. For example on one occasion, I was listening to a radio 
station that was being broadcast from South Africa with a group of men. One of the 
stories making the news headlines was that five young men had died on the side of a 
mountain near Johannesburg. They had been attending a ‘traditional’ initiation school, 
which according to the news report, taught young men about their culture and traditions 
and would perform the ‘traditional’ circumcise operation. On completion of the various 
rituals, the initiates would return to their home communities as men. The five teenagers 
had died from pneumonia and septic wounds caused by beatings and circumcision. One 
of my companions shook his head in disgust, commenting, “We used to have the same 
thing here but it was stopped many years ago.” None of those gathered, all aged 
between 30 and 40, had been through such an initiation, but they all said that their 
fathers and grandfathers would have had to. My friends were somewhat hazy about the 
details but insisted that young men had to go into the bush for a number of weeks, 
during which time their manhood was tested by having to live off the land and cope 
with wild animals. The young men would be circumcised and would return to the 
community as ‘real’ men. “That was a long time ago,” one man told me, “we do not do 
it here anymore. Some of us go through such a ceremony when we go to South Afiica, 
but most of us choose not to.”
Good goods: relations of return
While I argue that the rituals associated with departure in Massingir expressed a 
concern with sustaining the social order of the home community, those associated with 
return suggested rupture and fission. It is this phase of ‘reintegration’ on which I now
A female initiation rite, known as v i k h o b a ,  continues to be observed in Massingir, although I was never 
able to discover all that much about it. My male informants said the details o f this were a secret that the 
women keep to themselves. The most I was able to learn was that the initiation took place in the evenings 
of May and June, when the young women go to the house o f one o f the older women and they are taught 
to dance, housework and “all the other things that make them good wives!”
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want to focus. The array of consumer goods which returning miners brought home form 
a dominant theme in the narratives associated with labour migration. On their return 
from South Africa miners were far less concerned with sustaining existing social 
relations with their lineages, rather they concentrated their efforts in establishing and 
cementing new relationships. The consumer goods with which they returned were 
crucial to these efforts.
McAllister describes two Xhosa rites of return, both of which centre on the alcohol that 
a migrant is expected to bring back (1980). The first is the formal presentation of bottles 
of liquor by the migrant to specific individuals followed by a series of speeches, 
welcomes and thanks. There may be more than thirty adults at such affairs and the 
festivities can go on for up to three days (1980:220-225). The second ritual described by 
McAllister is the Umsindleko beer drink. This is a much larger ceremony involving 
members of the whole community. Quantities of beer are brewed and elders, 
representatives of the returnee’s lineage and of the wider community give a series of 
speeches (1980:225-234). Through these ceremonies the returning Xhosa migrant is 
publicly reaffirming his commitment to his household and the values of the society. In 
this way the rituals of return are as concerned as those of separation with conservatism 
and the patriarchal order.
This contrasts with the situation in Massingir in significant ways. While there is a 
similar tendency to come home with at least one bottle of liquor, the consumption of 
this alcohol is an altogether private affair. I attended one such occasion, by accident, on 
my way back from trudging around one informant’s maize fields. It was a hot day and 
my water supplies had run out. I collapsed in Trazente Chauque’s compound 
desperately dehydrated and asked for some water. Unfortunately, Chauque did not have 
any water but smiled and, to my horror, handed me a mug filled to the brim with a vile 
cocktail of brandy, gin and red wine. Although this was the last thing that I wanted to 
drink, Chauque was celebrating the return of his son and I was obliged to join in.
Chauque explained that this was a custom that had been carried out by men returning 
from the gold mines. He told me that when he was a miner he had always brought 
several bottles of liquor back from Joni. He would make a small offering to the 
ancestral spirits, as is the custom when drinking any alcohol, and would share the rest
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with his father and brothers. Chauque’s son, who was immaculately dressed in newly 
pressed trousers, a football shirt, a new baseball cap and gleaming white trainers, had 
just returned from South Africa and the custom was being repeated. During my time in 
Mavodze I was able to witness two more similarly private events. On each occasion the 
head of household explained to me that had been the custom of returning miners, and 
the new migrants of today were expected to continue the tradition.
This small private libation and the offering of money at the Leadwood tree, mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, can be considered rites of return. However, these were very much 
token gestures and it was the public consumption of other goods that formed the most 
important part of a returnee’s homecoming. McAllister dismisses the items such as 
“foodstuffs, clothes etc.” that the returnee brings home as having little significance for 
the Xhosa (1980:241). In Mavodze, however, it was the consumption and distribution of 
these “other items” that was important. This was clearly illustrated to me, through the 
characteristically dramatised and compacted mode of ritual, during a spirit possession 
ceremony that I attended.
I had been invited to the ceremony by a neighbour and watched the proceedings with 
him and his family. Shortly after we had all arrived three women began drumming. 
Another woman emerged from a nearby Ndumba hut, walked briskly into the central 
circle and sat down on the mat. She removed her headscarf and at once began to tremble 
and enter into a state of trance. The three female drummers changed their rhythm and a 
spirit was summoned. This spirit was a local man, Masacane Valoi. He was very angry 
with the women and rearranged himself to face the men, turning his back on the group 
of women. He called to the young boys, some of whom were watching; others who had 
been distracted were playing under a nearby tree. The boys came over and sat in a 
huddle in front of the spirit. The spirit sent the young girls out of the compound. He put 
on a smart green fioral-pattemed shirt and a cap emblazoned with the name ‘Orlando 
Pirates’ —  one of South Afiica’s two most popular football teams. The spirit shook 
hands with all of the boys and began to tell a story:
I lived in this area when I was young. My father had many cattle in his corral and it was 
my job to tend to his animals. I would take the cattle to grazing areas and to the rivers and 
pools so they could drink. My fnends also had to look after their fathers’ cattle and we
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would go together. We would catch fish in the river and make traps for animals. We 
would cook this food on a fire. Those were good times. When I got older I saw one girl 
who was fetching water fi*om the river. I liked her and we went into the bush together. 
She told me that I had to go to Joni and work underground so that I could earn money to 
marry her. I went to Joni and worked for a long time and saved my money. I came back 
and I married the girl. She then said that I had to go back and earn money to buy her 
things. I went back to the mine and worked hard. In South Afiica I bought her a pot and 
came back home. She did not like the pot I had bought her and she cried and shouted. In 
the middle of the night she woke up, stabbed me with a knife and killed me.
The spirit finished his story and told the young boys “when you go to work in the gold 
mines, remember me and I will look after you.” He then looked at me and told the boys 
that he was afi*aid: my presence there reminded him of the white men who’d been in 
charge of the mine in which he used to work. The possessed woman started to tremble 
and the spirit left her. The drummers slowed their tempo and the other women began to 
sing. The ceremony continued into the evening, with several other women becoming 
possessed. However, my analysis will concentrate on the spirit of the murdered miner.
The narrative that the spirit directed towards the young boys demonstrates the idealised 
pattern of male development: young boys spend their prepubescent years herding their 
father’s cattle; after adolescence they travel to South Afiica to work in the gold mines; 
returning home with their earnings, the boys marry; they return to the mines to earn 
more money with which to set up their own, independent household; and now at home 
they will live off agriculture and livestock production. However, there is more to what 
the spirit said than teaching the young boys that it was expected that they would, like 
their fathers and grandfathers before them, go and work in the gold mines of the 
Transvaal. A part of what drove the murdered miner back to the mines was the need to 
satisfy his wife’s desire for material goods. He was killed because the goods he had 
returned with failed to satisfy his wife’s expectations. This spirit possession is indicative 
of the way that the accumulation of material goods has become embedded in the 
miners’, and former miners’, narratives of kinship, work and marriage.
In his ethnographic study of the neighbouring Gwambe people in the 1940s, Fuller 
attributes numerous changes in patterns of consumption to the male exodus to South
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Africa (1955): there was an increasing use of furniture such as tables, chairs and 
cupboards that men were bringing back at the end of their contracts (p. 163); people 
acquired the habits of drinking tea, coffee or cocoa and using sugar and condensed milk, 
having been exposed to these new commodities in the mine compounds (p.233); leisure 
time was spent in a different manner with the introduction of football and card games 
(p. 165 & 234); even styles of haircut changed. Fuller argues that people preferred to 
shave their heads —  originally explained “by the frequency of hygiene shaving in 
mines” but later apparently a fashion choice (p. 172). To credit all of these changes to 
migrant labour alone ignores the other complex changes that were going on within 
Mozambique at that time due to the expansion of Portuguese colonialism. However, 
there can be little doubt that the new patterns of consumption, as well as having 
something to do with these changes, owed much to migrants’ earning power, new 
exposure to popular cultural styles, and easy access to mine-based trading stores.
If we return to the spirit possession ceremony, in each instance of possession the 
medium changed her clothes. These changes were made to signal that a specific spirit 
had inhabited her body. For example, when possessed by a former army general, she 
wore two chains of beads symbolising belts of machine-gun ammunition across her 
chest. In the case of the miner who was murdered by his wife, the medium put on a new 
green shirt and an ‘Orlando Pirates’ cap, thus resembling a young migrant with his 
sartorial smartness and his awareness of South African soccer trends. The medium’s 
new shirt and cap signalled her possession by a former miner.
To make a further point about the significance of migrants’ clothing: we saw when I 
visited Chauque’s compound that his son was immaculately dressed for his 
homecoming; he wore the same outfit to the going-away party that I organised at the 
end of my fieldwork. While the son had put on his best clothes, his father, Chauque, 
apologised to me for the condition of the clothes that he was wearing. He regretted that 
the clothing that he had brought back from the mines had long since perished. “The 
clothes I brought back from Joni looked good,” he told me. “When I came home I 
looked like a man who had made it.” In contrast, he was now dressed in an ill-fitting old 
jacket and a T-shirt that his son had brought back from his recent trip to South Africa. 
Chauque complained that the items didn’t fit very well and that the jacket had a hole in 
it. He looked down at the outfit and laughed. “It is always like this,” he said. “When I
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came back from the mines I brought my father some cheap old clothes. Someone was 
selling them in the mining compound. They didn’t fit him either. It was much more 
important that I bought good clothes for myself. That is the way it should be.”
Another former miner recounted similar feelings to me after his jacket sleeve had fallen 
off whilst he was laying a floral wreath at a poorly attended Armed Forces Day 
ceremony organised by the local state officials. He had complained that his son had 
given him the jacket and it had probably been bought cheaply in South Africa. As the 
old man stood holding the errant sleeve in one hand and the exposed shirt of the other 
arm flapped in the wind, this appeared to be a clear demonstration of the selfishness of 
youth. While the father was standing there in clothing that was falling apart at the 
seams, his son, no doubt, was lying at home listening to music from his new radio, 
dressed in shiny new sportswear. The story demonstrates themes more complex, 
however, than the self-interest of the younger generation. The rituals undertaken by a 
migrating miner on his departure are concerned with maintaining a connection to his 
lineage, his father and his paternal homestead. Having worked in South Afiica, 
however, a returnee is more concerned with separation. The libation of alcohol and 
limited distribution of third-rate gifts are little more than gestures. A returned migrant is 
far more focussed on distancing himself from his paternal household and establishing 
his own. Rather than acknowledging old relationships, the returning migrant is 
concerned with creating and sustaining new social relations.
Most of the wages earned by a migrant on his first visit to the mines would be used to 
purchase cattle to pay the bridewealth needed for marriage. The bridewealth, or lobolo, 
was —  until relatively recently —  about 15 head of cattle. Interestingly, in Massingir 
the preference remains for bridewealth to be paid in animals, unlike in other parts of 
Southern Afiica where waged labour has heralded a shift in preference from cattle to 
cash. Indeed cash is not even used to purchase the cattle; farmers instead often prefer to 
exchange animals for consumer goods that the migrants bring back from South Afiica. 
The marriages are usually arranged with families within the region but from outside the 
village. The new wife would then come and take residence at her new husband’s 
father’s house. After marriage the priority for a young man is to earn enough money to 
establish his own household, as it is only by doing so that a man becomes fully mature. 
To do this the migrant must purchase his own cattle to build up a herd for the new
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household, as discussed in the introduction. Equally important, however, is the purchase 
of consumer goods from South Africa.
The importation of South African goods at one level was purely functional; the items 
were simply much cheaper on the other side of the border. However, the provision and 
consumption of goods were crucial in forming and maintaining conjugal relations. The 
woman who was possessed told the story of a miner whose wife sent him to South 
Africa to bring her consumer goods but was eventually murdered by her because the pot 
he brought her was inadequate. This ‘pot’ condenses what in reality was a whole range 
of consumer goods: anything from clothes to huge wrought-iron bed-frames. Whenever 
I visited the homesteads of retired miners and began to discuss their experiences I was 
inevitably shown the goods that they had brought back to equip their household. Men 
would pull out rusting trunks and display the tools, kitchen utensils, paraffin lamps and 
ageing radios that they had bought in Joni. I would be ushered into their huts and shown 
the tables, chairs and wardrobes they had brought back for their wives. On several 
occasions I was asked to translate English instructions and labels that the miners had 
puzzled over during the years that they had been back in the village.
As we have seen, the rites performed by the miners of Massingir on their departure are 
in some ways similar to those of the Xhosa as described by McAllister, in that they are 
both associated with endorsing the dominant social order and are symbolising the 
individual’s loyalty to the paternal homestead. The actions of the miners returning to 
Massingir, however, differ considerably from those of McAllister’s Xhosa. McAllister 
details a series of rituals and practices performed by the returning Xhosa migrant that 
reincorporate him into the family home. These actions all involve the sharing of 
commodities and the migrant accepting the moral authority of the home. In Massingir 
this is not the case. The consumption of commodities concentrates on the individual and 
his wife. The focus is on the migrant himself rather than on the paternal home. Some 
gifts are distributed to agnatic kin, but the distribution occurs in private and the gifts are 
acknowledged to be of poor quality and little value. In the villages of the Lower 
Shingwedzi Basin the miners return to their home community as men and the public 
consumption of the goods that they bring with them serves to demonstrate their change 
in status to the wider community.
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While the actions and practices taken by the miner on his return to the village all appear 
to indicate a public severing of ties to his father’s household, this cannot be seen as the 
returned miners distancing themselves from the old order. By breaking away from the 
paternal homestead and establishing his own, the miner is in fact reinforcing and 
continuing the patrilineal system. The resources acquired by several trips to South 
Africa allow the miner to get married, build his own house and buy his own cattle. With 
this the returned migrant can start his own family and has the means to sustain it 
through agricultural and livestock production. Although the actions of the miner on his 
return are concerned with severing his individual ties to his paternal homestead, he is 
ultimately reinforcing the existing patrilineal system in the same way that his father and 
grandfather had done before him.
Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, it is instructive to open the discussion to a wider context. 
There is a large and growing literature that explores the links between economic 
production, migration and the consumption of goods. Much of this is concerned with 
how the consumption of goods plays a role in shaping people’s identities. For example 
Mary Beth Mills looks at the migration of rural women to Bangkok (1997). Although 
these women are engaged in low-status low-wage labour, their experiences of 
exploitation are mediated by the aspiration to . participate in new patterns of 
consumption. Through the purchase of clothing, cosmetics and other consumer goods, 
these women seek to construct new identities through which to overcome their marginal 
position in society. Similarly, Michael Kearney argues from his Work among the 
Mexican communities migrating to California that social categories such as ‘peasant’ or 
‘worker’ that were previously determined by modes of production must be rethought in 
terms of consumer habits (1996). Carla Freeman echoes these sentiments in looking at 
female information processors working in Barbados (1998). Freeman shows how 
through the purchase of imported designer clothing and other consumer goods these 
women attempt to set themselves apart from the other factory workers.
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In many ways the practices of the Mozambican miners explored in this chapter resonate 
with this idea that people who go to work are partially defined by the goods created 
within the capitalist economy. Certainly the migrants’ obsession with clothing and how 
this was publicly flaunted around the village on their return could be seen as an 
expression of their new identity. A returned migrant’s proudly-displayed clothes and 
consumer goods demonstrate to the other residents that he has overcome the dangers 
entailed in migration and has returned home as ‘a man’. However, rather than just 
focusing on individual identities, this chapter has shown how the process of migrant 
labour was also concerned with social connections and the creation of dependent 
relationships. It is insufficient to consider ‘consumption’ and how it enables people to 
create new identities, without thinking about how miners transform the social contexts 
into which they return.
In the Mozambican border villages the migration of generations of men to the gold 
mines has been understood as both a transition for individuals and as a means of 
reinforcing the social system (see also Harries 1994 and Murray 1981 as referred to 
earlier). Indeed, as is shown by the discussions about village leadership with which I 
opened this chapter (and will return to in Chapter 6), working in the gold mines has 
become a key feature of local social and cultural identities. Equally, labour migration 
has been of economic significance to the region. Due to the limited potential for 
agricultural and livestock production, the remittances brought home from the mines are 
important sources of household income. The monies earned and goods brought back by 
the miners are used to pay the lobolo (bridewealth), build a homestead, and invest in 
cattle for agricultural production and for sale in times of crisis.
While migration to the gold mines is considered of local economic and social 
importance, this chapter has also demonstrated the state involvement in its development. 
For the last 150 years relations between South Africa and Mozambique have been 
founded on labour migration and access to transport links. Until 1975 both states have 
deliberately encouraged labour migrations through an array of different policies. For the 
Portuguese colonial government the miners provided a key source of revenues through 
different systems of taxation and deferred pay. The South African economy and 
political system was dependent on cheap foreign labour and access to the Mozambican
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ports, thus maintaining the relationship based on labour and transport also suited the 
South African state.
The cooperation of the two states shaped the nature of the migrations for the miners in 
Massingir. Although the recruitment of miners was managed and organised by Wenela, 
the private company established by the mining companies, the terms of the migration 
were defined by the conventions agreed between the Mozambique and South Afiican 
states. This ensured that all the miners were legally crossing the borders and were 
legally able to work in South Afiica. The agreements detailed the number of miners that 
could be recruited and the length of their contracts. The agreements between the states 
controlled all aspects of the miner’s salaries, including the exchange rates at which the 
salary was based and where and how often the monies were paid. Through this system 
of deferred pay, the states were also able to control where and how the miners could 
spend their wages.
This highly controlled system of labour migration continued until the 1970s. The states’ 
interests and involvements in the system had defined how the men of the border villages 
had worked in the gold mines, framed how they understood South Afiica, and 
influenced the village social and cultural system. In the mid-1970s this situation was to 
change. Political upheavals reshaped the inter-state relationships and changed the 
politico-economic structures throughout the region. At the same time the South Afiican 
gold-mining industry was undergoing massive internal changes that were to redefine the 
role of its labour force, most notably reducing its dependence on foreign workers.
The next chapter considers how these changes have affected the villagers of the Lower 
Shingwedzi Basin. As we have seen, through the experiences of the former miners 
migration to the gold mines has become a socially recognised transition from male 
adolescence into adulthood. This expectation continues and is expressed through the 
narratives of the retired miners and through rituals such as spirit possession. However, 
due to the mining companies cutting back the foreign labour force there are far fewer 
job opportunities in the mines that are open to young Mozambicans. I examine how the 
migrants from Massingir have responded to this problem and how trends of migration 
have changed in the light of the restructuring of the South Afiican mining industry.
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3. Mining Aristocrats and Lion-Dodgers: The changing nature of 
Mozambican labour migration
Introduction
A young boy came to my house and said that his father was home and wanted to speak 
to me. I had visited Solomao Valoi’s homestead several weeks earlier hoping to speak 
to Solomao about his experiences working in the South African gold mines. His second 
wife had informed me that her husband was still in Joni. However, his contract was due 
to finish in a couple of weeks and I should come and speak with him when he returned 
home. Solomao was sitting in the shade eating breakfast and motioned for me to sit and 
join him. He apologised that he was not at home when I had visited and explained that 
his previous contract had finished only a week ago and he had come home for a six- or 
seven-week holiday.
It was his first trip back to Mavodze in 14 months and he was planning to build a new 
cement house for his third wife with the materials he had brought back from South 
Africa. His homestead already contained two large brick houses complete with 
windows, doors and concrete floors. We walked over to where two men were digging in 
the ground and Solomao explained that this was going to be the site of the cement 
house. He was anxious to see it finished before he returned to the mines. His next 
mining contract was due to begin in early April and he told me that he would catch the 
bus to Maputo and then cross the border several days before the contract was due to 
start, so that he would be sure to get to the mine on time; he did not want to lose this 
job.
Solomao was in his late forties and had worked in the gold mines since 1975. Like most 
of the miners in Massingir, he had been recruited through the Wenela office in the 
Olifantes valley. During his 27 years of experience he had been employed on eight 
different mines in the Transvaal and had worked as a lifr-operator, in a two-man drilling 
team and as part of a team transporting ore to the surface. “The company says that I am 
now a ‘team leader’ or ‘supervisor’ but everyone in the mines still calls us ‘boss boys’,”
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Solomao said, “I’ii show you my qualifications.” He went into one of the houses and 
came back minutes later with a plastic folder. “These are my certificates” he told me 
and handed over the package. I opened it and pulled out a number of laminated A4 
sheets of paper. Each stated the qualification that Solomao had obtained: “Certificate of 
General First Aid 1993”; “Certificate of Mine First Aid”; “Certificate of Mine Rescue 
2000”; “Certificate of History, Safety and Philosophy of Mining”. Solomao explained 
that the only Mozambicans mining companies would employ were those who had years 
of experience and qualifications like these. “I have no problem getting new contracts”, 
he said.
They have my file at the Wenela offices in Xai Xai, Maputo and Ressano Garcia. When 
a mining company needs someone with my qualifications, the people at Wenela look 
through the files and send a message to say that I have another contract and I should go 
to such-and-such a mine on a certain day. It is easy for me. All the Mozambicans who 
work in the mines these days are like me, they are old men who have been working in 
Joni for many years.
Two other miners whom I interviewed told stories similar to that of Solomao. Both 
were ‘boss boys’ and had worked in the gold mines for more than 20 years. Solomao 
explained that the South Afiicans no longer recruit novice miners fi*om Mozambique:
They tell our boys that the jobs are taken. The South Afiicans tell us that we are taking 
their jobs. Before the South Africans did not like to work underground, they said it was 
too dangerous. Now they have no other jobs. They want to work in the mines. Our boys 
cross the border and try to get work, but there is none. They have to sell things on the 
street to earn money for food. This mining business has changed.
Solomao’s final statement is something of an understatement. During his 27 years of 
service, the South Afiican mining industry has experienced not the slight change that 
his modest phrase suggests but a fundamental transformation. This chapter argues that 
this transformation has occurred both as a result of the mining companies reacting to 
changing economic circumstances and also as a consequence of the changing political 
situation in southern Afiica. Continuing the theme from the beginning of the previous 
chapter, it examines how the end of colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975 affected
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relations between the South African and Mozambican states and the impact that this has 
had on the pattern of labour migration. The strained relations between the two states and 
the restructuring of the mining industry initially resulted in far fewer employment 
opportunities for the men of Massingir and southern Mozambique: despite later 
rapprochement between South Africa and Mozambique the South African economy has 
experienced continuing problems, with its mining sector being among those worst hit. 
The experiences of the contemporary miners, like Solomao Valoi, contrast with those of 
Ernesto Nkuna and the other miners that were discussed in the previous chapter. In 
contrast to an earlier pattern in which most villagers worked in the mines for several 
years and then return to the village to engage in agricultural production, far fewer men 
are able to work in the mining sector today. Those who are do so as highly trained, well- 
paid career miners.
While men like Solomâo Valoi who have secured work in the mining industry are 
emerging as a local elite or a ‘mining aristocracy’, the majority of the residents of the 
Lower Shingwedzi Basin have not been as fortunate. The previous chapter demonstrated 
that working in the mines was of social, economic and cultural significance to the 
people of this region. I argue in this chapter that, although there are no mining jobs 
available, the social, cultural and economic pressures have remained. The majority of 
young men of Mavodze and the surrounding villages have been unable to work in the 
mines and instead enter South Africa as illegal migrants. Rather than crossing the 
border with work permits and documentation issued by Wenela, these new migrants 
have been taking the hazardous route through the Kruger Park and searching for 
whatever jobs are available to them. This chapter explores the experiences of these new 
migrants and considers the effect that these changing patterns in labour migration have 
had on social relations in the border villages of Massingir.
Restructuring the South African mining industry
During the late 1970s the South African mining industry underwent a fundamental 
transformation. The most significant change for the villagers of Massingir has been the
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mining companies’ considerable retrenchment of foreign labour. While almost every 
male resident over the age of 40 had once been employed in the mines, very few 
remained in this employment. Of the households that I interviewed, only 6 had male 
members currently working in the mines. If one looks at the mining industry in general 
the percentage of foreign labourers working in South African mines fell from almost 
80% of the entire workforce in 1972 to just over 30% in 1977 (from Crush 1995:32). 
This new policy of labour ‘internalisation’, as it was termed by the International Labour 
Organisation (see for example Stahl 1979), resulted in thousands of Mozambicans 
losing their jobs (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Average number of Mozambicans working in the South African Mining 
Industry, 1971-1999.
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Source: South African Chamber of Mines, personal communication; TEBA Maputo, personal 
communication
The substantial body of literature that addresses this issue shows that the drastic 
reduction of the foreign labour force was due to a combination of different factors. Of 
these the freeing-up of the international gold price on the international markets was 
pivotal (Crush et al 1991:105). In 1944 the gold price was fixed at US$ 35 per ounce at 
the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, USA. By the
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1960s global demand for gold was so strong that the price was forced upwards. In an 
effort to uphold the status of the dollar the United States and other major Western 
powers formed a gold-pool, pledging their combined gold reserves in defence of the 
fixed gold price. Demand continued to rise and the gold-pool collapsed in 1968, forcing 
the IMF and the central banks to broker a new two-tier agreement whereby central 
banks would trade gold at a fixed official price and other gold could be traded on the 
fi:ee market. In 1978 the IMF finally abolished the official price of gold and allowed 
central banks to value and use gold reserves as they saw fit. The South African Reserve 
Bank set the price of US$163 per ounce.^^ Prices on the open market rocketed to 
US$305 in 1979 and peaked at US$805 in January 1980 (Lang 1986). Over the last two 
decades the price has fluctuated between US$300-500 per ounce.
South Afiica is the world’s largest producer of gold and its industry has consistently 
accounted for between one-third and one-half of total global production (US Library of 
Congress 1996). The massive hike in world gold prices, therefore, resulted in windfall 
profits for the mining companies. These extra revenues allowed increased 
mechanisation of the industry, most notably seen in the Anglo American Corporation’s 
operations in the Orange Free State (Seidman 1995). The increased dependence on 
technology reduced the need for manual labour and resulted in gradual layoffs across 
the sector. A second consequence of the rising profitability of the gold mining 
companies was an increase in workers’ wages. The Chamber of Mines had come under 
growing international criticism for their wages policy following the publication of 
Francis Wilson’s book Labour in the South African Gold Mines (1972a). Wilson 
demonstrated that, in real terms, wages in the mining industry had decreased over the 
preceding eighty years (Wilson 1972a: 141; see also Crush et al 1991:105). The higher 
revenues, generated from the inflated gold price, allowed the mining companies to 
increase wages to a level that could compete with other sectors of South Afiican 
industry. This coincided with a general recession in the South Afiican industrial sector 
such that more generous wage structures encouraged a surge in native South Afiicans 
applying for positions in the mining sector. For the first time in its history the mining 
industry had a labour supply that exceeded demand. The consequence of this shift from
For further details on the history o f the world gold market see Lang (1986).
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a predominantly foreign to an internal workforce was the dramatic cutback in mine 
labour recruitment from elsewhere in southern Africa, including Mozambique.
The increased mechanisation and rising wages were facilitated by the steep rise in the 
gold price, yet these were changes that could not be instigated overnight. Figure 1 
clearly shows that the number of Mozambican miners fell very sharply between 1975 
and 1977. This drastic reduction not only affected the Mozambican miners but was 
reflected across all the foreign work forces in the mines. It had been precipitated by two 
political incidents that had occurred in the mid-1970s. Firstly, in 1974 Malawi banned 
recruitment of its nationals following an aircraft crash near Francistown (Botswana) that 
killed 74 miners returning from service in South Africa. The Malawian government’s 
decision suddenly to withdraw 120,000 miners (approximately 30% of the workforce) 
highlighted the mining industry’s vulnerability to action taken by supplier states that 
were becoming increasingly hostile to the apartheid government. These fears were 
further realised the following year when the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique 
collapsed and was replaced by the socialist Frelimo government. The Mozambican 
workforce, at that time, was the largest foreign labour contingent in the mines and the 
threat of further disruption to this crucial resource forced the mining companies to 
pursue a policy of labour internalisation (de Vletter 1987:200; see also Coplan 
1994:250). The reduction in foreign labour, therefore, although facilitated by the 
increased gold price, must be considered to be a response to the broader political 
changes that were occurring throughout the region.
The potential to use the mining industry’s dependence on a foreign workforce as a 
political tool had been realised as far back as 1960 when the then Tanganyikan 
government halted all organised labour migration to South Africa in protest against the 
Sharpeville Massacre.^® Even after the cutbacks of the 1970s the instrumental use of 
migratory labour continued. If we return to Figure 1, we can see that between 1983 and 
1985 the number of Mozambicans working in the South Afiican mining industry 
increased from 45,836 to 54,223. This 15% increase was a result of the Nkomati Accord 
signed by South Afiican President P.W. Botha and Mozambican President Samora
An incident in March 1960 in the South African township o f Sharpeville where police opened fire on a 
crowd of anti-apartheid demonstrators, killing 67 people and injuring a further 180 (Frankel 2001; Harris 
1988).
92
Machel in March 1984. The Accord was an agreement on “non-aggression and good 
neighbourliness” whereby both countries would refrain from interfering in each other’s 
internal affairs (Hanlon 1990:257). In other words. South Africa agreed to cease its 
support of Renamo and its war of destabilisation, and Mozambique to end all support to 
the ANC other than political, diplomatic and humanitarian aid. The destabilisation war, 
combined with poor economic policies, had financially crippled Mozambique and the 
prospect of increased labour exportation, with its potential to generate revenue, was an 
important factor in bringing its government to the negotiating table (de Vletter 1987; 
Hanlon 1990).^  ^ While, for the most part, the Mozambican government upheld its part 
of the agreement. South Afiica flagrantly disregarded the accord (Hanlon 1996:16). 
(That the accord was ultimately limited in its extent was shown by the fact that a new 
agreement based on labour exportation and use of the Maputo Port was later considered 
necessary. It was discussed but was never signed by either country).
The issue of Mozambican migrant labour was again used as a political instrument in 
October 1986. A landmine blast injured six South Afiican soldiers travelling in a 
military vehicle close to the Mozambican border. The South Afiican government 
attributed the attack to the banned ANC, who were allegedly operating out of 
Mozambique. In retaliation for this incident, the South Afiican foreign minister Pik 
Botha announced that all of the 60,000 Mozambican workers employed in the mining 
industry would be repatriated on the termination of their contracts (de Vletter 1987; 
Jones 1986; Laurence 1986). The mining industry, which had not been consulted on this 
decision, immediately protested against it; the sudden loss of this number of workers 
would have severe economic ramifications. An agreement was finally reached between 
the Department of Manpower and the Chamber of Mines whereby the government 
climbed down and effectively repealed the repatriation order.
This incident illustrates the complex symbiotic relationship that existed between the 
mining industry and the apartheid state. The decision to repatriate the Mozambican 
miners was politically motivated, yet the response by the mining companies shows that
It is interesting to note that before Frelimo came to power at independence many o f  the more radical 
socialist elements in the party advocated stopping migrant labour to South Africa on the grounds that it 
was feeding an oppressive capitalist system. However, on gaining control the government found that it
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there were limits to the extent of state control over this sector of the economy. The 
mining companies understood the economic repercussions of this action and convinced 
the state to reverse its decision.
While the South African state did not repatriate all the Mozambicans employed in the 
mines, the changing political relations between the two countries and the economic 
changes that had affected the mining industry have drastically reduced the number of 
Mozambicans employed in the industry. If we return to Figure 1, the number of miners 
employed in 1999 had slipped back down to pre-Nkomati Accord levels and remained 
much lower than levels of the mid-1970s. As the number of jobs available in South 
Africa dropped, the Mozambican population grew by over 25% and therefore the 
demand for the few jobs available increased dramatically. In 1975 approximately 17% 
of all males between the ages of 15 and 60 years old and resident in Maputo, Gaza and 
Inhambane provinces (the principal areas of labour recruitment)^^ were working in the 
South African mining industry. By 1997 this had fallen to only 8%.^^
These cutbacks have not only reduced the number of job opportunities for young men in 
Mozambique, but have also affected the way in which labour is recruited from the 
region. In a 1998 study, Fion de Vletter explores how the position of the Mozambican 
mining workforce has changed following the end of apartheid in South Africa. He 
interviewed over 455 miners and their families in the recruitment depots and throughout 
the southern provinces of Mozambique. Table 2 is taken from de Vletter’s study and 
shows the district of origin of those of his interviewees who came from Gaza Province.
could not afford to lose the substantial revenues generated by the miners and the migrant labour system 
continued (Murray 1981:29).
Interview with Nathaniel Nhanlale, Office Co-ordinator TEBA Xai Xai (November 2002)
Calculated from the 1980 national census (Direcçâo Nacional de Estatistica 1985), 1997 national 
census (Instituto Nacional de Estatistica 1997), Chamber o f Mines (personal communication) and TEBA 
Maputo (personal communication).
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Table 2: District of Origin of Miners, Aug/Sept 1996
District of Gaza Number Percentage
Xai Xai 49 26.7
Chokwe 39 21.3
Chibuto 36 19.7
Manjacaze 28 15.3
Biiene/Macia 16 8.7
Other 15 8.2
Source: From de Vletter ( 1998:16)
The districts that supply the majority of the miners, Xai Xai, Chowke and Chibuto, are 
the most urbanised in the province. There are so few miners originating from the more 
rural districts of Massingir, Chicualacuala, Mabalane, Massengena and Chigubo, that 
these areas have been simply amalgamated into the category of ‘Other’. While further 
empirical evidence is required, it does appear that there has been a shift in migrant 
labour recruitment from predominantly rural areas to the more urban or peri-urban areas 
of Mozambique. As the demand for labour has diminished, the mining companies have 
cut back their recruitment operations across southern Afiica.^^ In Mozambique Wenela 
downscaled its operations by closing all its rural recruitment centres. This had a 
particularly large impact on the communities in Massingir given the remoteness of this 
district. While it had been relatively easy for men from Massingir to drop in at the 
Wenela office in the Olifantes valley, its closure forced them to travel all the way to the 
Wenela office in Xai Xai: a journey that is both expensive and time-consuming. Even 
having made this trip, there is no guarantee that a job will be waiting at the other end. 
Conversely, it is relatively easy for those young men living close to the Xai Xai office 
to pass every so often and enquire after work. It is therefore more likely that the jobs 
available will go to those people living in, or closer to, the town containing the 
recruitment office. Thus recruitment favours the urban Mozambicans far more than
Between 1975 and 1993 TEBA/Wenela reduced the number o f its stations in southern Africa by almost 
half (Head 1995:130-131). For further details o f the changing nature o f TEBAAVenela’s operations see 
Rowett (1995).
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Photo 18; The former Wenela recruitment office in the Olifantes Valley, Massingir
Photo 19: The TEBA/Wenela recruitment centre in Xai Xai
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those living in the remote areas such as the villages of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin. 
While the mining companies have reduced their dependence on Mozambican labour 
over the last three decades, by no means have they entirely done away with the 
Mozambican miner. The 1986 incident when the mining companies argued against the 
repatriation of the entire Mozambican workforce demonstrates its continued importance 
to the industry. In 2002 there were still over 50,000 Mozambicans employed in the gold 
mines (TEBA personal communication). This is a drastic reduction from the levels of 
the 1970s, but is still, nonetheless, a significant figure. Equally —  despite Wenela’s 
emphasis on urban recruitment —  there are still men like Solomao Valoi working in the 
mines who come from the rural districts of Southern Mozambique. While these men 
remain part of the mining workforce, their lives differ considerably from those of the 
older miners who were discussed in the previous chapter.
Career migrants and the labour aristocracy
Solomao and the other miners had all been recruited by Wenela and had gone to work in 
the mines through the same legal route as thousands before them. However, they had 
not followed the pattern described by those former miners in the previous chapter, 
whereby a migrant uses his wages to build up enough capital to get married, construct 
an independent household and retire to live off agricultural and livestock production. 
Solomao and the other present-day mine-workers in Mavodze were all in their late 
forties and had been working in the mines for more than 20 years. During this period 
they had gained numerous qualifications and held positions that carried considerable 
responsibility: they were not unskilled manual labourers who simply dug shafts but 
were skilled and highly experienced team leaders (for details of the role of team leader 
see Moodie 1980). The 1986 repatriation order was based upon the South Afiican 
government’s assumption that the foreign Afiican workforce in the mining industry was 
unskilled and easily replaceable; but in the case of Mozambican miners like Solomao, it 
was not. These were skilled men with many years of experience carrying out specialised 
jobs. Solomao was a team leader who was trained in mine rescue techniques. The labour 
retrenchment of the 1970s changed the foreign workers from unskilled men who could 
seek employment as and when they required cash into highly-trained career-orientated
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employees, or “rural commuters” (Moodie with Ndatshe 1994:42), who returned home 
only for leave (de Vletter 1987:201),
This shift came about through the introduction of re-engagement certificates or, as the 
miners term them, ‘bonus cards’. Solomao Valoi was so anxious to arrive at the mine in 
time for his next contract that he was planning to leave several days in advance, just in 
case he was unexpectedly delayed en route. His anxiety was due to the fact that he, like 
all miners going on leave, had been issued with a ‘bonus card’ stating that he had to 
return for a new contract within a specific period or risk being replaced. If replaced, a 
Mozambican miner stands little chance of getting another contract.
While the ‘bonus card’ system ensured that experienced miners would serve back-to- 
back contracts, the labour retrenchments made it very difficult for young men with no 
experience, or novices, to find new mining jobs. In the 1980s hundreds, and sometimes 
thousands, of young men camped outside the Wenela depot in Maputo waiting for a 
chance to go the mines (Head 1995:130). This informal settlement disappeared during 
the 1990s, but it remained the case that thousands of young men would arrive at the 
centre if word had spread that Wenela was recruiting novices. Today, the supply of 
labour fi*om Mozambique exceeds the mining companies’ demand to such an extent that 
Wenela has completely ceased its recruitment of Mozambican novices.^^
Despite the mining companies’ cut-backs and Wenela closing its gates to novices, some 
young Mozambicans have been able to find employment in the gold-mining industry. 
One such miner who lived in Mavodze was Six Valoi.^^ I had met Six in a bar in 
Massingir, a week earlier, and had given him a lift back to Mavodze. He worked in an 
Afiican Rainbow Minerals gold mine in South Afiica’s North West Province and was 
back in Mozambique for a six-week break before his next contract started. Six had 
purchased various building materials in South Afiica and was spending much of his 
time carrying out neglected odd jobs in and around his homestead. I strolled over to 
Six’s house to collect some spanners that I had lent him and found him sitting in the
Interview with Nathaniel Nhanlale, Office Co-ordinator TEBA Xai Xai.
‘Six’ was his official name, as it appeared on his identity card. Six’s father had worked in the mines 
and, like many former miners, had named his children after English words and phases he had acquired 
whilst in South Afiica.
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shade tinkering with an old plough, listening to his enormous stereo system that he ran 
off an old car battery. The door that he had been using my tools to fit still flaunted its 
250 Rand — relatively expensive in the local setting — price tag, and Six was 
obviously pleased with his morning’s work. He invited me to sit down and we began to 
chat.
Six was 29 years old and had been working in an African Rainbow Minerals’ mine for 
the last three years. He commented that he had been very lucky to get the job in the gold 
mines and explained that it was getting increasingly difficult for Mozambicans to get 
mining contracts in South Africa. Six had been fortunate that his uncle was a ‘boss boy’ 
(team leader) in a Rainbow Minerals’ mine and had put forward Six’s name when he 
had heard in 1999 that the mine was recruiting new miners. At that time. Six had been 
working illegally in South Africa since 1989 and was able to organise official 
documentation and identity papers through the mining company. These papers, much 
treasured, were now securely stored in the house: he went inside for a moment and 
returned with his laminated identity card and ‘bonus’ papers that guaranteed him his 
next contract. He proudly showed me the documentation and said that he would go back 
to South Afiica early because he did not want to lose this job. “Losing this job would be 
a disaster” he said. “It’d be impossible to find anything else like it.”
Starting at the beginning, he recounted the story of how he came to be working illegally 
— and later legally — in South Afiica. In 1989 he and four fiiends fled Mavodze 
village as the incidence of Renamo attacks on villages in Massingir district was 
increasing. As well as fleeing the violence, they also hoped to find work in South 
Afiica. The group of five had followed the border northwards and had crossed into the 
Kruger National Park. They travelled at night and hid from the police and park patrols 
during the day. Although they were all afraid of the wild animals, especially the lions 
for which the National Park is famous, they managed (in a manner rehearsed by 
countless illegal migrants both before and since) to cross the Park without mishap in 
two days. They headed towards Phalaborwa, where one member of the group had 
family living nearby.
Six had anticipated following in his father’s footsteps by working in the gold mines. He 
quickly learned from the other Mozambican refugees, however, that this was
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impossible. Instead, Six walked from farm to farm asking for work and eventually was 
offered a job picking oranges on an estate near Tzaneen. The job proved to be short­
lived and he was soon forced to seek another. For ten years he had worked as a labourer 
on farms and construction sites. He would get jobs either by approaching the farm or 
building site directly or by joining groups of other unemployed men who waited at 
crossroads for potential employers to drive past and offer a day’s work. As a migrant 
with no legal status, Six said the pay was very low and they had no legal rights: “Some 
of the boers [the generic term used by Mozambicans for white South Africans, literally 
‘farmers’] would make us work for four days and then on the fifth, when they were 
supposed to pay us, they would say we had to go or they would call the police.” In 
1996 Six had, indeed, been deported in this way, but he later returned and found 
employment as a miner:
The police came to the building site and asked to see our papers. We did not have any 
papers, so they arrested us and put us in their bakkie [van]. We were taken to a police 
station and they arranged for a man to drive us through the Pafuri border post and then 
on to Chokwe. I didn’t want to go to Chokwe and so I paid the driver some money and 
he dropped me off just after the border post. I was back in Mozambique and decided to 
go home, I had not seen my father for a long time. I had saved some money and used it 
to get married. However, I could not stay here in Mavodze, there is no work. I went 
back to Joni [South Africa] and carried on working on farms. I sent some money to my 
wife when I had some, but it was not enough. One day I received a message from my 
uncle to say that he had found me a job for the mining company. I went to their office 
and they gave me the job. I was very lucky. It was only because of my uncle that I was 
able to arrange the work on the mine. I am now legally allowed to be in South Africa 
and get paid well. You see why I don’t want to lose this job at the mine. I am lucky to 
have it.
Six was indeed fortunate to have found work in the gold mines; of all the mineworkers 
in Mavodze, he was the only one less than 40 years old. In spite of this age difference. 
Six’s attitude was similar to that of Solomao Valoi and the other older miners in that he 
considered mining to be his career. Six wanted to return to the mine before the date 
specified on his ‘bonus card’ to be eligible for another contract. He had no wish, even in 
the long term, to stop mining and settle in the village and begin agricultural production.
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as the previous generations of men from Mavodze had done in the past. Six was a miner 
and had no intention of giving up this position.
Although Six Valoi had joined the ranks of the other career miners in the village, the 
way in which he obtained his first job differs considerably from the experience of the 
other mineworkers. The older miners, such as Solomao, had all been recruited through 
the Wenela offices within Mozambique and had migrated to South Africa equipped with 
the appropriate documents to pre-arranged jobs at specific sites. Six, on the other hand, 
had first crossed into South Africa illegally, walking through the Kruger National Park 
with a number of companions. He had worked in temporary jobs on farms or 
construction sites and due to his lack of documentation had been deported. Six’s 
fortunes had changed when his uncle, an established miner, had recommended his 
nephew to the mining company as an appropriate candidate to begin work as a novice. 
With a limited number of new positions available, many of the mining companies have 
introduced this system of recruitment-through-referral when wishing to employ new 
workers.^^ By taking on the sons or close relatives of long-serving miners, the 
companies reward existing staff for their length of service and also ensure the loyalty of 
their new employees. Six Valoi was recruited as a part of one such ‘special order’, as 
the mining companies refer to this partisan recruitment policy.
This changing recruitment policy has had profound effects in the villages of Massingir. 
The previous chapter demonstrated that remittances from migrant mine labour have 
long been acknowledged as a source of wealth for rural households. In the late 1970s 
Andrew Spiegel argued that rural differentiation in Lesotho was cyclical and dependent 
to a large extent on the household developmental cycle (1980). Households comprising 
young couples were largely landless but received an income from the absent husband. In 
time, the household acquired land and directed some of the wages into hiring labour to 
work in the fields. The head of household, soon retiring, could then depend on the 
income of his adult sons until they left to establish their own households. The following 
phase is less secure as the household received no external income and capacity for 
agricultural production might be depleted due to lack of implements, draught power and
Interview with Nathaniel Nhanlale, Office Co-ordinator TEBA Xai Xai
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labour. Whatever differentiation occurred would later be reversed when the new 
generation of mine workers left home to fund its own new households.
If this was the case when Spiegel was conducting fieldwork in Lesotho, the situation 
today differs markedly. Following the cutbacks in the foreign workforce in the mines, 
far fewer men get the opportunity to work underground and those who do now operate 
along the lines of career miners rather temporary migrants. More recently, David 
Coplan has argued that the men in rural communities in Lesotho who work in the mines 
are showing signs of developing into a “labour aristocracy” (1994:252). A similar 
phenomenon can be seen in the villages of Massingir. If we return to the story of 
Solomao Valoi, we can see that he is using the wages he earned from his secure mining 
job to construct a third cement house for his third wife. The cost of building one cement 
house is well beyond the reach of most households in Mavodze and having three wives 
is a sure sign of affluence. It is also noticeable that Solomao is not constructing the 
house himself; rather, he is able to hire others to do this for him. Although the career 
miners, such as Solomao Valoi, are becoming increasingly more affluent, relative to 
those without work in the South African mines, this group does not yet top the village 
economic hierarchy: the households whose large herds of cattle survived the war remain 
the economic elite.^^
While the mining families are not yet the economic elites of the villages of the Lower 
Shingwedzi Basin, I suggest that this is likely to happen. Coplan’s use of the term 
‘aristocracy’ is particularly apposite, for Wenela’s nepotistic method of recruiting 
novices ensures a miner’s son will ‘inherit’ his father’s job. If we look at the case of Six 
Valoi, he was able to gain access to a relatively well-paid career because his uncle was a 
miner. Those families with existing access to this important resource are unlikely to 
relinquish it. When an older miner is preparing to retire, one of his younger male 
relatives can be recommended as a novice and the ‘mining dynasty’ is reproduced. 
Although there is no evidence to support this yet, as this recruitment policy has only 
been recently adopted, I suggest that the economic power wielded by those families that 
have men working in the mines will continue to increase.
Economic wealth does not necessarily translate to political power. Local political life is explored 
further in Chapter 4 & 6.
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Hazardous journeys: from miners to migrants
This reduction of mining recruitment is not unique to Mozambique as the overall 
downturn in the mining sector has seen changes throughout the southern African region 
and most authors foresee these resulting in calamity for those living in this area. 
Ferguson (1999) observes retrenchment on the Zambian copperbelt and notes that 
workers have left the urban areas and have returned to the countryside, thus shattering 
the expectations of an ‘Afiican modernity’. Dunbar Moodie argued that the entire 
region will be affected by the downturn in the gold industry: “whole areas of the 
Southern African countryside have been able to survive because they are reservoirs of 
potential labourers for the mines—and [they] now face disaster because of changing 
recruitment patterns or mine labour retrenchment” (Moodie with Ndatshe 1994:11). 
Harri Englund states that the “end of employment in the South African mines caused an 
undeniable economic decline” in Mozambique-Malawi borderlands (2002:115). Judith 
Head predicts that the reduction in migrant labour will be a “catastrophe” for Southern 
Mozambique (1995:136) and it takes little deciphering to ascertain the gist of Gay 
Seidman’s argument in her paper entitled Shafted: The social impact o f down-scaling in 
the OFS goldfields (1995). The consensus among nearly all commentators is that the 
retrenchment would have disastrous consequences for the communities supplying the 
labour.^^
In the previous chapter I argued that the migration of large numbers of Mozambican 
men to work in the South African gold mines during the Portuguese colonial period was
One o f the few who differ from this opinion is de Vletter (1998). He argues that, despite cutbacks that 
have taken place across the board in the mining industry, levels o f recruitment in Mozambique have been 
gradually edging upwards and may soon surpass those o f Lesotho (at present the largest supplier of 
foreign labour to the mines, although its labour force has also been cut). It is true that the mining 
companies prefer to recmit Mozambican workers, as they are perceived as more industrious, less mihtant 
and accepting o f  working conditions more onerous than those that other miners will tolerate. However, de 
Vletter’s optimism, in part, stems from his methodological approach. His research team interviewed 160 
miners’ wives in the provinces o f Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo and 455 miners at the TEBA/Wenela 
depots at Ressano Garcia and Johannesburg and the Algos depots (another agency that recruits for the 
mines). It is not surprising that informants who are exclusively miners, or are married to miners, have a 
rosy outlook on the migrant labour situation, since they are still in employment and earn a relatively good 
income from a reasonably secure job. Different conclusions might have been reached had the 
methodology incorporated the details o f former miners, young men currently searching for enq)loyment 
in the gold mines, or those living far from the TEBAAVenela posts.
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of economic importance and had been incorporated as a social and cultural phenomenon 
into the lives of the residents of Massingir. Although the gates of the mines now appear 
to be permanently closed to most rural Mozambicans, there remains a pressure — both 
economic and socio-cultural — for young men to migrate as miners. However, as there 
are so few job opportunities available, for most of them this is impossible. Instead, 
rather than going to Wenela and obtaining work through the legal avenues, the young 
men of today are forced to cross into South Afiica as illegal migrants and find whatever 
work they can.
If we return to the story of Six Valoi, what made his story exceptional was his luck in 
being recruited by the mining company having been referred by his uncle. What makes 
it more typical was the way in which Six’s experiences began. Six had left Mavodze 
with a group of fiiends and they had illegally crossed the South Afiican border by 
walking through the Kruger National Park at night, avoiding the police and attacks fi*om 
wild animals. Throughout the period that I lived in Massingir, small groups of young 
men, similar to that described by Six Valoi, were regularly crossing through the park 
and illegally entering South Afiica.
The groups usually consisted of between four and seven young men, all dressed in 
relatively smart-looking clothes with small rucksacks on their backs and carrying five 
litre bottles of water. In the heat of the afternoon, whilst I was sitting in the shade 
writing up field notes, they would often approach my house and request some water. In 
an average week I would see three or four of these bands of young men walking 
northwards to cross the Kruger Park, if I was driving I would often stop and offer them 
a lift as far as the fence. The youths whom I spoke to were not always local residents 
but had often travelled from as far away as Xai Xai or Manjacaza districts or even 
Inhambane Province, former recruiting areas of the mining industry.
It is impossible to calculate exactly how many Mozambicans enter and work in South 
Afiica, but in Mavodze the vast majority of households had at least one family member 
who had crossed the border and was working illegally. The district director of 
immigration. Sr. Ibrahim Faki, explained that the number of migrants varied throughout
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the year/^ The busiest months were from March to July when people cross the border to 
find work harvesting fhiit in the numerous farms along the western boundary of the 
Kruger National Park. Sr. Faki estimated that more than 50 people per week cross the 
border during this period and about half this number cross during the other months of 
the year."^  ^ He confirmed that these migrants came not only from Massingir but also 
from throughout the provinces of Gaza, Maputo and Inhambane. In 1995-6 the South 
Afiican Department of Home Affairs repatriated 289,114 illegal Mozambican 
immigrants (Africa Confidential July 1997)."^  ^Although by no means all of these would 
have crossed the border in Massingir, this statistic does provide some sense of the 
enormous numbers of people involved."*^
A number of informants told me that this clandestine migration across the border was 
not a new phenomenon. Even during the peak periods of mine recruitment, illegal 
border crossing took place. One informant told me that, if one needed some money to 
pay taxes or to buy something but did not want to work the length of a whole contract in 
the mines, one could take the two-day walk to cross the border and find temporary work 
on a farm or on one of the smaller mines on the edge of what is now Kruger Park. 
Although some people preferred to cross this way, even at that time, far fewer did so 
than today. The universal consensus, among everyone from field informants and 
government officials to the popular press and academics (see for example Davis & Head 
1995) is that the rate of illegal migration from Mozambique to South Afiica has 
increased dramatically.
There were two ways that migrants could cross the border into South Afiica. The first 
was to walk through the Kruger Park, as Six and his fiiends had done. The alternative 
route was to travel south and cross the border between the Park and Swaziland. In the 
1980s the South Afiican government erected 63km of Norex electrical fence in an 
attempt to close this border area to ANC operatives who, the government claimed, were 
based in Mozambique. The fence was designed to carry a lethal current of 1,000 amps
Interview 21®* October 2002,
As director o f  immigration Sr. Faki is responsible for preventing this illegal migration and therefore his 
statistics can be seen as a very conservative estimate o f the numbers crossing the border in this area.
Estimates o f the number o f illegal migrants that are in South Africa must also be treated with caution as 
figures are often inflated to justify military and policing budgets (Human Rights Watch 1998).
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and up to 3,300 volts (Human Rights Watch 1998). Attempting to cross this fence often 
proved fatal: the most reliable estimate of the number of Mozambicans killed while 
attempting to cross is in the region of 200 a year (de la Hunt 1998:125).'^  ^Despite the 
unprecedented danger associated with this border fence, several of my informants 
claimed to have crossed it. They described a number of elaborate, and often 
harebrained, schemes to avoid electrocution, including tunnelling under the fence; 
chopping a tree down so that the tree fell onto the fence, breaking down the barrier and 
short-circuiting the electric system; and even simply propping up the live wires with a 
very, very dry stick and crawling underneath.
Melvin Weigel argues that this border policy has no other precedent. While the US- 
Mexico border has electric sensors, it has no capacity to kill or injure. There are few 
other areas in the world where illegal migrants regularly die when crossing international 
borders. Most deaths that do occur are as a result of natural boundaries such as African 
migrants drowning in the Straits of Gibraltar en route to the EU or Haitians and Cubans 
drowning on their way to Florida (Weigel 1998:100-1). With the gradual liberalisation 
of the apartheid regime and the moves towards multi-party democracy, the voltage and 
current flowing through the border fence were reduced to a non-lethal level in 1990."*^
While many Mozambicans died attempting to traverse the electrified border, the 
migrants from Massingir rarely used this route. Instead they opted to cross into South 
Africa through the Kruger National Park. Like crossing the fence, this too could be a 
dangerous journey. Six Valoi mentions that he and his travelling companions were 
afraid of the wild animals living within the Kruger National Park. The Kruger Park was 
designated a South African National Park in 1926 and extends over 19,485 km^ along 
the South African-Mozambican border. Six Valoi’s concerns about the fauna living 
within the park are quite justified: a recent report estimates that Kruger contains over 
7500 elephants, 3000 white rhinos, over 2000 lions, and 1000 leopards, not to mention
Many o f those repatriated may have been refugees who had fled the violence in Mozambique during 
the 1980s.
^  Minnaar & Hough (1996) suggest a lower figure o f 96 people who were killed by this fence between 
1986-9, Regardless o f the exact body count, it is clear that when the fence was set to ‘lethal’, it was 
indeed fatal to many o f those attenpting to cross it.
Alarmingly, high-ranking officials in the ANC government including Joe Modise (Defence Minister 
1994-1999) and the Home Affairs Minister, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, have called for the fence to be 
switched back to ‘lethal mode’ to restrict the flow o f illegal immigrants (Africa Confidential, July 1997).
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other dangerous animals such as crocodiles and hippos ('t Sas-Rolfes 1996). It is the risk 
of a lion attack that instils the most fear into the young migrants whom I spoke to in 
Massingir. This risk is quite real. During my 17 months of fieldwork there were three 
fatal lion attacks on people attempting to cross into South Africa. The director of 
immigration said,
We do not know how many people die because it depends whether the South African 
wardens find a body or not. The lions do not eat the whole body, they leave the head,'*® 
but often other animals will take the bodies. We estimate about 7 people are killed every 
month. It is much worse during the dry season because the people do not light fires and 
the lions are more likely to attack.
I spoke to several South Afiican game wardens working in the Kruger Park who said 
that the patrols often find the remains of victims of lion attacks who can be identified as 
being Mozambican by remnants of identity documents or from Mozambican currency 
being found in the vicinity of the body. One warden claimed that Mozambican coins 
had been found in the stomach of a lion that had been killed. The South Afiican 
wardens reported that some of the lion populations are changing their territories to hunt 
along the principal routes being taken by the Mozambican migrants. Anecdotes from 
conservationists working in the Limpopo National Park also appear to suggest that lions 
in certain areas of Kruger Park are changing their behaviour in relation to the increased 
traffic of people walking across the border.
The young men of Mavodze respond to these hazards with a sense of bravado. Much 
like the older miners discussed in the previous chapter, the young men tell often- 
exaggerated anecdotes about the dangers associated with their migration. The stories 
recounted by the young men who have returned from South Afiica are not, like those of 
their fathers and older counterparts, associated with the risks of working underground. 
Rather, they recount the perils of travelling on foot through the Kruger Park. I heard 
such stories when the young men met to play cards or draughts close to the barraka in 
the village. In an attempt to outdo his fiiends, each would embellish the story, often 
resulting in absurd exaggeration. One said.
The name o f one o f the rivers in the Shingwedzi basin is M a d o s e ,  meaning beard. It was so named 
because a lion attacked a man in that valley and all that was found o f him was his bearded jawbone.
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One time I was walking across to Joni with about 5 other people. We were sleeping and 
I woke up to see a lion coming through the bush. I woke up everyone else and we 
started throwing rocks and making noise. An elephant was nearby and heard all the 
noise and got angry. The elephant started screaming and pushing over trees. The noise 
of the elephant scared the lion away.
Another boasted.
One time Jose and I were walking through the park. We did not want the boers to catch 
us so we slept without lighting a fire. Jose was asleep and felt something brush against 
his foot. Thinking it was nothing he rolled over. It brushed him again and as he was still 
half asleep, he thought it was nothing. On the third time he woke up and saw a lion 
standing over him. He could not even throw a stone because he was so scared. I was 
braver and started shouting and throwing rocks and sticks. The lion then ran off.
The adventures recounted by the young men reflected the dangers and tension 
associated with crossing the game park. The bravado and boastful nature with which 
such anecdotes were told indicate the extent to which the youths had confronted these 
dangers and, through exchanging stories, they were demonstrating to each other that 
they had proven themselves as men. They had grown up listening to their fathers 
recount tales of mining accidents, the hardships of working underground and how the 
migrants were men enough to overcome these problems. With no hope of finding work 
in the mining industry, the young men of Massingir could not engage in such story­
telling and instead adapted the same meta-narratives to elaborate upon the perils 
involved in their own experiences of migration.
These stories indicate a noticeable shift in emphasis from those told by the former 
miners, discussed in the previous chapter. Both sets of stories concentrate on the 
dangers that the men face and demonstrate the narrator’s bravery in overcoming these 
difficulties. While the stories recounted by the miners recall incidents that occurred 
underground, the young men of today are unable to find jobs in the mines and therefore 
cannot share the same stories. Instead, they tell of the dangers involved in their 
migration; the actual journey across the border. Unlike the miners, the young men of 
today distinguish between the migration and the labour. For the miners these two
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concepts were bound together; one could not work in the mines without migrating. The 
migration and the mining were'inseparable. The miners’ rite of passage was working in 
the mines; the journey was an insignificant part of this. For the young men of today the 
migration has become a challenge in itself, one that is distinct firom the problems 
associated with finding work.
The former miners were dismissive of these tales of the younger generation and would 
mock the stories of bravery in the Kruger Park. My particular favourite was a story that 
I heard in one old miner’s compound during the caju season:
Four young men were crossing the Kruger Park on their way to find work in South 
Africa. They had walked a long way and stopped to get some sleep. In the middle of the 
night, one of the young men woke up and heard a noise in the bushes. There was 
obviously a large animal prowling around close to their camp. He jumped up and 
shouted, “There’s a lion! There’s a lion!” He began to hurl rocks and sticks at the clump 
of bushes from where the noise originated. Two of his companions, now awake, joined 
in, desperately throwing anything they could get their hands on in a frantic attempt to 
scare the lion away. During a lull in their bombardment and much to their surprise, the 
lion stopped moving around and began to shout at them, “Stop! Stop you idiots! I’m not 
a lion! It’s me! It’s me, your mate! I only got up to have a piss!”
The older men denigrated the feats of young men by retelling their tales of adventure as 
jokes. The former miners would tell me that the hazards faced by the younger 
generation were trivial. “They know nothing of danger,” one old man told me. “These 
kids are just walking through the bush. They are scared of animals. Animals are 
nothing.” The experiences of their sons were dismissed as nothing more than a walk in 
the park. In mocking the young, the older men were not only bolstering their own 
achievements and bravery, but also sustaining the pressure on the young migrants to 
continue to try and find work in the mines. By ridiculing the achievements of the 
younger migrants, the older generation is arguing that the only way to become a ‘proper 
man’ in this society is to be a miner.
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Finding work in South Africa: bad jobs with low wages
Having completed the hazardous clandestine journey into South Africa, a young 
migrant must look for work. Before finding a job in the mines. Six Valoi had worked 
illegally as a labourer on farms and construction sites. Many of the young men in 
Mavodze recounted similar experiences. Almao had first travelled to South Africa in 
1990. He had earlier travelled to Xai Xai and applied for a mining job at the Wenela 
office, but had returned to the village empty-handed as the company was not recruiting 
novices at that time. Almao explained that he did not have a passport so had to cross 
into South Africa through the Kruger Park. He had stayed in South Africa for almost 
three years and had lived in Rustenburg, Johaimesburg and Malelane. He had taken 
whatever jobs he was offered, working in Johannesburg as a labourer on a number of 
construction sites, picking fruit on several large farms in Malelane, and making bricks 
in a factory in Rustenburg.
The experiences of Six and Almâo are typical of those of other illegal migrants in 
Mavodze. Of the households that I had surveyed in the village, 66 had family members 
working illegally in South Africa. Only 29 of these were aware of what type of 
employment the relative had found: 12 worked in agriculture; 11 in construction, 4 were 
hawking cigarettes, cassettes, clothes or other items on the streets; and 2 were working 
as illegal security guards. These positions were nearly always at the lowest end of the 
job hierarchy and illegal Mozambicans would usually be only employed on an informal 
and temporary basis; with virtually no chance of job security or stability; with 
considerable risk of redundancy; and with the attendant problem of having to move 
from place to place in order to find new employment.
The labourers’ undocumented status leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. 
Human Rights Watch states that undocumented migrants working as farm labourers are 
among the lowest-paid workers in South Africa, earning on average as little as US$1-2 
per day (1998:36). My evidence supports this, although returning migrants in Mavodze 
stated that they had been paid slightly more than the salaries stated in the Human Rights 
Watch report. Miguel Valoi had returned from South Africa in 2002. Miguel’s last job 
had been picking oranges from orchards on a farm in Mpumalanga Province. He had
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been standing at a crossroads with a group of other unemployed migrants and one of the 
foremen from a farm had picked up a group of them and offered them some work. The 
workers were paid 32 Rand (US$ 3.20) per 100 bags of oranges they filled. Miguel had 
managed to fill a hundred on his first day and the foreman said that if he continued to 
work at that pace he could have the job until the harvest was completed. Miguel had 
moved into a bunkhouse on the farm and was provided with food in the evenings. The 
job had lasted just over two weeks. Miguel reflected that the job had been one of the 
better ones he had been given during his two and a half years in South Afiica. It was 
good pay and he was given board and lodging. The worst jobs, he told me, included 
selling goods on the street. He had spent several months selling cigarettes and 
confectionery on a small stall in Johannesburg. There were so many other people 
trading the same items that it was hard to make anything at all. “If the other vendors 
found out I was a Mozambican they would beat me and steal my goods. The South 
Afiicans didn’t like us taking their work.”
The Mozambican migrant workers were subject to physical abuse not only from their 
South Afiican competitors, but also from the police. If apprehended by the authorities 
illegal migrants would be arrested and detained until they could be repatriated to their 
country of origin. For Six Valoi, detention had been uneventful and he had been taken 
back to Mozambique without any incident. However, not all the young men from 
Mavodze had been so fortunate. In the early 1990s the South Afiican police had arrested 
one young man, whom I shall call Arturo to respect his wish for anonymity, in the 
Northern Province (renamed Limpopo Province in 2002). He protested and claimed that 
he was a South Afiican and had lost his identity card.'^  ^The police did not believe him. 
The young man insisted that he was telling the truth. The police handcuffed his hands 
behind his back and tied his feet together with a length of rope. The rope was thrown 
over a hook in the ceiling and the young man was lifted up by his feet. A large drum of 
water was placed under him and the police lowered him into the drum. He was 
repeatedly dropped into the water until he eventually admitted that he was from 
Mozambique. The police then beat him with the hosepipe that had been used to fill the 
water drum and he was deported several days later.
This was a plausible excuse because the Sbangaan live on either side o f the border and use a very 
similar dialect.
I l l
The illegal status and the threat of torture and deportation leave Mozambican migrants 
in South Africa highly vulnerable to exploitation from more unscrupulous employers. 
Six Valoi said that some of his South African employers had threatened to have him 
deported unless he left the worksite without his wages. This practice appeared to be 
common."^  ^ Luis Zitha told me about a time when he had been working on a farm and 
the foreman had said that the workers were to be paid every fortnight. They had worked 
for 12 days and then the foreman had called the police. Luis had been put in the back of 
a van and driven off to a police station before being sent back to Mozambique via 
Komatipoort. Luis said that losing the 12 days of wages was bearable, commenting, 
“We weren’t being paid much anyway”. The problem was that he had been in South 
Africa for two years, during which time he had saved some money and bought many 
goods to bring home. He had left these at a friend’s house. “When they took me back to 
Mozambique, I had to cross back into South Africa to go and collect these things. There 
were so many of them that I couldn’t carry them all back through the Kruger Park. Can 
you see me running away from a lion carrying this table and those chairs?” He indicated 
the furniture in his compound and laughed. “No, I had to pay someone to drive all these 
things through the border and I walked back with the lions.”
Clandestine crossings, consumption and crime
Luis’ story tells us something about a further aspect of the illegal migration experience. 
In chapter 2 we saw that the purchase of commodities in South Afiica was a 
fundamental part of labour migration. The miners would use their wages to purchase 
goods in the mining compounds and would pick these items up at the Kawena 
distribution warehouse on their return to Mozambique. Luis’s account of his deportation 
and subsequent return to South Afiica to collect the goods that he had purchased 
demonstrates that, despite the shift away from legal organised migration, the 
consumption of South Afiican commodities remains important to these new, illegal 
migrants. The undocumented migrants are working and travelling outside the 
framework of the law and therefore cannot use the same institutionalised distribution
See also Human Rights Watch (1998:39)
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structures utilised by the miners. Some men will literally carry their purchases back to 
Mozambique. I spoke to one former South African immigration officer who had caught 
a man attempting to carry an old car battery, four used car tyres, two sets of broken 
caravan steps and a plastic table capable of seating six, back to Massingir. The man was 
transporting this assortment of bric-a-brac, item by item, through the Kruger Park. Luis 
laughed at the mere suggestion that he should carry his goods home, opting instead to 
pay someone to drive them through the border post and deliver them to his doorstep. 
For the most part, and for those who had earned enough to be able to afford it, this was 
the preferred means of transporting items home.
A whole transport network had developed in response to the changing patterns of 
labour migration. Private taxis (chapas), usually minibuses with trailers — or, for those 
servicing more rural areas, pick-up trucks — would collect goods from previously 
arranged places in South Africa and deliver them back to the villages in Mozambique. 
Mavodze was serviced by two of these private entrepreneurs: James and Nikeas. James 
had been bom in the neighbouring village of Massingir Velho, but had lived in South 
Africa for most of his life. He held a South African passport and drove a relatively new. 
South African-registered, four-wheel-drive Ford pick-up. Being in possession of all the 
correct paperwork, he mostly used the principal official border crossing point between 
Mozambique and South Afiica at Ressano Garcia. He said that he did the trip between 
three and four times a month,
I drive around the farms, villages and towns in South Africa where I know people from 
Mozambique are working. I speak to people and tell them that I will be leaving on such- 
and-such a day, from such-and-such a place. The word spreads and on that day there 
will be a group of people and a pile of things that I carry across the border. I leave the 
goods in my aunt’s house and people inform their relatives that they must come and 
collect the items that I have delivered. Sometimes I bring people with me. For a person 
with a passport it costs 200,000 MZM (US $8.70) and for those who don’t have the 
correct papers, 1,500,000 MZM (US $65). The price goes up because I have to give 
some money to the border guards or take a ‘bush road’ that bypasses the border post.
Nikeas lived in Mavodze and ran a far less professional operation. Although Nikeas had 
a Mozambican passport, he lacked a driving licence and his car, to the best of my
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Photo 20: A toilet constructed from South African road signs and other bric-a- 
brac brought back by a returning migrant
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knowledge, was registered in neither South Africa nor Mozambique. It lacked a starter 
motor and—for most of my time in the village—a passenger door, not to mention road 
tax, registration documents or insurance. Nikeas ran his operations through the more 
‘relaxed’ border post at Pafuri. Pafuri is about 280 km north of Mavodze at the juncture 
of the South African, Mozambican and Zimbabwean borders: a drive which takes 
between nine and 14 hours depending on the state of the roads. The border post is a run­
down former Portuguese trading post inhabited by a couple of dusty border guards and a 
customs official. The officials are notoriously lax in checking documentation and 
Nikeas claimed that it cost as little as 50 Rand (US$5) to persuade the guards to let his 
vehicle, loaded with un-documented people and goods, across the border. However, 
despite their apparent differences, Nikeas and James offered much the same type of 
service; both making a living by transporting goods and people across the border."^ ^
The clandestine labour migration results in the illicit movement of goods not only from 
South Africa into Mozambique, but also from Mozambique into South Africa. 
Throughout my time in Massingir, people frequently referred to the weapons that had 
been distributed by the government during the civil war, acknowledging that many of 
these armaments had not been decommissioned despite the signing of the peace treaty. 
During one such discussion I passed around a catalogue that I had been sent fr’om a 
Christian Aid-sponsored art exhibition that had been showing at London’s Oxo Gallery. 
The exhibition featured the results of a project known as ‘Transforming Arms into 
Ploughshares’ that had been operating in Northern Mozambique during the mid-1990s. 
The project encouraged people to surrender their weapons in return for construction 
materials or tools such as sewing machines and ploughs. Local artisans and artists 
would then transform these old weapons into pieces of public art. The exhibits shown in 
the catalogue are remarkable and provoked much discussion among my informants in 
Mavodze. However, when I explained the idea of exchanging weapons such as AK-47s 
or bazookas for sewing machines or ploughs, they laughed at me. “These people in the
The changes in the mining industry have drastically reduced the amount o f material being purchased 
through Kawena, the distribution conqjany that operates in the mining compounds and delivers 
throughout Southern Afiica. In response to this, the conçany has recently begun sending representatives 
around the farms and rural areas o f South Afiica in an effort to gain the business o f the Mozambican farm 
workers. The coirqjany has also expanded its business in Mozambique by opening commercial outlets for 
non-mining customers (discussion with Alex Vagos, Manager o f Kawena Xai Xai, 2/12/02).
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Photo 21: Cover of the Christian Aid exhibition displayed at London’s Oxo gallery
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north are stupid,” they said, pointing at my glossy brochure. “Why would they want to 
swap such a fine weapon for a plough? They could sell it in South Afiica and buy a 
hundred ploughs.” One man explained that many people still had their weapons fi*om 
the war. In Machamba and Mapai (two villages north of Mavodze), for example, there 
are people who know the location of the Renamo arms and ammunition caches. If these 
individuals wish to sell a weapon, they will contact a fiiend in South Afiica and strip the 
gun into smaller pieces. These pieces are given to the young men walking across the 
border. Each migrant is told that he will receive some money when his piece of the 
weapon is delivered to a specified location.
The South Afiican police force seized 5,256 firearms that were being smuggled in from 
Mozambique between January and May 1994; this had dropped to 1,222 by the 
following year (SAPA 1995). Although this figure has since dropped further to only 372 
arms seized between August 1999 and October 2000 (Hennop 2001), the smuggling of 
firearms fi*om Mozambique into South Afiica continues. Other items are also smuggled 
into South Afiica by illegal migrants. During my fieldwork a large jam-jar of uncut 
diamonds was taken off one migrant by a Limpopo National Park game warden, there 
were persistent rumours that drugs were being trafficked across the border and I was 
able to speak to one group of poachers who continued to trade rhino horn and elephant 
tusks.
Stephen Ellis documents the South Afiican security services’ involvement in ivory-, 
gem-, drug- and arms-smuggling while attempting to destabilise neighbouring countries, 
including Mozambique (1994). He controversially argues that members of the military 
and white elite continue to have interests in these illicit trades. They use such contacts to 
“retain their capacity to destabilise South Afiica at least until such a time as they are 
convinced the country has a stable government in which white interests are adequately 
protected” (1994:68). While I remain unconvinced by this final point, Ellis’ discussion 
of the criminalization of the Afiican state in both this article and in his subsequent work 
with Jean-François Bayart and Beatrice Hibou (Bayart et al 1999) is of interest in this 
context. The involvement of state agencies, whether sanctioned or not, in illicit 
smuggling activities is of course cause for concern. However, the experiences of the 
clandestine Mozambican migrants reveal the less sensational, but nevertheless illegal.
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activities that occur at an everyday level by those crossing the border and the 
Mozambican and South African officials who are responsible for patrolling it.
The transport of consumer goods and people across the border by the likes of Nikeas 
and James is dependent on the South Afiican and Mozambican border officials turning a 
‘blind eye’ or accepting the occasional bribe. Through accepting, and in some cases 
demanding, bribes the state officials are perpetuating the activities of the smugglers (see 
also Coplan Unpublished, on the movement across the Free State-Lesotho border). The 
beatings and torture administered by the police, as described by those migrants who had 
been deported from South Afiica, fall well outside the remit of the law.^° The practices 
at border crossings and police brutality are among the more apparent aspects of the 
criminality of state officials. However, a far subtler degree of state criminal activity is 
exposed in the stories of the migrant workers. Many of those clandestine migrants who 
had been employed on construction sites and, especially, farms reported being arrested 
and deported following police raids on the premises. While undocumented workers 
should be repatriated, those employing these illegal immigrants should also be 
prosecuted: the evidence suggests that this is not occurring (Human Rights Watch 
1998). Far from clamping down on illegal labour practices, the state is encouraging the 
exploitation of these undocumented workers. By arresting and deporting workers before 
they receive their wages, the police are providing the — predominantly white — farm 
owners with a cheap, if not free, workforce.
Welcome home? The new migrants and returning to the village
The changing nature of labour migration has resulted in significant changes to the 
social, cultural and economic life of the Mozambican villages that have historically 
supplied South Africa with its foreign workforce. The clandestine migrant labourers 
earn considerably less than their few legal counterparts who continue to work in the 
mines. A farm labourer will earn between US$1-3 per day, while I estimate that an
The instances o f police brutality are not limited to the South African authorities. The Mozambican 
game wardens operating within the LNP would frequently punish poachers and illegal migrants by 
beating the soles o f their feet, as well as extracting the legally stipulated monetary fine (see Chapter 5).
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average miner would earn about $4 per day. The difference is compounded by the fact 
that a miner has a job that is guaranteed for a specified period of time, normally 
between 12 and 14 months. A young man who has crossed into South Afiica illegally 
has virtually no job stability and will often have to spend the small amount he has 
earned from one job supporting himself until he can find another. He is also, as we have 
seen, vulnerable to exploitation and abuse fi*om employers and faces the constant threat 
of deportation. It is, therefore, very difficult for a young Mozambican who is in South 
Afiica illegally to save any money.
The difference is further compounded by miners’ receiving full board and lodging and 
thus having few day-to-day living expenses. This, together with the system of deferred 
pay, discussed in Chapter 2, which means that the miner will be paid only 40% of his 
wages in South Afiica and will collect the rest of his salary once he returns to 
Mozambique at the end of the contract, enables miners to save money. Where miners 
thus return home with the majority of their income, there is no such proviso for the 
illegal migrants. Any income that clandestine migrants are able to save is quickly 
converted into consumer goods to bring home and while they may return with new 
clothes or a radio, unlike the miners it is unlikely they will be able to return with many 
savings.
The fixed length of service in the mining sector makes it certain that the miner will 
return home on a regular basis. This is not the case for the young men who cross 
illegally. The miners usually return home every 12-14 months. However, in all the 
examples given above clandestine migrants do not return for periods of up to three and 
four years. The young men explained that it requires much more time for them to save 
enough money to make it worthwhile returning to Massingir. It would be a sign of 
failure for them to return empty-handed.
In earning less money, returning less fi*equently and having a less secure system of 
transporting goods home, the clandestine migrants are less able to support their families 
in Massingir than the miners. Employment instability makes it much harder for a family 
in Mozambique to contact relatives working illegally in South Africa, as the workers 
have to travel around so much more. Therefore, during times of crisis at home, such as 
the catastrophic floods of 2000 or the prolonged drought of 2001-03, the family can
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have difficulty informing the men working across the border of any problems. Even if a 
family does succeed in contacting its breadwinner, he may not be in a position to assist 
financially. The older residents of Mavodze fi*equently complained that their sons were 
not sending food, money or clothing fi*om Joni. The older men would grumble that, 
when they were working in the mines, they would send home food and money to their 
families; why weren’t today’s young people doing likewise? Very often men would 
complain that their sons would return fi*om working with new clothes and fancy radios, 
but would bring nothing to eat nor money with which to buy food. The purchase of 
consumer goods, as I have argued in the previous chapter, had been an important feature 
of labour migration for generations and I do not think that my older generation of 
informants were resentful of this aspect of the younger migrants’ behaviour. The cause 
of contention lay in the fact that today’s migrants earned far less than the miners of the 
previous generation and they were spending such a high proportion of their wages on 
the consumer goods that they had very little else with which to return to the villages. In 
the past this extra money had been used to assist kinsmen and others in times of crisis; 
today’s migrants were returning without such funds. The older generation assumed that 
the young men were flittering away their money on women and drink in South Afiica 
and were angry that very little was returning to the villages in Mozambique.
The issue of bridewealth cattle {lobolo) was a bone of particular contention. I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter that during the heyday of migrant mine labour the 
young men would return to the village at the end of their first contracts and use their 
wages to purchase cattle with which to pay the required bridewealth to their potential 
father-in-laws. Having married, the young miners would return to South Afiica and earn 
money to establish an independent homestead, complete with their own herd of cattle. 
These animals could be purchased in exchange for consumer goods fi*om South Afiica 
or, more commonly, with the deferred wages that miners would receive in cash on their 
return to Mozambique. As we have seen, the changes in migratory labour have resulted 
in lower wages paid in cash for casual labour, in contrast to the system of deferred pay. 
Today’s migrants, therefore, return home with much less cash than their predecessors. 
With less money, the young men lack the purchasing power to buy the number of cattle 
required for the lobolo payment. At the same time the price of cattle has increased. 
During the war a great number of cattle were stolen or killed: the total cattle population
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in Gaza province fell from 418,000 in 1981 to only 50,000 in 1990;^  ^ and during the 
same period in Mavodze, almost every household lost most, or all, of their animals. 
With fewer, more expensive cattle and fewer migrant remittances made to rural 
households, the young men are unable to pay the standard lobolo of 15 heads of cattle.^^
Members of the older generation are anxious to rebuild their cattle herds following the 
losses incurred during the war. They regard bridewealth payments as a means of doing 
this. Even before the war, lobolo payments were an important means by which the older 
generation would sustain a cattle herd. Due to poor environmental conditions and 
limited animal husbandry techniques, cattle reproductive rates are low in this area and 
the herds are gradually depleted as households are forced to sell animals to raise money 
in times of crisis to pay for items such as medical costs, food or clothing. Cattle are 
important as a source of status (see Ferguson 1990), a means of production through 
traction, and as a source of cash and means of saving. People are mistrustful of banks 
and prefer to invest any money they have in livestock. The older men regard the lobolo 
cattle as a type of pension with which they can support themselves as they get older. As 
a result, the older men demand as many animals as they can in exchange for their 
daughters’ hands in marriage. As the older men want as many animals as possible and 
the young men do not have the resources to provide this number, heated negotiations 
now take place over the lobolo payments. The fall in bridewealth from 15 cattle to 
anything between six and three animals indicates that young men are gaining the upper 
hand in these negotiations, but this much lower rate represents a source of considerable 
tension between the generation of former miners and the younger generation of illegal 
labour migrants.
Disagreements over bridewealth have, my informants reported, led to more young 
couples leaving the village and eloping. This became a common topic of conversation 
after the daughter of one man fled with her boyfiiend to South Afiica. The father had 
been demanding a lobolo payment of over 20 cattle which his prospective son-in-law
Information collated from documents held at the Province Livestock Services, Xai Xai.
Frelimo attempted to limit l o b o l o  payments to only three animals as a part o f its campaign against local 
traditions that the party dismissed as backwards and impeded the modernisation o f  the country (see 
Chapter 4). There was a general consensus among both my informants and the local Frelimo 
representatives that this had not been enforced, as cattle were transferred over a period o f time and not in 
a single batch,
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could not afford. The father, famous for his stubbornness, refused to lower his demands. 
The young couple had stolen some of his chickens and left the village. The father was 
outraged and called a public meeting, where he proposed that a group of men should 
track down the couple and the young man should be killed. While the others attending 
the meeting did not take this suggestion seriously, the old man’s anger was clear to 
everyone. After the meeting several informants explained that people were concerned 
about the rising number of couples leaving the village to avoid bridewealth payments. 
Ten years ago, they said, such instances were rare, but in recent times eloping was 
becoming increasingly common.
Even for the couples who did not elope, the consequences of the shift from a mining 
workforce to illegal migrant workers has changed the way in which households develop. 
In the previous chapter we saw how migrating to the mines acted as a rite of passage for 
young adolescents. In this chapter I have argued that, although the mines are no longer 
an option for most residents, young men are turning to illegal migration and informal 
sources of employment. The problem is that this new form of migration does not offer 
the same economic rewards or the structured system that mining once did. While young 
men are able to migrate, they are less able to accumulate the resources necessary to 
leave their fathers’ homesteads. Even if a young man can raise enough for the brideprice 
with which to marry, his lower wages and lack of job security make it difficult to 
establish his own herd of cattle and supply the other resources needed to form their own 
homestead. As a result households in Mavodze appeared to be getting larger. It is of 
course difficult to qualify this with empirical evidence on the basis of only 17 months of 
fieldwork. Clearly, individual households expand and contract over time according to 
the domestic cycle, and therefore one cannot classify homesteads into completely 
separate categories at any one point in time. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence from my 
informants did suggest a change might be occurring due to the new patterns of 
migratory labour. People would comment that ‘normal’ homesteads comprised between 
8 and 15 people, usually with one or two adult males. They would talk disapprovingly 
or with pity about the size of the households of the ‘new migrants’. These were much 
larger, ranging from 20 to over 30 people and with 6, 7 or 8 adult males. With growing 
households and reduced access to animals, it becomes more difficult to cultivate enough 
land to support these larger families.
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Conclusions
In the previous chapter I argued that the large-scale labour migrations from 
Mozambique to South Africa developed not only as a response to economic needs, but 
also as a result of political agreements and cordial relations between the two states. The 
agreements and mutually beneficial policies that developed between the mining 
companies, the Portuguese colonial government and the South Afiican state shaped the 
lives of generations of Mozambicans living in the southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza 
and Inhambane. As the chapter demonstrated, migrating to the gold mines gained far 
more significance than that of simply earning a living; it became entrenched in the 
social and cultural fabric of the rural communities. Becoming a gold miner in South 
Afiica was a rite of passage for the young men of southern Mozambique: through 
mining they became accepted as a man; through mining they could marry; and through 
mining they could establish their own homestead to continue their lineage.
This chapter has examined how this situation has changed. Just as the system of migrant 
labour was established through economic need and agreements between states, this 
chapter has demonstrated how the economic circumstances of the 1970s and 
disagreements between states overhauled the labour system, transforming the lives of 
those living in the areas that have historically supplied the mining workforce. The 
abolition of fixed gold prices allowed the mining industry to invest in mechanisation 
and raise miners’ salaries. This reduced the mining companies’ dependence on vast 
amounts of cheap foreign labour. At the same time the political landscape of southern 
Africa was undergoing massive change. The former colonies surrounding South Afiica 
were gaining independence and these frontline states were taking an increasingly firm 
stance against the racist polices of the South Afiican state. Migrant labour became used 
as a political weapon, wielded by both sides, in the struggle against apartheid. Anxious 
to protect this vital sector of the economy the South Afiican state and the mining 
companies sought to internalise the mining workforce as much as possible, resulting in 
massive job losses throughout the former supplier states.
It was widely predicted that this labour retrenchment would be a disaster and result in 
the economic collapse of the rural areas across the region. In Mozambique the number
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of miners sent to the goldmines has heen cut by about 50%. In this chapter I have 
argued that these reductions have, indeed, disadvantaged those living in rural areas, as 
Wenela has closed its network of rural recruitment centres in favour of several key 
depots located in the national and provincial capitals. Nevertheless, despite the 
retrenchment a small number of men from the villages of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin 
continue to be employed in the mines. Their experiences, however, differ considerably 
from those examined in Chapter 2. Rather than serving several contracts in the mines as 
relatively unskilled labourers, the few men from the villages who are employed today 
have become skilled, well-paid career miners. They do not work for several years and 
return home to be absorbed into agricultural production, but continue working back-to- 
back contracts in South Africa. When these professionals are due to retire, or when new 
workers are needed, the mining companies limit recruitment to the immediate family 
members of their existing employees. Consequently, these few families are able to 
sustain a good secure income and relative to the other villagers are emerging as a rural 
economic elite; a ‘mining aristocracy’.
While in the past employment opportunities in mining were open to nearly all of the 
young men in the village who wanted them, following the downscaling only a very few 
were lucky enough to be miners. The vast majority of young men were unable to follow 
their fathers to the gold mines of the Witwatersrand. Although the gates of the mines 
were closed to most, the social and economic pressure to go to South Africa remained. 
Young migrants were forced to cross the border illegally and risk the hazardous journey 
through the Kruger National Park. Unable to engage in telling the stories of the dangers 
of the mines, as the miners of previous generations had done, the young men exchange 
similar tales to emphasise their bravery and masculinity in relation to the perils of 
crossing the Kruger Park. Rather than migration and mining being synonymous, the 
young men’s tales now stress the dangers inherent in the act of migrating, 
differentiating these from the relatively uneventful experience of the workplace itself.
Where previous generations of villagers had gone to South Africa as miners through the 
Wenela recruitment system, the new migrants cross the border illegally and struggle to 
find employment. The jobs that are commonly available are as temporary labourers on 
construction sites or as seasonal agricultural labourers. I have demonstrated that these 
jobs are poorly paid and highly insecure and the workers are susceptible to exploitation
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and deportation back to Mozambique. These limited prospects have resulted in many 
migrants participating in smuggling and other illegal activities to subsidise their 
incomes.
With less ability to earn and save money, the new migrants are reluctant to return home 
without the consumer goods that are expected of returnees. While miners returned home 
at the end of every contract, new migrants can stay away for periods of up to three or 
four years. This high degree of absenteeism and the fact that, even when they do return, 
few migrants have been able to save much money have resulted in growing tensions 
between those migrating and the home communities. The young men are unable to 
provide sufficient numbers of cattle for bridewealth and cannot save enough money to 
establish their own households. As a result there is a growing divide between those 
families who have access to mining labour and those who do not. The cyclical pattern of 
economic differentiation described by Spiegel (1980) among migrants in Lesotho is no 
longer appropriate for the contemporary migrants fi*om Mozambique. Those who have 
secured jobs in the mining industry are able to repeatedly renew their contracts and 
develop long-term mining careers. These families are able to maintain their 
advantageous position due to the nepotistic recruitment policies adopted by the mining 
companies. The young men from families that are unable to find positions in the mines 
are forced to cross into South Afidca illegally and take temporary jobs that leave them 
open to exploitative employment practices and low wages.
In this chapter and the previous one I have argued that the lives of the residents of 
Mavodze and the surrounding villages have been shaped by their social and economic 
dependence on South Africa. With the neighbouring country being of such importance, 
one might ask whether these people have not come to identify themselves with it. Or do 
they have a ‘borderland’ identity as some of the literature suggests is likely? As I have 
indicated, neither of these is the case: instead, they continue to identify themselves as 
Mozambicans. Studies of migration have noted how migrants often gain a sharpened 
sense of their own identity while they are away. In her work in Johannesburg among 
female migrants fi’om South Afiica’s Northern Province, Deborah James observes that 
the women’s commitment to their home region is strengthened through absence and by 
living elsewhere (1999). We have seen in Chapter 2 that Patrick Harries argues that 
Mozambican Shangaan identity was shaped by the labourers’ migrations to South
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Africa in the late 19^*^ and early 20^ ’’ centuries (1994). The evidence presented so far in 
this thesis has demonstrated that migration continues to play an important role in the 
lives of those living in the Mozambique-South Africa borderland today. However, my 
aim here is not to demonstrate how this sense of Mozambican identity is sharpened 
while being away but rather how it gets consolidated while back at home. In the 
following chapter I argue that the strong sense of nationalism held by the residents of 
Massingir owes much to their experience of local political life and, in particular, the 
way that Frelimo has come to dominate politics in this region.
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4. Frelimo and the single-party state
Introduction
“There is only one political party around here. In this region we only have Frelimo; 
there are no other parties”, explained my friend Joaquim as I bought a couple of beers at 
the village barraca (kiosk). Joaquim was the director of education for the administrative 
post of Mavodze. That evening he was venting his frustration at having to close the 
village school in order to provide a venue for the Frelimo leadership to host a meeting 
during which elections were held to appoint members to the various local party 
committees. “In this part of Gaza Province, this is the way it is,” continued Joaquim,
If I want a government job, I have to be a member of Frelimo. There is no other way. 
That is why all those people are on the committees; they have to be part of the party to 
keep their jobs. If the district administration found out that I was in Renamo, for 
example, I would lose my job. There is no other party here. It is only Frelimo.
These were sentiments that were echoed time after time during the 17 months that I 
spent living in Massingir. Frelimo was referred to as 'The" political party and most 
people would use the term ‘party’ interchangeably with the terms ‘government’ or 
‘state’. During my time in Massingir I never saw any Mozambican political insignia 
other than that of Frelimo.^^ The regional leaders had told me that there were no 
Renamo supporters in this area; according to the chefe do paste, not one single vote for 
Renamo had been cast in this area during the 1994 general elections.
The situation that I experienced in Massingir appeared to be in stark contrast to the 
overall impression given by numerous political scientists and development practitioners 
that herald Mozambique as one of ‘Afiica’s success stories’ in its effective transition 
from a single-party state to a multi-party democracy (Rotberg 2002:503; Ellis 2004).
T-shirts and posters carrying slogans and symbols o f the South African ANC were common and 
indicate how strongly the region is affiliated with the neighbouring regional superpower (see Chapters 2 
& 3). However, there was never any sign o f support for other Mozambican political parties.
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While there have been two nation-wide multi-party elections and the parliament sitting 
in Maputo has for over eight years included delegates from several parties, there is no 
sign of pluralist politics in Massingir. Frelimo dominates the political scene: there is 
little to indicate that the one-party system has ever been replaced.
In this chapter I chart how Frelimo came to dominate the political landscape in 
Massingir and illustrate how, to all intents and purpose, the one-party system continues 
to operate at a local level despite the move to pluralism at the national level. I argue 
that, although Frelimo was relatively unknown in this region before independence, at 
the end of colonial rule the party capitalised on anti-Portuguese sentiments and was able 
to quickly generate local support. Due to unique local circumstances Frelimo’s rural 
polices, that had proved extremely unpopular elsewhere in Mozambique, were warmly 
welcomed in the Lower Shingwedzi Basin. The party was able to bolster this local 
support during the civil war by assisting the local residents with weapons and training to 
protect themselves from Renamo attacks. Following the end of this conflict, Frelimo has 
been so successful at sustaining its popularity that other political parties have been 
unable to establish a foothold in the region. This chapter explores how the local Frelimo 
leadership achieved this and how this achievement has influenced local understandings 
of the state and political system.
Single-party regimes in Africa and Mozambique: theory and practice
Across Africa, single-party systems emerged as a common form of government 
following the end of colonialism. The rise of African nationalism following the end of 
World War U had put the European colonial powers under increasing pressure to leave 
the countries that they had occupied for much of the previous two centuries. During the 
late 1950s, as a result of either armed struggle or more peaceful negotiations, the 
colonial powers began their withdrawal from the continent. Most African countries had 
gained independence by organising a single nationalist movement. This had come to 
symbolise the struggle against the colonial regime and became the major party 
following independence (Wallerstein 1961:95). Many thought that the only way in 
which these newly independent states could avoid crumbling into chaos was through
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uniting under one party to strengthen and build the nation; party diversification would 
result in instability. As Immanuel Wallerstein argued in the early 1960s, “the choice has 
not been between one-party and multi-party states; it has been between one-party states 
and either anarchy or military regimes or various combinations of the two” (1961:95). 
Such views were echoed by Africa's new political leaders: in the Congo Patrice 
Lumumba argued that divisions would lead to the suicide of Africa (cited in Zolberg 
1966:50); in Guinea Sékou Touré said that without this political unity, colonialism in 
Afnca would prevail by seeping into the cracks caused by internal cleavages in African 
society (cited in Zolberg 1966:44); in Tanzania Julius Nyerere argued that, “to minds 
moulded by Western Parliamentary tradition and Western concepts of democratic 
institution, the idea of an organized opposition group has become so familiar that its 
absence immediately raises a cry of ‘dictatorship’” (cited in Zolberg 1966:48).
This optimism about the potential of the one-party African state was not to last. The 
prevailing notion that single-party governance was fundamental to uniting and 
strengthening states that had suffered years of colonial oppression began to be 
questioned. By the 1980s the lack of pluralist politics was becoming synonymous with 
corruption, fraud and bad governance (see Apter 1999 on Nigeria; Rotberg 2002:206-8 
on Zaire). Far from creating political stability, Jean-François Bayart argues, “one of the 
crucial issues in the unstable political life of Africa is the recurrence of authoritarian, 
totalitarian or despotic situations” (1986:109, italics added). He dismisses the cultural 
justification that pluralism is somehow un-African; nobody, Bayart says, continues to 
believe the African adage that ‘two bull-crocodiles cannot live in the same river’ 
(1986:109). Democracy, human rights and valuing the idea of the individual may be the 
products of Western history. However, these concepts were first introduced with 
colonialism and have become integrated into political cultures to such an extent that 
they cannot be simply eradicated with vague references to authenticity (Bayart 
1986:109; see also Clark 1998:46; Wiseman 1996).
This kind of rejection of cultural ‘special pleading’ has taken root in the international 
community. The notion that a single-party system of government is required for African 
development was superseded by the theory that a pluralist democratic system of 
government is the necessary foundation of a successful state. It was the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War that, according to many authors, heralded an
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era in which the push for democracy replaced the fight against communism as the 
underlying principle behind Western foreign policy (de la Gorgendiere 1996; Golooba- 
Mutebi 1999). Although the Comaroffs (1997) dispute this périodisation, observing that 
international pressure for democracy was being applied long before the Berlin Wall 
came down, there remains little doubt that the post-Cold War hegemony of the United 
States as the single world superpower (militarily and, perhaps more importantly, 
economically) has increased this pressure. This pressure is not merely rhetorical; the 
failure to conform can lead to the imposition of trade sanctions, exclusion from 
international organisations, refusal of credit, debt relief or even humanitarian aid. With 
the end of the superpowers’ rivalries, African statesmen are no longer in the bargaining 
position they occupied throughout the Cold War; instead of playing one side against the 
other to benefit from economic or military support, they now have little choice but to 
conform and be happy with what support they are offered (Plank 1993:408). This lack 
of choice has not always translated into the successful implementation of multi-party 
democracy, as my discussion of Mozambique, and southern Mozambique in particular, 
will make clear.
In many ways Mozambique has more or less followed the trajectory outlined above 
Frelimo spearheaded the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. Frelimo was founded 
in Tanzania in the early 1960s and its armed uprising took the form of guerrilla warfare, 
mainly in the northern provinces of Mozambique. In 1974 a faction of the Portuguese 
military, disheartened by the continuing colonial wars, staged a coup in Lisbon and 
overthrew the right-wing administration of Marcelo Gaetano^ "*. The collapse of the 
regime in Portugal forced the colonial administration to the negotiating table and, under 
the terms of the Lusaka Accord, Mozambique gained full independence on the 25* June 
1975. When the Portuguese pulled out, Frelimo was the only significant movement that 
could take over power and so the movement, as it was then known, assumed control of 
the new state. Frelimo, like other leftwing nationalist movements in Angola, Congo, 
Ethiopia and Tanzania, argued that a single-party socialist government was required to 
unite the new country, redistribute wealth, provide services to the people and revitalise 
the flagging economy (Clark 1998:45). The party’s hegemonic sway was undermined.
Stanley Payne (1995: 312-317) argues that, while the authoritarian regime that was established by the 
military in Portugal in 1926 was right-wing, it could not be considered fascist. He argues that the 
leadership rejected the fascist movement and was hostile to fascist culture in general,
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however, by forces of destabilisation unleashed as a result of its support for African 
nationalist movements in neighbouring white minority-ruled countries. These countries’ 
governments launched campaigns of destabilisation against Frelimo-govemed 
Mozambique, the principal tools of which were the Renamo guerrilla insurgents who 
conducted a campaign of brutal destmction and civil war throughout Mozambique fr*om 
1978 until 1992.
While Renamo began as a destabilisation force backed by UDI Rhodesia and apartheid 
South Africa, it later gained local support as an alternative to Frelimo in areas of 
Mozambique where the state’s rural and economic policies had proved to be deeply 
unpopular. By the late 1980s the political climate in southern Africa had changed and 
external support for Renamo was drying up. Years of civil war, drought and economic 
mismanagement had brought Mozambique to its knees. Both sides were under immense 
international pressure to negotiate a lasting settlement, fri 1992 the Rome Peace Accord 
was signed and Renamo agreed to cease fighting in exchange for the end of single-party 
rule. A new constitution was drafted and elections were held. In 1994 Frelimo won the 
first multi-party elections, winning 44% of the ballot. Renamo, which had been 
relaunched as a political party, secured 38% of the vote. The elections were universally 
hailed as a success and, having staged a second national vote in 1999 (in which Frelimo 
secured a second term in office), Mozambique is now said to have a fimctioning multi­
party democracy.
Viewed in these terms, Mozambique’s transition — frrom civil war, through peace and 
single-party rule, to pluralism — appears to be quite remarkable. However, as Richard 
Crook has commented on the transition to multi-party politics in Côte d’Ivoire, “[it] 
would be unrealistic to expect that the legacy of more than thirty years of single-party 
and single-presidential rule could have been wiped out in one single electoral contest” 
(1995:36). This is equally true for Mozambique; the gap between the international 
assessment of that country’s achievements and the actual situation on the ground is 
considerable (Alden 2001:101). The fact that multi-party elections took place need not 
necessarily imply pluralism. Joaquim’s comments, with which I opened this chapter, 
indicate that the practice of multi-party democracy has by no means diffused throughout 
the country. In order to establish if this is the case we must heed Jonathan Spencer’s 
(1997) recent call for anthropologists to investigate post-colonial politics with real
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empirical vigour and, more locally, Harry West’s (1998a:74) insistence that confusions 
that exist in Mozambique today can only be understood through understanding how 
people at the local level are experiencing the transition to democratic governance.
A number of recent studies have concentrated on local understandings of the politics in 
the post-war era in Mozambique. Karri Englund has looked at the transition from war to 
peace and democracy in rural communities on the Mozambican-Malawi border (2002). 
Jocelyn Alexander studied attitudes to local authority in Manica Province, central 
Mozambique (1997). Harry West has been investigating power relations in communities 
living on the Mueda Plateau in the far northern province of Cabo Delgado (West 1998b; 
2001; 2003; West & Kloeck-Jenson 1999). Lars Buur and Helene Kyed have observed 
the recent implementation of Decree 12/2000 dealing with community leaders in 
Sussundenga District, Manica Province (2003). In every case the authors note the 
various and numerous problems and limitations of the political reforms that are taking 
place in each area. All of the studies provide evidence that seriously undermines the 
presumption that the transition from single-party to multi-party politics has been an 
outright success. What distinguishes these studies from my own is Renamo’s presence 
in the areas concerned. While all these writers explicitly highlight the shortcomings of 
the current state of Mozambican pluralist politics, in each of the examples there are 
representatives of the opposition parties (principally Renamo) present in the area and 
these individuals are recognised as legitimate political actors. West recalls bouncing 
along in a pick-up truck with one Renamo activist and visiting the Renamo headquarters 
(2003:92-93). Alexander visited Renamo-controlled areas and interviewed Renamo’s 
director of education (1997:14). Englund observes that although Frelimo officials 
attempted to force Renamo officials to keep a low profile (2002:177), there could be no 
doubt that there was genuine support for the opposition in the region where he worked. 
These areas, then, contain at least the ingredients for a multi-party system.
The situation in Massingir was very different. Joaquim was not exaggerating when he 
told me over a beer that there was only one party present in the area around Mavodze 
and Massingir. Despite repeated attempts to find evidence of opposition parties 
throughout my time there, I never once heard of any residents having supported or even 
thinking of supporting any party other than Frelimo. There was absolutely no evidence
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of pluralism — or prospective pluralism — in voter behaviour or in the way the state 
operated.
In order to understand how and why Frelimo has retained effective single-party rule in 
the district of Massingir and why there is a complete absence of any other political 
parties, we must begin with the historical perspective on how Frelimo came to gain 
popularity in the region in the first place.
Frelimo-isation & villagisation of Mavodze
From the perspective of people in Massingir, the liberation struggle had always been 
abstract rather than an experienced reality. Although Frelimo had been fighting the 
Portuguese since the early 1960s, nearly all of the fighting had occurred in the northern 
provinces of Mozambique.^^ Frelimo was relatively unknown elsewhere in the country. 
Residents of Mavodze explained that during the colonial era it was very difficult to 
receive news about what was occurring elsewhere in the country. A number of the older 
men reported that they had heard a bit about Frelimo and the liberation struggle from 
colleagues while they had worked as migrant labourers in the South African goldmines. 
However, until independence, nobody from Mavodze and the surrounding villages had 
met a member of the liberation movement.^*  ^Mario, one of the older men in the village, 
described to me the first time a representative of the new government arrived in 
Mavodze:
The first time that we met someone from Frelimo was in 1975. In those days we did not 
live here in the village but in the Olifantes valley. One day a soldier from Tete, called 
Jorge Degodine, arrived in the valley and asked to meet all the people who lived nearby.
For further information about the war o f independence see: Isaacman & Isaacman (1983:79-109); 
Newitt (1995:517-538).
The lack o f involvement o f people in this area in Frelimo’s liberation campaign contrasts with 
neighbouring areas o f the southern Mozambique. Elsewhere in Gaza province, people crossed the border 
and travelled through Rhodesia to join Frelimo and fight against the Portuguese in the north o f  
Mozambique. One explanation for this was that much o f  the nationalist ideology was fostered in the 
mission-based education system in the southern provinces. However, there was no mission activity in the 
vicinity o f Mavodze and the other villages o f the Lower Shingwedzi Basin.
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He told us that he was Frelimo solider and had been fighting the Portuguese in the 
north. Jorge Degodine told us that Frelimo had beaten the Portuguese and forced them 
to leave Mozambique and return home. Frelimo was in charge; they were now the new 
government. His job was to go from place to place on his motorbike and tell the people 
that Frelimo was now ruling the country and what this meant. We did not know what 
Frelimo was; most of us had not even heard of them. Degodine told us that Frelimo was 
the name for the group of people that had forced the Portuguese to go and were now the 
government for us, the people of Mozambique. There was a new president who was 
called Samora Machel. He was a Shangaan from near Chokwe. Jorge Degodine told us 
that Samora was a good man and liked the people. Samora was not a leader who would 
only feed himself. He told us that together we would build a new country. Frelimo did 
not like the old system. We would not have to do forced labour or pay hut taxes. Jorge 
Degodine said that the old leaders were part of the Portuguese oppression. They were 
part of the old Mozambique and could not carry on with their work. He said that we 
needed new leaders. He told us Chauque would make a good village secretary. He had 
heard that Chauque could speak Portuguese and could write because he had worked in 
the cantina (trading post) with the Portuguese for many years. We agreed that Chauque 
would make a good leader and he became the secretary of Mavodze. Degodine said that 
there was a lot of work to do and that Chauque could not do all this work by himself, he 
would have to appoint a group of men to help him. Chauque and this group were the 
first to be a part of Frelimo and responsible for organising our area.
I heard similar versions of the same story from a number of village residents. In every 
case, what struck me as surprising was the fact that the village residents appeared to 
readily accept this new situation without so much as batting an eyelid. To summarise 
Mario’s account: a stranger arrived unannounced at one’s doorstep bearing news of the 
previous government’s demise and claiming to be a representative of the new regime. 
He then told the residents that their leaders were now obsolete and appointed a man 
with no leadership experience to run their affairs. The majority of people accepted this 
without serious debate. I found this account scarcely credible. In my own experience it 
had taken me months to earn an inkling of trust from just a few village residents. Most 
villagers probably remained convinced that I had some ulterior motive for being there, 
despite 17 months of local residence. How had this man Degodine won the people’s 
support so easily?
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There is, of course, the likelihood — as with most oral histories — that my informants’ 
memories of the episode were coloured by the subsequent events of the last 25 years. It 
could be the case that Frelimo had become popular at a later date and that this 
popularity had altered people’s memories of the initial reception of the party. However, 
a detailed analysis of the event, within the local context, suggests a number of reasons 
why the population of Mavodze readily welcomed Frelimo as the new government, 
despite never having any prior experience of the party’s activities.
The people of Massingir had loathed the Portuguese colonial regime. Residents of 
Mavodze recalled having to plant fields of cotton for the Portuguese, rather than being 
free to grow the food crops they needed to survive. Failure to pay taxes resulted in 
Mozambicans having to undertake six months of forced labour (chibalo) away from 
their families and in the harsh conditions of the Portuguese-owned farms near Chokwe, 
or repairing roads and railways elsewhere in the province. At independence the 
Portuguese administrator and his staff had left. As the news of independence and 
liberation spread, it is little wonder that Frelimo was popular; its struggle had freed the 
population from the oppressive colonial regime.^^
Despite the fact that most, if not all, of the fighting during the war for independence had 
taken place in the northern provinces of Mozambique, the residents of Mavodze saw 
themselves, in retrospect, as united with Frelimo in the battle against the Portuguese. 
This sense of unity stemmed from the history of the Gaza Empire that had dominated 
the region in the 19* century and had held out against repeated Portuguese attempts to 
expand their occupation inland. Stories about Gungunhana, the last ruler of the Gaza 
Empire, were extremely popular in Mavodze. People would tell me how their Shangaan 
grandparents and ancestors had fought against the Portuguese with Gungunhana at the 
end of the 19* century. “The Gaza Empire had been very strong and the Portuguese 
could not conquer us”, my field assistant told me. By his account, it was only with the 
aid of the Chopi, a rival neighbouring tribe, that the Empire was brought to its knees.
In fact the victory was not Frelimo’s alone. Most commentators agree that it was the sustained pressure 
o f fighting long wars against the nationalist movements in several colonies (Mozambique, Angola, 
Guinea-Bissau), rather than the outright military success o f any single nationalist movement, that had led 
to the collapse o f the Gaetano regime in Portugal, and ultimately independence for the colonies (Saul 
1985; Arabamsson & Nilsson 1995).
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The Portuguese wanted to control all of this land, but Gungunhana would not let them. 
Even with all of their guns and armies, the white men could not defeat us. The 
Portuguese did not know what to do. It was only because the Portuguese went to the 
Chopi people who live in Inhambane for help that they were able to defeat the Gaza 
Empire. The Chopi knew how to get Gungunhana and so they laid a trap. The 
Portuguese captured Gungunhana and sent him into exile in the Azores. The white man 
then had control of our land.
Whether by this means or not, Gungunhana’s defeat in 1896 and the subsequent 
collapse of the Gaza Empire marked the end of African resistance and the expansion of 
Portuguese control from the coastal regions into the interior. This control lasted until 
Frelimo came to power in 1975. The residents of Mavodze saw their forefathers’ battles 
against the Portuguese and Frelimo’s war of independence as part of the same fight. 
Indeed the grandfather of Frelimo’s president Samora Machel had served in 
Gungunhana’s court (Hanlon 1990:189). Frelimo, therefore, must be a force for good as 
it had rid the residents of Mavodze of the Portuguese and was on the same side, and 
been involved in the same battle, as their ancestors.
There was also an ethnic dimension to Mavodze residents’ initial acceptance of Frelimo. 
Although Jorge Degodine, the first representative of Frelimo to arrive in the area, was 
from the northern city of Tete, many of the movement’s leadership were Shangaan 
people from Southern Mozambique. All three of the party’s presidents, Mondlane, 
Machel and Chissano, were bom in Gaza Province. As early as the 1960s there were 
concerns from within the movement that southerners were beginning to dominate the 
party (see Saul 1985:57).^^ This domination has continued: the three southern provinces 
of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane are seen as a Frelimo stronghold and, conversely, 
Frelimo is seen very much as the party of the Shangaan. Residents of Mavodze must 
surely have been more at ease accepting Frelimo as their new leaders than members of 
another ‘outside’ group.
This ethnic affiliation, the historical legacy of having fought the Portuguese, and the 
fact that Frelimo had liberated the country, all contributed to the way in which Frelimo
Renamo continues to criticise Frelimo as being the party o f southerners (see Hoile 1994).
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was initially accepted in Massingir. However, while these factors certainly helped 
establish the legitimacy of the new government, Frelimo was quick to build upon this 
initial support by taking advantage of a set of unique local circumstances. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, during the final years of colonial rule the Portuguese had been engaged in 
damming the Olifantes River. By independence this dam was almost complete and the 
valley in which the population lived was beginning to flood. Frelimo were able to build 
local support by assisting the displaced residents construct a new settlement.
Before 1977, as Chapter 1 describes, ‘Mavodze’ referred to an area rather than a village 
per se. The population lived in dispersed homesteads in the Olifantes Valley, cultivating 
land and producing livestock along the banks of the river. The Olifantes is a major 
tributary of the River Limpopo that flows through Gaza Province and empties into the 
Indian Ocean near the provincial capital Xai Xai. Much of the agricultural production of 
Gaza Province depends on the fertile soils of the Limpopo Valley and the majority of 
the population lives on its floodplain. In an attempt to regulate the flow of the Limpopo, 
allowing irrigation and flood control, the Portuguese decided to dam the River Olifantes 
at Massingir. Work on the dam was begun in 1972 by a consortium of Portuguese 
companies headed by TAMEGA. Construction was completed in 1976. However, less 
than a year after completion the dam displayed major distress defects and as a result the 
irrigation potential of the dam was seriously impaired. The sluice gates now lie 
unmounted by the side of the slipway below the dam and the reservoir has, since 
completion, been filled at barely half of its designed storage capacity.Despite the 
defects, the construction of the dam resulted in the flooding of much of the Olifantes 
valley. Residents of Mavodze recalled that the reservoir filled rapidly during the floods 
that affected southern Mozambique in 1977. It became obvious that they could no 
longer continue to live on the Olifantes’ floodplain.
The most serious fault is due to the increased uplift pressure at different locations near the toe o f the 
dam. It is mostly believed that this is due to the existence o f highly pervious layers and geological faults 
under the dam that were not adequately treated during design and constmction (Marcus Wishart, 
environmental consultant to ARA-SUL, personal communication 2003)
A US $40.6m loan from the Afiican Development Bank is currently being used by the Mozambican 
Government to rehabilitate the dam and a smallholder irrigation scheme. This ‘second phase’, as it is 
known locally, is due to be conqjleted in 2006. People in the area always refer to the second phase as 
including the installation o f hydroelectric turbines, thus providing electricity to this region. However, 
electricity production would be limited, due to height and volume o f  water restrictions, and it is unlikely 
that any hydro-electric element will be included in the work.
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Photo 22: Massingir Dam in the dry season
Photo 23: The flooded Olifantes Valley where the population used to live
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At the same time that the dam was being built and Mavodze’s agricultural land was 
being flooded, Frelimo had replaced the Portuguese government. On coming to power, 
the Frelimo government was determined to end the social and political oppression that 
had prevailed under the colonial regime. It envisaged the future of the country as lying 
“in the building of a modem economy based on mechanised farming and a spread of 
industries” (Newitt 1995:547). In September 1975, Frelimo organised the first national 
agricultural seminar that proposed the regeneration of Mozambican agriculture through 
a system of communal villages (Marsh 1976); these were to become “the backbone of 
rural development” (Hanlon 1990:122).
The people of Mavodze and the surrounding villages were forced to leave their land and 
homes by the floodwaters caused by the Portuguese-built dam. Residents explained that 
the Portuguese had intended to move the entire population affected by the dam out of 
the area completely. Frelimo, however, allowed people to stay and suggested moving to 
higher ground and building communal villages as an alternative.^^ Several of my 
informants discussed the events leading up to the building of the village of Mavodze:
After the rainy season some men from the district came to visit Chauque [the new 
Frelimo secretary] and said that he needed to call a meeting. One of the men was called 
Chambone and he was the district administrator. He said that we could no longer live in 
the Olifantes valley. It was much better for us to live together in a village so that we 
could all work together. We knew that we could not continue to live in the valley. The 
Portuguese had built the dam and the water was building up behind it. Our fields were 
getting flooded and the river would have soon covered some people’s houses. The 
administrator told us that we should build a village on the high ground at the top of the 
valley. We would have to clear the bush and build a road. He told us that he would tell 
Chauque how to build the village and how to organise the work.
The new village was organised in much the same way that you see it today. It was to be 
laid out in neat lines and people would live much closer together. Before it was 
different, we lived in homesteads that were very spread out; you couldn’t even see your 
neighbour’s house. The village was split into four bairros [wards] by a road that ran
Ironically, draft proposals for the Limpopo National Park state that within the next ten years the 
population of the area may be resettled to the same region envisaged by the Portuguese 30 years ago 
(LNP 2003; AIM 2004a).
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through the centre. In the centre we had to clear an area that was to have the cooperative 
shop, a school, a football pitch, an area for village meetings, a health post, and a 
Frelimo Party office built in the middle. Each of the bairros was divided into blocks and 
we were allocated squares of ground where we could build our houses. Chauque told us 
that we should build our corrals for the cattle and goats on the edge of the village, not 
next to our houses.
When we had cleared a road through the bush, Frelimo brought a truck of zinc roofing 
sheets from the district and gave out 15 sheets to each household, to help us build our 
new houses. They also used the truck to help us move the logs that we had chopped to 
build the houses, corrals and granaries. It was a lot of hard work. At first we had to 
carry on going to the river to get water, but in 1982 the party put in tubes and a diesel 
pump so that we had water in the middle of the village. We built a school and Frelimo 
brought a schoolteacher to come and teach our children.®^
Frelimo intended the communal villages to allow access to schooling, health facilities, a 
co-operative shop, clean water and quality housing (Hanlon 1990:121). Frelimo saw the 
arrangement as a new social contract, in which the people would build the villages and 
the government provide the amenities (West 2001:131). With their homesteads and 
farmland being lost under the water of the reservoir, the residents of Mavodze were 
more than happy to participate in Frelimo’s process of villagisation. Their choice was 
of course somewhat determined by the fact that the Portuguese had initially built the 
dam. But, in any case, the fact that people were happy to move and participate in 
Frelimo’s villagisation programme contrasts with the experiences of villagisation 
described elsewhere in Mozambique.^^
The French anthropologist Christian Geffray undertook research in the rural district of 
Erâti in the northern province of Nampula during the 1980s. His central argument is that 
Frelimo’s rural policies alienated many communities and this discontent swelled the 
ranks of Renamo supporters, allowing the civil war to spread (1990). Alice Dinerman 
correctly observes that the two axes on which Geffray’s thesis turns are the discontent 
generated by Frelimo’s villagisation programme and the party’s refusal to recognise
“  Taken firom a group discussion held in Mavodze (22/04/02).
For exançle, villagisation was an especially unpopular policy in the Zambezi flood plain.
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traditional authority (Dinerman 1994:571; see also Fry 1990).^ "^  Geffray’s work has 
been subject to much criticism. Bridget O’Laughlin argues that the temporal and spatial 
boundedness of Geffray’s work results in him presenting a distorted and static account 
of the rural discontent (1992a; 1992b). She states that Geffray homogenises the 
peasantry and ignores the internal class relations that existed in rural communities. On a 
more theoretical level, Dinerman shows how Geffray’s argument was not necessarily 
vindicated by his own evidence and that he was guilty of naturalising tradition at the 
moment when it was becoming increasingly politicised (1994). Others have despaired at 
how Geffray’s thesis developed in a single district in Nampula has been applied without 
serious questioning to the entire country (see for example Englund 2002). While I agree 
with all of these critiques, there is little doubt that Frelimo’s policy of communal 
villagisation was often the source of much discontent. Harry West notes that, in Cabo 
Delgado, some farmers were forced against their will to leave their homesteads and 
settle in a communal village (2001:134), and even pro-Frelimo writers observe that 
villagisation was often unpopular and people were forced to move (see for example 
Hanlon 1990; Egero 1987). By 1982 Frelimo itself recognised that the collectivisation 
of the countryside was not going well (Frelimo 1982:24-25).
These criticisms notwithstanding, the hostility arising from villagisation was not as 
prevalent in Gaza as it was in the more northern provinces. Otto Roesch attributes this 
to the massive popular support Frelimo enjoyed in the province. Roesch argues that this 
support was so strong that peasant farmers, although preferring to live in their dispersed 
settlements, moved to the communal villages “out of a sense of duty and obligation 
towards Frelimo” (1992:466). Such devotion to Frelimo may have been present in the 
villages near Xai Xai, where Roesch worked, as these communities had had a longer 
and more intense relationship with the party. I do not think this could have been the case 
in Mavodze. The people had not encountered Frelimo until after independence in 1975, 
and although I have argued that a number of factors may have generated initial support 
for Frelimo these were not enough to generate the unquestioning allegiance described 
by Roesch.
^  I return to Geffray’s work and address issues relating to traditional authority in Chapter 6.
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For Mavodze we may turn Roesch’s argument on its head. It was in fact the process of 
villagisation that played a crucial part in endearing the local population to Frelimo, 
rather than alienating it from the party. The people living in the area disliked the 
Massingir Dam that had been built by the Portuguese; not only was the reservoir 
flooding their farmland but several villagers had been killed in a quarrying accident 
during the dam’s construction. The Portuguese had caused these woes. Frelimo arrived 
in the area having pushed out the colonial power and was now not only offering to help 
relocate the population away from the floodwaters, but was also supplying building 
materials and amenities for a new village. The residents described how Frelimo had 
brought roofing sheets for the new houses and transported building materials to the site 
of the new village. However, I was later to find out that it was in fact TAMEGA, the 
construction company, which had provided this assistance. One informant from outside 
the village recounted how the Frelimo officials from the district had only escorted, 
rather than provided, the TAMEGA trucks that had brought the materials from the 
construction site to the village. It was only the villages that had been affected by the 
flooding of the Olifantes Valley that were being compensated; all of the neighbouring 
areas that were also encouraged to resettle in communal villages received no such 
material help from the government, for no funds were available. In Mavodze, and the 
other villages surrounding the dam, Frelimo had successfully appropriated the 
compensation package that had been allocated to the disturbed communities by the 
construction company and had distributed it as its own. Frelimo had built upon those 
factors that had initially warmed the local residents to the organisation: the historical 
connection in the struggle against the Portuguese, ethnic affiliations to the leadership, 
and, of course, their final deliverance of liberation from colonial rule. The party 
capitalised on the legacy of the Portuguese damming of the Olifantes River by 
‘providing’ the materials and logistical support to a resettlement that was inevitable. In 
Massingir, unlike many other areas of the country, local residents welcomed the process 
of villagisation and Frelimo consolidated and built upon the local support that had been 
generated on its arrival in the region.
Villagisation, however, entails far more than simply moving house. During the late 
1970s the government of Guatemala undertook a campaign of villagisation similar to 
Frelimo’s in Mozambique. Looking at this Latin American example, Finn Stepputat 
demonstrates that villagisation was concerned with stabilizing rural areas and forming
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sites of governance (2001). Stepputat argues that three forms of stabilization underlay 
the process of villagising the countryside: special stabilization, whereby only the 
successfully settled areas were able to benefit from development infrastructures; social 
stabilization, in which a community was organised through establishing committees, 
public meetings and communal labour; and finally symbolic stabilization, in which 
public space was arranged as a site of governance by including features such as a central 
plaza including a school, clinic and administration building (2001). Stepputat*s model 
can be usefully applied to show how Frelimo’s policy of villagisation in Massingir was 
also a process of govemmentalization.
If we return to my informants’ description of how the village was built, and if we look 
at the sketch map of the village of Mavodze as it stands today (Map 3), it is clear that 
Stepputat’s concept of symbolic stabilization, or creating sites of government, is as 
applicable to the Mozambican as to the Guatemalan context. At the centre of Mavodze 
there is a central plaza, which accommodates the school and the houses for the teachers, 
the health centre and the nurse’s house, the water point, the village football pitch, the 
public meeting site, the administration building and administrator’s house, the Frelimo 
party office, the flagpoles flying the party flag and the flag of the republic, and the 
several small shops that serve the village. This is an organised public space in the very 
centre of the village that contains all the state institutions and houses the state 
employees. However, in Mavodze it is not just the central plaza but the entire village 
that can be described as a site of governance. The grid layout is clear from the sketch 
map. The village is split into four bairros (wards), each of these into blocks and then the 
blocks into household compounds. The spatial organization of the village allowed 
Frelimo easily to survey the goings-on in the village, operating, as Harry West has 
observed, in much the same way as Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon discussed by 
Foucault in his analysis of the modem prison (Foucault 1979; West 2001:132). 
Throughout my fieldwork the ease with which village activities could be observed 
meant the village leadership — like the fieldworker — always knew what was 
happening in the village.
Frelimo’s ‘unobstmcted surveillance’, as West puts it (2001:133), was not only a result 
of the way in which villages were spatially arranged. It also owed much to the means of 
social organization that was undertaken to achieve what Steputtat calls social
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stabilization (2001:300). On arriving in Massingir, Frelimo was not only interested in 
villagising the rural population but also organising a new political system, as my 
informant Mario (see above) explained:
Jorge Degodine [the Frelimo soldier who was the first party representative to meet the 
village residents] said that the old leaders were part of the Portuguese oppression. They 
were part of the old Mozambique and could not carry on with their work. He said that 
we needed new leaders.
The existing political structure, led by the village régulo (chief), was dismissed as 
backward and as having collaborated with the Portuguese regime.^^ Frelimo initially 
replaced the system of régulas with grupos dinamizadores (activating groups), such as 
the group of men appointed to assist Chauque in Mavodze, that were established as a 
short-term measure to “safeguard and consolidate the gains of the revolution” (People’s 
Power 1978:43). Later, a more structured system was developed based on a party-cell 
model. Selected Frelimo party members would be responsible for different parts of the 
village. A secretary would be in charge of the village and assisting him would be the 
leaders of the four bairros (wards). Each bairro was divided into blocks and a secretary 
appointed to oversee it. Therefore, each physical subdivision of the village had a leader 
appointed by Frelimo that was responsible for the people living in that area. In this way 
the spatial organisation of the new villages was complemented by the newly-introduced 
political structures. Together, these techniques allowed the single-party state to extend 
its control over the rural population.
Frelimo’s intention to replace the colonial regime with a new Mozambican state (Hall & 
Young 1997:71) was not only being realised through the spatial arrangement of the 
communal villages and the introduction of the new political structures, but also through 
the service provision that was provided in the new villages. One of the features of the 
new village of Mavodze was the school in the central plaza. Prior to the construction of 
the new village, the only educational facilities in the area were at a local mission 
complex over 40 km away. Education was the Frelimo government’s number one 
budgetary priority and on coming to power the party launched an extensive national
The position o f the dismissed ‘traditional’ authorities is discussed in Chapter 6,
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literacy campaign (Hall & Young 1997:56). Although this had relatively little impact in 
Mavodze, as most people remained illiterate, education was concerned with far more 
than simply teaching people to read and write. Schooling was a part of creating a 
Mozambican national sentiment: the building was adorned with the national flag; pupils 
would sing the national anthem; they were taught the history of their new country. This 
process was replicated at public meetings and the other public buildings also flew the 
national flag. The party set out to build a new nation-state and, as this was a single-party 
state, the nation and Frelimo were inextricably connected. To the people of Massingir, 
the state was the party and the party the state: to be a part of the new Mozambique was 
to be a part of Frelimo.
Thus, Frelimo was more or less an unknown organization in Massingir before 1975. 
However, when the party did arrive and began to establish its presence the local 
residents — for reasons outlined above — initially warmed to it. Through constructing a 
new village and introducing a new leadership system, Frelimo was able not only to 
bolster support but also to enjoy considerable control over the rural population. This 
control became increasingly important as the armed conflict with Renamo began to 
escalate in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Villagisation was increasingly to become a 
military tactic rather than a means of organising social development (Bowen 2000; 
Roesch 1992).^  ^In the next section I look at how Mavodze and the surrounding villages 
were affected by the war and argue that this experience further united the population 
behind Frelimo.
Massingir 1978-1992: the uncivil wars
In the second month of fieldwork in Mavodze I asked one of my informants where he 
had lived during the war. I was somewhat surprised when he responded, “Which war?” 
Despite Renamo’s having been created and largely funded and supplied by
The use o f villagisation as a military tactic has been observed in various conflicts throughout the world, 
for example it was a technique employed by both the guerrilla fighters and government troops in the 
conflict in Guatemala (Stepputat 2001).
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neighbouring states,the  majority of scholars and commentators regard the conflict that 
affected most of Mozambique following independence as a civil war, that started in the 
late 1970s and lasted until the signing of the Rome Peace Accord in 1992 (see Finnegan 
1992; Nordstrom 1997; Africa Watch 1992; Hanlon 1991; Hall & Young 1997). The 
residents of Mavodze and the neighbouring villages did not see it like that. Their 
experiences of this period led them to distinguish between two separate and very 
different wars: that against Ian Smith and that against Renamo.
The war against Ian Smith and white minority-ruled Rhodesia was understood in terms 
of conventional warfare. People described this fighting as being between one army and 
the other, with neither side deliberately targeting civilians. This first war began shortly 
after independence. A number of the village residents were conscripted into the army 
and were trained as infantrymen and artillery operators. Although the war did not 
directly affect the villages in the Shingwedzi basin, as much of the combat in Gaza 
Province took place in the Limpopo valley, the village residents learned about the 
fighting from these men who had fought in the army. The Ian Smith government had 
begun attacking Mozambique in an attempt to destabilise the country and stop Frelimo 
support for the Zimbabwean nationalist movements that were using Mozambican 
territory as a base for their liberation struggle. According to Ken Flower, the former 
head of Rhodesian intelligence, the Rhodesian raids into Mozambique primarily 
targeted military and economic infrastructures (Flower 1987:244).
This interpretation is borne out if one looks at Gaza Province. Here it was the road and 
rail bridges in the Limpopo transport corridor that were hit particularly hard. 
Mozambican forces responded with heavy artillery attacks in an attempt to keep these 
attacks at bay (Hanlon 1990). A Rhodesian aircraft was downed during one 
unsuccessful raid that was designed to destroy one of the dams on the River Limpopo; 
one can still see the dusty remains of the fuselage proudly displayed in the centre of a 
roundabout near Chokwe. However, it was not to be a decisive Mozambican military 
victory that brought to an end the ‘first war’ as experienced by the residents of
Initially Rhodesia (until 1979) and then later South Africa (1980-92) (see Flower 1987; Winter 1981).
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Mavodze. Rather, it was the success of Zimbabwean liberation movements and the end 
of wbite-minority rule that baited the external aggression.
In taking up arms against Ian Smith’s regime, Frelimo maintained its credentials among 
the people of Massingir as a liberation movement. However, while Frelimo gained a 
certain amount of prestige among residents for having united with the Zimbabwean 
nationalist movements, it was the ‘second war’ —  against Renamo —  that was to have a 
far greater impact on people’s lives. Ultimately, it would firmly cement Frelimo as the 
only legitimate party in Massingir.
The origins of Renamo, formerly known as MNR (Mozambican National Resistance), 
are closely connected to the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). 
Although the Renamo leadership maintains that discontented Mozambicans formed the 
organization to fight Marxism, with the Smith government offering only limited support 
(Dhlakama, cited in Afiica Watch 1992:21), most analysts agree that the Rhodesian 
secret service created Renamo as a force with which to destabilise the Frelimo 
government. Operating out of Rhodesian bases, Renamo ran guerrilla raids on Frelimo 
targets in Mozambique and broadcast anti-Frelimo propaganda through a radio station 
known as The Voice of Free Afiica. In April 1980 Zimbabwean independence 
threatened to cut off Renamo’s support and supplies. However, neighbouring South 
Africa at this time was taking an increasingly aggressive stance against the black 
frontline states and, as Zimbabwean independence loomed, the Rhodesian CIO asked 
the South Afiicans to assume sponsorship of Renamo (Afiica Watch 1992:26). The 
South African military agreed to this and, in the words of the head of the Rhodesian 
intelligence service, took over the operation “lock, stock and barrel” (Flower 1987:262). 
The apartheid regime in South Afiica was now Renamo’s major backer, supplying 
everything fi*om equipment and military bases to intelligence and training (see Winter 
1981; Flower 1987).®*
While there is no doubt that Renamo was supported, if  not established, by the Rhodesian and South 
Afiican military, the debate continues over how much internal support the organisation generated within 
Mozambique and has produced a large body of literature (cf. Hoile 1994; Vines 1996; Bowen 2000; 
Hanlon 1991; McGregor 1998; Geffiray 1990; Gersony 1988; Minter 1998). This is not a debate I intend 
to address in detail in this thesis, because, as I will show below, Renamo had no legitimacy whatsoever in 
the region where I conducted fieldwork.
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The ‘first war’ against Ian Smith had, for the most part, little impact on the people of 
Mavodze. The ‘second war’ had a far greater one. Residents reported first hearing about 
Renamo, now covertly supported by South Africa, between 1984 and 1985 when forces 
first entered Gaza Province near Pafuri, a border crossing some 180 km north of 
Mavodze. Over the next four years Renamo moved southwards along the River 
Shingwedzi, establishing a base in Machamba, some 70 km away. During this period 
residents of the villages to the north had been fleeing their homes and resettling in 
Mavodze, which was assumed to be more secure. By 1989 Renamo forces controlled 
most of the Shingwedzi basin and in December launched their first direct attack on the 
village of Mavodze, killing three people and stealing food and cattle. This chronology 
partly explains why the people of Mavodze saw the civil war in terms of two wars. The 
conflict with Ian Smith’s Rhodesian army had finished in 1979, Renamo did not appear 
in Gaza until 1984, and had little impact on people’s lives until at least a couple of years 
after that. The seven or so years of peace that had elapsed between the two periods of 
fighting clearly separated them into two different conflicts: for the residents of 
Mavodze, the ‘first war’ started in the late 1970s and the second in the mid-1980s.
The second difference between the two wars was the identity of the enemy; the people 
of Massingir could see that they were fighting two different enemies. While the ‘first 
war’ was against the Rhodesian army, Renamo was an unconventional guerrilla 
movement that was supported by the South African government. The proximity of the 
villages to the South African border allowed people to see the South African aircraft 
flying over Mozambican territory. During their habitual migrations back and forth 
across the border through the Kruger National Park (see Chapters 2 & 3), residents 
could see the South African military openly supporting Renamo. It was an open secret 
that Renamo used South African bases in and around the National Park at Phalaborwa 
and Skukuza. White South Africans, according to the villagers, were frequently spotted 
with Renamo forces operating on the Mozambican side of the border. On several 
occasions when 1 was visiting villagers in their fields, people we encountered joked that 
if they had seen a white man with two Mozambicans walking in the bush ten years ago 
they would have shot us all for being Renamo.
It was not merely a matter of timing and the enemy that differentiated the two wars; it 
was the nature of the warfare itself. As 1 mentioned above, the residents of Mavodze
148
perceived the war with Rhodesia in terms of one army fighting another. In the second 
war, Renamo explicitly and brutally targeted civilians. During their first attack on 
Mavodze in December 1989, Renamo troops not only killed three people, they also 
decapitated them, threw the bodies in a latrine, and left the heads on stakes in the 
middle of the village plaza. Subsequent attacks on the village during the next three years 
were equally horrific.^^ Not only were people killed but also the health, education and 
veterinary infi*astructure that Frelimo had provided during villagisation was destroyed. 
This destruction and brutality were by no means unique to Mavodze. Observers noted 
Renamo atrocities occurring throughout the country. Afiica Watch observed that 
Renamo acquired a reputation for savagery (1992:27); the US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Afiican Affairs accused Renamo of carrying out “one of the most 
brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War IT’ (Roy Stacey, cited 
in Hanlon 1991:47); and Robert Gersony, in a report for the US State Department, 
compared Renamo's activities to those of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1988).
While brutal violence was a hallmark of Renamo activities throughout Mozambique, the 
levels of brutality varied regionally. Gersony identified three notional areas of Renamo 
operations, the ‘tax’, ‘control’, and ‘destruction’ zones (1988). The tax zones were 
usually found in rural areas with dispersed populations, where Renamo soldiers could 
move freely and demand ‘contributions’ fi*om farmers. Gersony notes that instances of 
murder, rape and kidnapping were less fi*equent here than elsewhere. The control zones 
were more oppressive, with more demands made of the local population and more 
severe punishments administered. Often close to Renamo bases, local people living in 
these areas were forced to grow food for troops, men forced to act as porters, and sexual 
demands made of women. Rape, beating, mutilation and murder were common 
punishments. Gersony’s third category, the zones of destruction, speaks for itself. These 
were frequently areas that had an affiliation to Frelimo. When Renamo attacked, troops 
targeted officials and civilians, structures and infrastructures. Public executions, 
extensive looting and kidnappings were fi*equent and indiscriminate. As a Frelimo
Informants recounted numerous brutal attacks in great detail. I prefer not to follow Nordstorm’s 
example in her ‘ethnography’, A  D i f f e r e n t  W a r  S t o r y ,  in which she presents numerous wartime atrocities 
in detail for no apparent reason other than to shock the reader (1997).
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stronghold. Gaza Province, like much of southern Mozambique, was considered a zone 
of destruction (Wilson 1992; Hall & Young 1997:169; McGregor 1998)7^
In Mavodze a large number of people fled these attacks. Almost a quarter of households 
abandoned the village and fled across the border to South Afiica, while others sought 
refuge in the more secure urban areas of Mozambique such as Chokwe or Massingir 
Town. However, the majority of residents (69% of households) chose to stay and fight 
back. As Renamo had gradually infiltrated the Province firom the northern border town 
of Pafuri, the residents of the villages to the south had time to prepare themselves. 
Solomao Valoi, one of the village leaders, explained what had happened.
People from the villages of Macandazul, Chimangue and Machamba had been attacked. 
They were running away from Renamo. They told us about what had happened to them. 
We knew that this would also happen to us. Some people decided to leave and go to 
Joni, but most would not. The [Frelimo] commanders came into the village and told us 
that we could have guns to protect ourselves. We took them and fought back.
Volunteers from the villages were issued with weapons and given rudimentary training 
by the Frelimo forces that were stationed in Massingir. After the militia had repelled the 
first Renamo raid, residents saw that the village was vulnerable to attack and abandoned 
it in favour of an encampment on a steep-sided hillock in the Olifantes Valley, known 
as Maiaman. From here, the villagers would venture out during the day to cultivate their 
fields and graze cattle, and retreat to the camp at nightfall. Despite this more secure 
camp, the militia patrols and the presence of Frelimo forces in the area, over the next 
three years Renamo mounted numerous other attacks, killing, kidnapping and raping 
residents, looting cattle and property, and stealing or destroying crops. Nevertheless, the 
encampment was never abandoned and the people of Mavodze took a great pride in 
having played a part in resisting Renamo.
In the light of the atrocities inflicted during the ‘second war’, it would have been 
unthinkable for any resident of Mavodze to have so much as contemplated voting for
Using material from the border areas o f the Maputo Hinterland, McGregor argues that the situation in 
the Renamo zones o f  destruction was far more complex than has been hitherto understood (1998), but my 
evidence indicates that the situation in Massingir did, indeed, approximate to Gersony’s wholehearted 
model o f destruction.
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Renamo in the elections that followed the end of the war. Residents had suffered, fought 
and died to resist the rebel movement; it was inconceivable that they would now vote 
for its candidates. Renamo had caused nothing but suffering throughout the war, 
whereas Frelimo had actively supported the local residents. It had been Frelimo 
commanders who had trained the male volunteers to fight. It had been Frelimo forces 
that had supplied guns, landmines, and ammunition for this militia. It had been Frelimo 
forces that had fought alongside the village residents to keep the Renamo guerrillas at 
bay. The experiences of the ‘second war’ in Massingir had not only rendered Renamo 
un-supportable, but also had yet further established Frelimo as the only legitimate party 
that could be voted for. Ironically, although the war ultimately brought pluralism to 
Mozambique, in Massingir it only further consolidated Frelimo *s single-party 
domination.
Sustaining single-party rule in a multi-party state
The Mozambican civil war ended in 1992 and a pluralist political system has, 
supposedly, been in place since the multi-party elections were held in 1994. However, 
by the time I carried out fieldwork in the villages of Massingir, almost a decade later, 
there was still no manifestation of pluralism on the ground. Frelimo was, in effect, 
continuing to rule through a one-party system. Thus far, this chapter has addressed the 
origins of Frelimo’s support in Massingir since independence; I now examine how the 
party has sustained this local monopoly in spite of the move to political pluralism at a 
national level. The key to understanding how this has happened lies in examining the 
lack of local disengagement between the party and the state and the resulting 
appropriation by local political actors of state, and other, resources in order to bolster 
Frelimo party popularity.
These interlinked processes were clearly demonstrated during the Frelimo Party 
elections that occurred in Mavodze during my fieldwork. The Frelimo Party 
headquarters for the administrative post of Mavodze was a small half-finished hut that 
stood about 50 metres fi'om my house. The office was rarely the site of great activity: 
the party secretary would cycle over from Massingir Velho in the late morning, rest his
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bike up against a nearby tree and spend the afternoon inside the hut before cycling home 
again at about 4:30 pm. Curious to know how he spent his afternoons in a completely 
bare, semi-constructed hut, I called in on him on two separate occasions; both times I 
found him fast asleep on the floor. One afternoon in February, on my return to the 
village firom a morning visiting fishermen on the lake, I was surprised to find the office 
the scene of much commotion. About a dozen bicycles were parked up against the tree; 
the chefe do paste and other village leaders were coming and going with great wads of 
papers; people were engaged in animated discussions and disagreements; there was 
even a visitor firom the district capital, Massingir. I was eventually able to collar the 
party secretary to ask him what was going on. “Elections,” he responded, “tomorrow the 
Party is having its elections. We will vote for the secretary and the members of the 
committee.”
The following day I was introduced to ‘Comrade Francisco’, the First District Party 
Secretary, who had arrived at the party office on the motorbike usually used by one of 
the directors in the district administration. The village school had been closed for the 
day so that the Party could use one of the classrooms for the proceedings. Later in the 
morning, the delegates and party members fi-om the villages of the administrative post 
began to arrive in Mavodze. They were ushered into one of the schoolrooms and sat at 
the desks; At one end of the classroom, in front of the blackboard, a committee of 
dignitaries sat facing the arrivals: the chefe do poste; the director of the school; the 
incumbent party secretary; the district party secretary; the president of the locality; and 
the fiscal (tax collector and assistant to the chefe do posté). The chefe do poste stood up 
and began the meeting by shouting “Viva o Partido do Frelimo!” and punched the air 
with his fist. “Viva!” the crowd responded with a similar gesture. And again, “Viva 
Frelimo!” “Viva!” The chefe do poste introduced Comrade Francisco who initiated 
some singing. His song began “Chissano, Chissano, You are our one President. 
Chissano, Chissano, You have built us schools and roads. You are our President.” This 
was quickly followed up with another chorus of “Viva Frelimo”.
The incumbent party secretary stood up and gave a speech documenting the party’s 
recent, and not so recent, achievements. He described how Frelimo had fi'eed the 
country firom the Portuguese, how the party had founded the village. He recalled the 
suffering that had occurred at the hands of Renamo and how Frelimo had protected
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people and had fought the ‘bandits’. When the war was over, the secretary continued, 
Frelimo had rebuilt the school and health post, had brought in teachers and the nurse, 
had installed the solar-powered water pump and rebuilt the cattle dip tank, had helped 
restock the farmers’ cattle herds, and brought food aid during the floods. At the time, 
many of these claims surprised me, as I knew much of this reconstruction work had 
been undertaken by a variety of national and international non-governmental 
organisations: a German organisation had funded the reconstruction of the school and 
clinic; a Mozambican NGO had rebuilt the dip tank with financial assistance from 
German churches; a British NGO had been involved in the cattle restocking; UNICEF 
had installed the water pump; and the World Food Programme had provided the 
emergency food aid during the floods. This appeared to go unnoticed by everyone else 
and the secretary’s speech received several rounds of applause.
Once he had finished, the chefe do paste explained how the voting would take place. All 
party members would be given a ballot paper and should put a cross by the name of the 
candidate who they wished to elect. There would be several ballots, as four committees 
had to be elected as well as the post of Party Secretary for the administrative post. As 
the name of a candidate was read out, s/he would stand up so that the other people could 
see who was who. Of those announced, I recognised the director of the school, the chefe 
do poste, four of the school teachers, the village secretary, tax collector, dip tank 
attendant, head of the water committee, and each of the four heads of the bairros; all of 
the major positions of responsibility in the village.
The voting took place and people posted their ballot papers into a cardboard box at the 
front of the classroom. During the voting, I asked one of the lesser-known candidates 
why he had put his name forward for election. He told me that he hadn’t. He had no idea 
how his name had come to be on the ballot paper and that he did not even want the 
position, so much so that he was intending to vote for one of the other candidates. The 
votes were counted in front of the electorate and the results read out and written on the 
black board. There had been little change: my friend who hadn’t wanted the job was not 
elected, the secretary remained the secretary and the bulk of the committee remained the 
same, including all the men who held the positions of responsibility in the village.
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Photo 24: Voting in the Frelimo elections
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During the election and interviews conducted in the days following it became clear that 
local state officials were simultaneously holding important party posts. As one 
interviewee confirmed, “Frelimo? Oh, they are all Frelimo. All of those people: the 
secretary, the president, the chefe do paste; they are all Frelimo. To get any job around 
here you need to be a part of Frelimo.” It also rapidly became clear that the same 
political elite had held these positions for the last two decades. There are fixed terms of 
office for each of the state and party jobs; for example the position of village secretary 
came up for renewal every five years and the job of party secretary every two years. 
Although these exact terms of office were not always strictly adhered to —  the current 
party secretary had held the position since 1995 and the village secretary could not 
remember the last time his office had been renewed —  there had been a periodic turn­
over of officials occupying the positions of authority since independence. However, 
rather than appointing new figures, the political establishment simply rotated 
themselves around the different jobs. For example, we can trace the series of people 
who were appointed to the position of village secretary. Chàuque had been appointed to 
this position following independence in 1976. In 1983 he fell ill and stood down. 
Chauqub then became one of the heads of the four village bairros and appointed 
Armando Jorge Valoi as his successor. Armando was village secretary until 1987, when 
the head of one of the bairros, Armando Manuel Mbombi, replaced him. Armando 
Manuel Mbombi served as village secretary until 1989* and was then made Frelimo 
secretary, later being replaced by Armando Jorge Valoi (the former village secretary). 
Armando Manuel Mbombi went on to become, and is currently, the fiscal for the 
administrative post. In 1989 the head of one of the bairros, Alberto Coshang Valoi, was 
made village secretary and he has retained the post until today.
Those individuals that had been appointed as the village secretary and had completed a 
term in office have subsequently gone on to serve as party secretaries, bairro 
secretaries, and even as tax collector. The older former leaders, such as the first village 
secretary, Chauque, although not holding official office, continue regularly to attend 
most of the party and state administrative meetings as part of an ad hoc council that 
provides advice to the incumbent officials. The local population, therefore, is presented 
with more or less the same group of leaders who have dominated the political system by 
rotating important jobs between themselves. Even the former leaders who hold no
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official positions continue to look as though they hold some position, since they 
continue to attend all the public and private meetings.
In this way the same local leaders have dominated political life both during the time of 
the one-party state and, now, after the shift to multi-party rule. With the same group 
occupying the state positions and the party offices, they are able to dominate all 
significant spheres of public life. It is this political elite that convenes all public 
meetings, that is responsible for conflict resolution, that controls the water supply, the 
cattle dip tank, and the distribution of food aid. It is to members of this group that 
visitors to the area must first present themselves. Through this control, the political elite 
(and by association, Frelimo) is able to maintain its grip on power.
Some of the mechanisms by which this is achieved were evident during the Frelimo 
elections, described above. References to the suffering inflicted on the local residents by 
Renamo and that Frelimo had come to their assistance were inevitably raised at every 
public occasion that I attended. The narratives of the war presented by the political 
leaders were always the same: Frelimo forces joining forces with and supporting the 
local residents in order to keep the demonic Renamo guerrillas at bay. Through the 
constant retelling of these stories, the memories of the war were never allowed to fade. 
Not only did this herald Frelimo as the party of saviours, but it also sustained the fear 
and mistrust of Renamo, consequently never allowing the opposition party to establish 
so much as a toehold in the region.
Another, and equally important, means by which the Frelimo elite could retain political 
domination was through the control and appropriation of development resources. All 
visitors, whether government representatives or not, were obliged to first meet with the 
village secretary or chefe do poste on arrival in the area. Any organisation wanting to 
operate in the area had to work with the political elite. When visiting households, 
touring villages or inspecting fields, either the village secretary, tax collector or chefe do 
poste would act as a ‘guide’. If a village meeting were to be convened it would be 
chaired by one of the same individuals. When NGOs selected beneficiaries or offered 
jobs as a part of a project, the political elite would, one way or another, assist with the 
selection process. Village residents would see the (Frelimo) village leaders taking part 
in every development project or scheme. The party leaders could therefore easily
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appropriate the work completed by either the state or NGOs as their own. This was 
clearly demonstrated during the election speech, in which the secretary reeled off the 
various NGO contributions to the post-war reconstruction as Frelimo’s doing. In 
addition, the appropriation of state resources and activities, such as the provision of the 
teachers and healthcare staff, not only bolstered the party’s popularity, but also 
continued to equate Frelimo with the nation. Through party officials’ fi-equent use of 
school and government vehicles, national insignia (such as the flag of the Republic) 
became familiar as symbols of Frelimo. Thus, supporting Frelimo was equated to 
supporting Mozambique; not to do so would be unpatriotic.
In order for the Frelimo leaders to retain control of political life in Massingir it was 
essential that ‘politics’ remained a local matter. It is true that political discourses at a 
national and even provincial level were centred on pluralism. Discussions about the 
upcoming municipal elections, the gradual decentralisation of power firom Maputo, and 
heated parliamentary debates between the two major parties, dominated the 
Mozambican media.^  ^ Rarely, however, did these discussions filter through to the 
residents of Mavodze. This was clearly demonstrated to me during the Carlos Cardoso 
Murder Trial. In November 2000, Cardoso, a respected independent journalist, was shot 
dead in his car near his Maputo office while investigating a banking corruption scandal. 
The Mozambican authorities came under a barrage of international pressure to bring the 
perpetrators to justice. In March 2001 the police arrested 6 men for the murder and the 
case was brought to court in November 2002. The trial was broadcast live on 
Mozambican radio and television. During the course of the trial several of the 
defendants confessed to the murder but alleged that the killing had been ordered by 
Nymphine Chissano, son of President Joaquim Chissano. When this revelation came out 
I was in Maputo and later travelled to Xai Xai. The trial and allegations had caused a 
sensation: people were glued to their televisions and radios; one could not get served in 
shops or restaurants because the staff were hidden behind their newspapers; 
conversations on buses and taxis were of nothing else. The rumours and conspiracy 
theories about murder, theft and corruption at the highest levels of government spread 
like wildfire. When I returned to Mavodze, however, none of the residents had even
Although the lack o f independent media throughout Mozambique ensured that such coverage, for the 
most part, was favourable to the Frelimo government.
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heard about it. There was no discussion about the trial, the murder, the president’s son 
or government corruption; quite simply nobody knew about the events that were 
causing such a furore elsewhere in the country.
Geographic isolation was part of the reason why Mozambican national news rarely 
arrived in Mavodze and the villages in the Shingwedzi basin. The national press was not 
widely distributed in the rural areas. Newspapers were seldom seen in the district 
capital, let alone the villages; in 17 months I never once saw a person reading a 
newspaper in Mavodze. However, even if the newspapers had been circulated in the 
rural areas few people would have been able to read them. The papers were printed in 
Portuguese. Due to the low levels of education in the villages of Massingir few people 
were literate in their mother tongue language, Shangaan, and even fewer able to read 
Portuguese.
This relative isolation also limits the local consumption of Mozambican radio. The two 
Mozambican radio stations that broadcast in Gaza do not have coverage that extends 
throughout the province and, although it is occasionally possible to pick up Radio 
Mozambique or Radio Gaza in Massingir, reception is poor and erratic and people tend 
not to listen to either. However, due to the proximity of South Africa and the installation 
of radio masts in the Lebombo Mountain range, it is possible to receive clear signals 
from many of the FM stations transmitting from across the border. There are a number 
of different stations broadcasting in different languages including English, Afrikaans, 
Zulu, and, most importantly for the residents of Massingir, Shangaan. Residents 
depended on these broadcasts for their news, sports and even radio soap operas. All of 
these, of course, were targeted at a South African audience and were, therefore. South 
Africa-centric. The result of listening to these stations was that people in Massingir 
knew exactly what was occurring in the neighbouring country in terms of sport, politics, 
economics, weather and even celebrity gossip but virtually nothing of current events in 
Mozambique. This became apparent when I spent an afternoon of listening to a Kaiser 
Chiefs^  ^ football match with Arturo Valoi. Arturo provided me with a detailed 
commentary of the numerous injury problems that had befallen his beloved ‘Chiefs’ 
throughout that soccer season. We also had a long conversation about South Afiican
One o f South Afiica’s two most popular football teams,
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politics with Arturo grilling me about my opinions of Thabo Mbeki’s response to 
Mugabe’s much-talked-about land reforms. He knew all about the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development that had recently been hosted in Johannesburg and could even 
make some sense of the so-called New Partnership for Afiica’s Development (NEPAD). 
However, when I asked about the Cardoso trial or other recent events that had occurred 
in Mozambique, he was ignorant. From listening to his radio, Arturo was fully versed in 
South Afiican current affairs but was completely unaware of what was happening in his 
own country.^^
Through the lack of access to media the residents of Mavodze were often not aware of 
events occurring elsewhere in Mozambique. However, this was not always the case with 
the chefe do paste, village secretary or other members of the political elite. The chefe do 
poste possessed a radio that could intermittently receive the national news, and being 
able to speak Portuguese the chefe was able to understand this. Through this limited 
access, the village leadership were able to disseminate the news items that they regarded 
as appropriate. In their case it was unsurprising that they were unwilling to discuss the 
Cardoso Trial, as it dealt with corruption and murder within the highest echelons of the 
Frelimo leadership. This stain on Frelimo at a national level could blemish the party’s 
image at the village level.
The minimal access to the media was one means by which politics in Mavodze and the 
neighbouring villages was kept ‘localised’, and thus firmly in the hands of the Frelimo 
elite. While this isolated the population fi*om many of the debates and criticisms of the 
government that were being made at a national level, the residents were also isolated 
from much of the political apparatus that existed at the provincial and district levels. 
There was little contact between the district administration and people in Mavodze. The 
district administrator only twice visited Mavodze whilst I was in the field. The first 
occasion was to prepare for an official visit by the provincial governor and the second 
was when he accompanied the governor himself. One informant told me that during the 
last governor’s visit he went to one of the villages with the district administrator. The 
governor was served some food and began to talk with some of the people. He asked
For more detailed examinations o f broadcasting and its affects on rural life in Africa refer to the 
collected essays in Pardon & Fumiss (2000). For the role o f broadcast media in African politics see the 
papers in the edited collection by Hyden e t  a l . (2002).
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them if they knew the administrator, they responded that they had never seen the man 
before and did not know that he was the administrator. The governor asked the 
administrator, “How do you do your work when your people do not know you? What 
have you been doing?” The administrator was replaced two weeks later. It appeared that 
the current administrator had learned from the mistakes of his predecessor and was 
making his first visit to the villages in his constituency to pre-empt any awkward 
questions during the governor's visit.
Just as the district officials would rarely visit the outlying villages, the villagers almost 
never went to the district administration. Theoretically, if a resident had a problem that 
could not be satisfactorily resolved by the chefe do paste in the villages, the matter 
would be referred up to the level of the district administration. In reality, however, this 
rarely happened.^"  ^ A person taking a matter to the district tribunal would have to be 
accompanied by various members of his family and other friends to assist him in stating 
his case. A return journey from Mavodze to Massingir in a local chapa (pick-up truck 
taxi) costs 30,000 MZM (US$1.30). The cost of transporting the required number of 
people to a hearing was beyond the means of the majority of village residents.
Many people stated that not only was the cost of transport too high, but the potential 
penalties that one could incur at the district level were far more severe than those 
handed out in the local administrative post. One farmer whom I spoke to had been 
unhappy with the chefe do poste’s judgement that he must pay another man a sack of 
maize worth 277,000 MZM (US$12.04) as his cattle had eaten some of the other man’s 
crops. I remained puzzled as to why he had not appealed against this unfavourable 
ruling at the district tribunal. He told me that, if he did pursue the matter to the district 
level and the judgement went against him, he would have to pay compensation, not in 
maize, but in cattle — a far more valuable commodity.^^ He could not afford to risk 
receiving such a penalty and so he was forced to accept the chefe do poste 's judgement.
I heard of only one case that ever reached the district tribunal and that was when one o f the wealthiest 
men in the area hit and killed a man while driving his truck back from town, having spent the day 
drinking beer in the local bar. The driver was mysteriously acquitted o f any wrong-doing and suffered no 
retribution. Rumour had it that, before the trial, each of the men sitting on the tribunal had received one 
head o f cattle from the defendant.
The average head o f cattle cost 2,500,000 MZM (US$109),
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In addition to the economic factors, people from the rural areas of the district were 
unwilling to take disputes to the district administration because it was outside their 
sphere of influence. Within the village or administrative post people had a wealth of 
connections that they could rely on. Through kinship ties or friendships, people could 
often influence decisions made by village leaders, but such negotiations were not 
possible at the district level. The district officials were further abstracted from village 
life; they were often from outside the region and perceived as a threat. Villagers, unless 
wealthy or powerful, saw themselves at a distinct disadvantage in the context of the 
district tribunal and were, therefore, very reluctant to pursue matters further than the 
administrative post.
The discussion of politics in Mavodze was centred on the village. The local political 
elite had succeeded, for the most part, in isolating the villages of the Shingwedzi basin 
from the discussions related to pluralist politics that were going on elsewhere in 
Mozambique. Through a variety of mechanisms, including the appropriation of state 
and non-state resources to bolster party popularity and the revival of memories of the 
recent war, this leadership had sustained the almost total domination of Frelimo in the 
locality of Mavodze, despite the national move to pluralist politics. The one-party 
system continued to operate in the multi-party state.
Dawning disillusionment
While Frelimo monopolised political life in Massingir and remained relatively popular 
among local residents, the party was not beyond criticism. When I arrived in the region 
in 2001, several villagers complained about the way the party/state had responded to the 
disastrous flooding that had occurred in the region the previous year. In February 2000 a 
combination of a prolonged rainy season and successive cyclones resulted in the 
catastrophic flooding of the Limpopo basin and wreaked havoc throughout Gaza 
Province.^^ Sited high on the plateau between two rivers, the village of Mavodze was 
not directly affected by the floods. However, as I discussed in the introduction, the 
River Shingwedzi burst its banks and swamped the fields that people had cultivated on
For further details on the Gaza floods see Christie & Hanlon (2001).
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the flood plain. A number of farmers were unfortunate in getting caught in the floods 
and had to seek refuge in trees for several days. The floodwaters destroyed that year’s 
crops and many households were left without food or seeds with which to replant. The 
neighbouring village of Bingo fared worse as it was situated in the Shingwedzi basin 
and many of the houses were washed away. One of the farmers affected by this disaster 
told me that afterwards, when the flooding had subsided, people went into town to get 
food.
Some people went as far as Chokwe to get help. In the towns we saw that the party was 
helping people. There were new buildings and the party people had new cars. People 
were receiving food and seeds, so they could plant new crops. In Mavodze, nobody 
helped us. It was then that we saw that this government is no longer for us. This 
government is a government for people in towns and cities. We, the people in the 
countryside, are alone. We saw that after the floods.
On another occasion, the village leadership was meeting in the shade of the tree near the 
chefe do paste’s house. I asked one of the villagers whom I was walking with what the 
meeting was about. He shrugged and said he didn’t know. “Ah, it’s just them. All of 
them love to talk. That is all they do these days; talk, talk and talk. They can talk for 
hours, but they never do anything anymore. They tell us they will do this and bring that, 
but most of these things never arrive.”
These expressions of dissatisfaction were limited to a minority of my informants and 
nearly all of these explained that their complaints were related to the recent behaviour of 
the local Frelimo representatives. Nevertheless, this discontent indicates that, although 
the local party/state were appropriating the activities of the various NGOs that were 
working in the region, this was not enough to satisfy the expectations of all the 
villagers. The small-scale interventions by NGOs were not a sufficient alternative to 
state service provision in the rural areas. Although the local state representatives would 
often discuss development initiatives or promise better healthcare, frequently they were 
unable to deliver such improvements to their constituents. As more promises were left 
unfulfilled, there was a growing sense of scepticism with the villages. This was initially 
restricted to general mutterings of discontent aimed at the chefe do poste (the senior 
state representative in the villages). However, as I explore in the next chapter, these
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isolated and relatively minor complaints about the actions of the party/state were to 
develop into far more serious and widespread protests following the development of the 
Limpopo National Park.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have argued that, while there has been a change from a single-party to a 
multi-party state at a national level in Mozambique, there has been virtually no effort 
made to turn this into a reality on the ground in the district of Massingir. Indeed, 
everyday behaviour demonstrates that there has been neither a disengagement between 
the Frelimo party and the state nor an emergence of other political parties. The almost 
total dominance of Frelimo allows the party to continue to rule this region as a one- 
party state. Heeding Hansen and Stepputat’s recent call for more detailed study of what 
ruling parties actually do when they rule (2001:28), I have examined how Frelimo*s 
continued domination of political life is due, in part, to historical legitimacy, ethnic 
affiliation and the legacy of the brutal civil war, but also to the mechanisms and 
techniques utilised by the local political elite in sustaining, for the most part, the 
popularity of the party through the appropriation of resources and isolating local politics 
from events that are occurring elsewhere in the country.
Although there is little doubt that the one-party state remains a reality in Massingir 
despite Mozambique’s multi-party system, this is not to argue that residents are unaware 
of the transition to democracy that occurred at the end of the war.^  ^Far from it. Indeed, 
like elsewhere in the country, there was a high turnout in the first general election in 
1994 and people frequently recounted casting their ballots.^^ By voting, residents of 
Massingir considered themselves to have become part of a democracy and would often 
talk about this. The concept of democracy was usually invoked in terms of “We can do 
what we want now; we have democracy.” This argument was used by several of the
Using the example of South Africa, Steven Friedman has noted that political systems that are 
dominated by a single-party are still democracies if  they hold regular electoral contests, the opposition 
parties are free and civil liberties are respected (1999:97-99).
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fanners who opted to move out of the communal village and build homesteads closer to 
their fields, an action that had been forbidden before the war. Democracy was therefore 
understood in terms of freedom rather than being, as is often assumed, associated with 
pluralist politics.
One of the effects of the single-party domination of local politics has been that the 
boundaries between Frelimo, the state and the nation have become indistinct. For the 
residents of Massingir, it was Frelimo that created an independent Mozambique by 
liberating the population from Portuguese colonial rule. In adopting a single-party 
system after independence Frelimo ‘became’ the Mozambican state. For the residents of 
the Lower Shingwedzi Basin there was no distinction between the party and the state; 
indeed, the two concepts were used interchangeably. On coming to power, constructing 
a sense of ‘the nation’ was an important priority for the Frelimo state. President Samora 
Machel spoke of the need to abolish tribal, regional, racial and religious distinctions and 
to concentrate on building a new country (Machel 1981:43).
This philosophy may not have been successfully implemented throughout the entire 
country, but it was readily adopted in Massingir. While labour migration to South 
Africa continued to be an important aspect of people’s lives, this chapter has shown that 
it has been through their experiences of Frelimo in local political life that the residents 
of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin have fostered a strong sense of national identity. For the 
villagers to support Frelimo was also to support the new Mozambique. Equally, loyalty 
to Mozambique equated to loyalty to Frelimo.
The local support for Frelimo, and its nationalist political agenda, was further bolstered 
during the fighting against Renamo, in what the villagers termed the ‘second war’. 
Frelimo had offered material assistance in the form of weapons and training that had 
enabled the villagers to protect themselves. The consequence of this was that the 
villagers saw themselves fighting alongside Frelimo, defending both the village and the 
party from Renamo attacks. However, the position of the villages added an additional 
nationalist component to the fighting. The close proximity to the border allowed the
This election has been often considered a vote for peace, with the end o f the war taking a higher 
priority than any other political issue (see Alden 2001). The voter turnout has decreased in subsequent 
elections.
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villagers to observe the South African government’s support of the Renamo forces. Men 
and supplies were brought through the border via the Kruger National Park. As a result, 
fighting Renamo was also regarded as defending the Mozambican nation-state.
The local experiences of the war rendered any local support for Renamo as a political 
party, impossible and Frelimo has sustained its political domination in this region 
despite the introduction of pluralist politics. However, as the final section of this chapter 
suggested, recently there has been some erosion of the party’s grass-root support in the 
villages of Massingir. In the next chapter I examine how this disenchantment with the 
Frelimo state has become more widespread. I return to the discussion about the 
Limpopo National Park, with which I began this thesis, and argue that the development 
of this park threatens the livelihoods of the residents of this region, by not only 
hampering agricultural production (as we saw with Femando’s field), but also in terms 
of making labour migration even more problematic. Faced with this threat, the villagers 
have mounted a campaign of physical resistance to interfere with activities of the park 
authorities. In addition to the day-to-day problems that the park has caused the residents 
of Mavodze and the surrounding villages, its development, I argue, has marked a 
significant change in the way the state operates in this region. This change has not 
simply caused the local populations to resist the park, but also has led them to question 
their long-held political allegiance to Frelimo.
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5. The Limpopo National Park: A park for the people?
Introduction
The short vignette with which I began this thesis describes Nelson Mandela releasing 25 
South African elephants into Mozambique in October 2001. With much hype and 
publicity, this event was the first of a series of animal relocations from South Africa to 
Mozambique: it paved the way for the creation of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park 
(GLTP). This park will eventually join conservation areas in Mozambique, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, forming the largest borderless game reserve in Africa.
Mavodze village lies within the Mozambican section of this superpark, known as the 
Limpopo National Park. Unbeknownst to me, or the people I had come to study, this 
was created shortly after I arrived in the region. Although the elephants that had been 
released by Mr Mandela had caused some damage to fields in the Shingwedzi Valley, 
this was an isolated event. Shortly after their release, this herd broke through the border 
fence and returned to South Africa. For the most part, the fact that we were living in a 
National Park made little difference to the way we lived our lives. This was soon to 
change.
One of the first signs that the situation was about to change occurred when I was driving 
into town with a number of other villagers. This journey usually took about 40 minutes 
and was, on the whole, uneventful. On this occasion we had almost reached the 
potholed asphalt that led into town, when we turned a comer and a man dressed in green 
combat fatigues stood in front of a newly constmcted checkpoint, blocking our way. He 
asked to see my passport and relevant documents for the car and, with a colleague, 
began searching through the various sacks of maize, bundles of clothing, drums of 
water, bicycles, chickens — and people — that were squeezed into the back. Everyone 
clambered out and unloaded their belongings and we all stood by the side of the road 
wondering what was going on. One of the guards informed us that the area was now a 
National Park, and it was his job to check that we were not transporting any illicit 
products obtained through poaching. Having meticulously checked the vehicle and its
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load, the guards allowed us to go. We all clambered back in, one of the guards lowered 
the chain barrier and we continued into town.
There was already a gateway at the spot where the checkpoint now stood, which had 
been constructed some months previously. The gateway had consisted of two lengths of 
fencing on either side of the road and a large green sign proclaiming that this area was 
the Limpopo National Park, a joint development venture between the German 
Development Bank and the Government of Mozambique. Despite a number of trophy- 
mounted antlers that had been added for decoration, the new construction was 
uninspiring and had been largely ignored by most people in the nearby villages. Our 
experience signified a change to all that. The new construction was no longer a 
decorative gateway to the new National Park, but a checkpoint manned by armed guards 
that would now control all access to the villages situated between the Olifantes and 
Limpopo Rivers.
As soon as we had passed the checkpoint the apathy felt about the park disappeared and 
people erupted in outrage at what had just happened: Who were those guards? Why 
were they searching us? What were they looking for? How long would they be there 
for? What was this park all about? How else would it affect peoples’ lives? The 
animated discussions continued as I dropped my companions off in town. By the time I 
returned home that evening, the news had reached the village and had been greeted with 
uproar. Residents had been aware of the creation of the Limpopo National Park for 
some time but the establishment of the checkpoint marked a watershed in relations 
between the residents and the Park authorities. This was the first time that the Park had 
directly affected the lives of the people living within its boundaries.
In looking at how the first 14 months of the Limpopo National Park has affected the 
residents of Mavodze and the surrounding villages, this chapter continues to explore 
how the changing cross-border political relations between the Mozambican and South 
African states shape the lives of these people. In the previous two chapters we have seen 
how the souring of relations between the neighbouring states following Mozambican 
independence resulted in changes to the patterns of labour migration and brought war to 
the villages of the Shingwedzi Basin. With the end of the apartheid regime in South 
Afiica in 1994, the hostilities between the neighbouring states ceased. The Great
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Photo 25: The Limpopo National Park entrance sign at the new checkpoint
Photo 26: The Limpopo National Park animal sanctuary
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Limpopo Transfrontier Park, with its emphasis on fostering cooperation and the tearing 
down of border fences, has been heralded as a symbol of this new regional unity.
Regional unity, however, is not the only objective of the park. This chapter explores 
some of the other vested interests — real and potential — that the different states have 
in the development of the Transfrontier Park’s development. Equally, as we have seen 
already in this thesis, border relations are not only a matter for the neighbouring states, 
but often concern other institutions or interested parties. As earlier chapters have 
argued, labour migration between Mozambican and South Africa was not simply a 
matter of interstate cooperation but also involved the interests of the mining companies. 
Likewise, in its later manifestation as illegal border-crossing it served the interests of 
farmers seeking to exploit cheap and vulnerable labour power. Similarly, this chapter 
argues that the development of the Great Limpopo National Park has involved a far 
broader range of interested parties than just the Mozambican, Zimbabwean and South 
African governments. An array of different groups, including NGOs, European Banks, 
international conservation groups and intergovernmental institutions, has been 
associated with the design, funding, creation and management of the superpark. This 
has not only led to confusion among local residents as to the ownership of the park, but 
also resulted in further changes to the way that the state operates in the Mozambique- 
South Africa borderland. In the previous chapter, I noted how Frelimo had appropriated 
some of the services that had been ‘outsourced’ to NGOs in this remote region. In this 
chapter I argue that the development of the park has led to a further ‘outsourcing’ of the 
duties that were once thought to be the responsibility of the state, including some of the 
more coercive aspects of governance.
This chapter argues that, rather than benefiting the residents of Massingir, the park is 
endangering their livelihoods and threatening their way of life. There has been little 
attempt to involve the local residents in the planning and design of the new park and 
consequently their interests have been marginalized. I argue that the park jeopardizes 
the agricultural basis to local livelihood strategies as well as further limiting the 
possibilities for labour migration. Although at a regional level the creation of the park is 
concerned with taking down fences and removing borders, for the residents of the 
Lower Shingwedzi Basin it is doing quite the reverse. While the fences will be removed, 
these were never the major obstacles for the young men of Massingir migrating to work
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in South Africa. The problems were always the animals and the guards. The 
Transfrontier Park seeks to increase both of these. Rather than dismantling the border, 
for the people of Massingir, the Limpopo National Park is creating a more impermeable 
one.
Background to the Limpopo National Park
In 1969 the Portuguese colonial government designated the region in which I conducted 
fieldwork a hunting concession known as Coutada 76. In theory this was to preserve the 
wildlife populations and other natural resources so that the (white) colonial elite could 
hunt for big game trophies. In practice, however, the limited capacity of both the 
colonial and post-colonial states made it difficult to enforce conservation laws. Indeed, 
few of my informants were aware of the area’s conservation status prior to the 
establishment of the Limpopo National Park (LNP). In November 2001 the Government 
of Mozambique upgraded the conservation status of Coutada 16 and renamed the area 
the Limpopo National Park (Boletim de Republica, Decree 38/2001). The park covers 
an area of over one million hectares, from the Zimbabwean border to the north, the 
South African Kruger National Park to the west, the Olifantes River to the south and the 
Limpopo River to the east.^  ^While this entire area was officially designated as National 
Park, during the first 14 months of its existence most of the activity on the ground was 
concentrated in the ‘wildlife sanctuary’, a fenced-off breeding area between the South 
African border and the village of Massingir Velho (see Map 2) where transferred 
animals from the Kruger National Park were released. Although vast in itself, the 
Limpopo National Park forms only a part of a larger regional conservation project that 
will eventually link the LNP with the Kruger National Park in South Africa, and the 
Gonarezhou National Park, Manjinji Pan Sanctuary and Malipali Safari Area in 
Zimbabwe. Known as the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), this massive 
transfrontier superpark will cover over 35,000km^ an area larger than that of Belgium.
The western boundary is still not entirely clear, as there appears to be a contradiction between the 
coordinates and the geographic description provided in Decree 38/2001 (LNP Management Plan, Second 
Draft 2004:6).
The three heads o f state signed an international treaty to estabhsh the GLTP in Xai Xai on 9 December 
2002, although Mozambique and Zimbabwe are yet to fully ratify this agreement.
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It is envisaged that the park will eventually be one component of an even larger, 
lOOjOOOkm^ , Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA) spanning the border regions of 
South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (see Map 1).
While these conservation projects are recent developments and have yet to be fully 
implemented, the concept of hi- or multi-lateral cooperation in this field is not new to 
Southern Africa. General Jan Christian Smuts first raised the idea of a transfrontier park 
in the 1920s, when he proposed a game reserve linking the Kruger Park to Rhodesia 
(Wolmer 2003:268). The concept was toyed with again in the 1930s and 1940s, when a 
larger park was conceived, spanning areas of Rhodesia, South Africa, Portuguese East 
Africa (now Mozambique) and the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana) (Duffy 
1997:443; Wolmer 2003:269). The Dongola Board, as it was known, was eventually 
shelved due to objections raised by the powerful mining and cattle-ranching industries 
in the region. In the 1970s a Portuguese biologist rekindled the debate by suggesting a 
joint Mozambique-South African conservation area encompassing the Kruger National 
Park and Coutada 16. However, once again this failed to come to fruition as Portuguese 
colonial rule came to an end and Mozambique gained independence in 1975. It was not 
until the early 1990s, when the South African National Parks Board commissioned a 
feasibility study on the Mozambican side of the border (Tinley & van Riet 1991), that 
the long-held plans for the international conservation area began developing into reality.
The concept of transfrontier natural resource management is by no means unique to 
Southern Africa; a global tourism conference held in Vancouver in 1988 listed 70 
different transfrontier nature reserves throughout the Americas, Europe and Asia, as 
well as Africa (Thorsell & Harrison 1990:13-15). The number of such parks has 
continued to increase since this conference and the notion of transfrontier conservation 
areas has become a well-established paradigm in the conservation discourse. The 
ideological framework of this derives in part from the romantic eco-centric philosophy 
of ‘bioregionalism’ that emerged in North American counterculture during the 1970s 
(Wolmer 2003:262; Aberley 1999). This essentially argues that place should be defined 
by “its life forms, its topography and its biota, rather than by human dictates; a region 
governed by nature, not legislature” (Sale 1985:43, cited in Wolmer 2003:262). This 
notion is a move away from creating islands of protected biodiversity, which has, until 
recently, been the dominant practice in African conservation, in favour of a more
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holistic approach that attempts to encompass a far larger area (Koch 1998). In the case 
of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, the idea is to remove the fences and other 
‘artificial’ or ‘man-made’ boundaries and create a vast ‘natural’ ecosystem. In doing 
this it is hoped that biodiversity is increased, the gene pool enlarged and the migratory 
ranges for large mammals extended.
This latter point has been particularly emphasised in the context of the Limpopo Park; 
much has been made in the park’s publicity material of the re-establishment of so-called 
‘ancient’ routes of animal migration,^^ especially those of elephants, which had existed 
before the imposition of the ‘unnatural’ borders by the colonial powers.^^ The elephants 
were of key importance to the GLTP. The elephant population of the Kruger National 
Park had exceeded the park’s recommended carrying capacity by approximately 2000 
and the South Afiican authorities were anxious to avoid the damaging publicity 
associated with a large elephant cull. The relocation of the South Afiican animals to 
Mozambican territory would alleviate the elephant problem in Kruger and avoid the 
need for a cull. For this reason the South Afiican National Parks Board (S ANParks) was 
especially enthusiastic for the Limpopo National Park to accept the animals and applied 
considerable pressure on the LNP authorities to organise this relocation as quickly as 
possible.
Regional ecology was not the only consideration that led to the establishment of the 
Transfrontier Park. The project, as William Wolmer notes, has appealed to a far broader 
coalition of interests (Wolmer 2003). This not only encompasses biologists and 
conservationists but also the neo-liberal development fraternity, including the German 
Development Bank (KfW*^) and the World Bank. The tourism potential of the massive 
park was seen as a means of generating substantial revenues for all three participating
** The ecological basis to these ‘ancient’ migratory routes o f large mammals is disputed by Norman 
Owen-Smith, who argues that migrations within Kruger Park are north-south, rather than east-west, and 
therefore it is unlikely that there will be anything more than local animal migrations within the GLTP 
(personal communication 2004). The quick return o f ‘Mandela’s ’ elephants to their home territory in the 
KNP raises further doubts to the ecological basis to the Transfrontier Park.
See for example Goodwin’s article in National Geographic (2001b) or the pamphlet promoting Mia 
Couto’s (a Mozambican author and ecologist) recent book launch in the UK (Serpent’s Tail & Arcadia 
2004; see also SANParks 2003).
Kreditanstalt fur Wiedaraufbau.
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countries — particularly through increasing existing park-based revenues. Although the 
Kruger Park attracted over one million tourists in 2002 (South Afiican Ministry of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2003), the park is still not operating at full capacity. 
By creating the largest protected area in Afiica, it is hoped that the prestigious 
superpark will attract more visitors to the region, especially firom North America and 
Europe. The South Afiican tourist infi*astructure is far more developed than that of 
Mozambique or Zimbabwe, but the larger park has attracted considerable interest from 
the private sector and it is hoped that the park will have a ‘honey-pot’ effect and 
increase tourism development throughout the region. Mozambique’s extensive unspoilt 
coastline, in particular, is hoped to add a ‘surf-and-turf dimension to the visitors’ 
experience; having explored the game parks, tourists can then relax on the pristine 
beaches and explore the coral reefs of the Indian Ocean.
The Transfrontier Park’s potential to increase tourist revenue is undoubtedly attractive 
to the governments of the three states involved in the project, but there are also broader 
political motivations to participating in the scheme. Transffontier Parks such as the 
GLTP are also often termed ‘Peace Parks’. This is based on the idea that a transfrontier 
conservation project is not only preserving an ecologically important area, but is also 
fostering inter-state collaboration and cooperation through the joint management of this 
environment. A transfi-ontier conservation area is seen as having the potential to diffuse 
border disputes or tensions stemming firom competition over natural resources and also 
to generate greater trust between the different governments (McNeil 1990). This latter 
point has been particularly important in Southern Afiica where, under the apartheid 
regime. South Afiica was involved in covert warfare against many of the fi'ontline 
states, including Mozambique (see Chapter 4). Through the establishment of the Great 
Limpopo Transfi-ontier Park, it is hoped that “nature has the power to heal [the] old 
wounds” (Koch 1998:54) between the two former enemies. South Afiica in the early 
1990s, despite the continuing process of reform, remained politically isolated: 
involvement in conservation projects, such as the Transfi-ontier Park scheme, was one 
way it could rejoin the international community.This was especially relevant for the
During the 1970s the WWF launched a fundraising scheme known as the 1001 club, whereby 1001 
individuals paid US$10,000 to become members o f this exclusive organisation. Members included 
business and establishment figures from all around the world, including Robert McNamara, Prince Philip, 
and Henry Ford II, as well 60 white South Africans. Few other international clubs welcomed white South
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white-dominated South African wildlife industry, as it was felt that through this regional 
cooperation it could begin to distance itself from its infamous apartheid past.^^
All three of the participating nations stood to benefit from the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park, yet South Afiican interests were very much the driving force behind 
the project. Much of the impetus for this came from the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), 
a South Afiican NGO that had been established in 1997 by Anton Rupert, a South 
Afiican tobacco millionaire and former president of WWF South Africa. In 1990 
Rupert met Mozambique’s President Chissano to discuss establishing a permanent link 
between protected areas in Mozambique and neighbouring Swaziland, Zimbabwe and 
South Afiica (PPF 2004b). Rupert was also instrumental in generating World Bank 
interest in the project (Wolmer 2003:270), gaining the personal support of Nelson 
Mandela (see Chapter 1) and, through the Peace Parks Foundation, securing over Rand 
65m^  ^of funding from the German Development Bank (KfW) and other smaller donors. 
The Mozambican Ministry of Tourism has joined with the Peace Parks Foundation to 
“assist the [Mozambican] National Directorate of Conservation Areas (DNAC) in 
overseeing the development of the Limpopo National Park” (GLTP 2004). Although the 
Peace Parks Foundation is officially only assisting the Mozambican Government, in fact 
the South Afiican organisation plays the dominant role in managing the Limpopo 
National Park.
The Project Implementation Unit, directed by an employee of the Peace Parks 
Foundation, is responsible for the day-to-day management of the LNP and developing 
the systems and infrastructures needed to make the project a success. This is a 
considerable task. Although the area has been declared a National Park, the various 
governments have agreed to the principle of a transfrontier project and it has the 
backing of a number of prestigious regional and international organisations and donors.
AMcans at that time and the 1001 club provided them with an opportunity to mingle and do business with 
other international tycoons (Bonner 1993:68-69),
There is evidence to show that South Afiican military and wildlife personnel were involved in poaching 
and smuggling ivory during the apartheid era (Elhs 1994). The South Afiican wildlife authorities also 
acquired a reputation for the forced relocation o f people hving in areas designated as protected areas (see 
Fabricus & de Wet 2002).
Rupert was involved in the creation of the WWF 1001 club and has had close ties to extreme rightwing 
Afiikaner organisations (see Ellis 1994; Bonner 1993).
Approximately US$7m
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anyone familiar with the region will know that the Mozambican side of the park cannot 
really be compared to South Africa’s highly-developed Kruger National Park. The 
Mozambican sector lacks even the most basic infrastructure: there are no roads or 
bridges, let alone the accommodation, electricity or water supplies required to attract the 
mainstream tourist market. The wildlife populations, especially those of the large 
mammals, were decimated during the civil war and have yet to recover. Like many 
other regions of Mozambique, the park and the surrounding area contain an unknown 
number of landmines which render the area unsafe. Due to these and other constraints, 
the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, although agreed in principle, has yet to be 
officially inaugurated and the international border between South Africa and 
Mozambique remains unchanged. For although a small section of the border fence 
between Mozambique and South Africa was ceremonially removed after the signing of 
the tri-partite agreement by the heads of state in December 2002, this was a publicity 
event that made no difference to the status of the border: the fence and border posts 
remain, the immigration services continue to patrol the area, and the migration laws 
remain unchanged.
Although the transfrontier aspect of the project has yet to become a reality, work has 
commenced on developing the Mozambican sector of the park. The project 
implementation unit began training staff towards the end of 2001 and work on the 
ground began in earnest in early 2002. The planning and development of the Limpopo 
National Park was intended to follow a so-called ‘new approach’ to conservation 
management that had gained prominence in Africa during the early 1990s.
A new approach to conservation in Africa
By the late 1980s it was clear that wildlife management throughout Afiica was in crisis. 
Illegal hunting had drastically reduced wildlife populations and resource extraction in 
protected areas continued unabated. The preservationist model that underpinned park 
management systems throughout Eastern and Southern Afiica was proving ineffective 
(Fletcher 1990; Gibson & Marks 1993). This policy of enforced exclusion of people 
from vast tracts of land in order to preserve the ‘unspoilt’ landscape and its fauna had
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stemmed from colonial ideologies of preserving game populations for predominantly 
white hunting expeditions (Grove 1987), such as those conducted by the Portuguese in 
Coutada 16. This echoes the popular Western dual perception of Africa: that in which 
the continent is either seen as a hellish heart of darkness engulfed in war and savagery, 
populated with faceless peoples suffering from famine and disease; or as an unspoilt 
Eden where great herds of animals are free to roam the pristine luscious grasslands 
under expansive blue skies. The most notable difference between these two views of the 
continent is that the image of the African hell is constructed around people, whereas the 
African Eden is empty of Africans entirely. Outdated and inadequate, policies based on 
these images of Africa needed to be replaced: international conservation organisations 
and African wildlife departments looked for new approaches to wildlife management.
This search coincided with a broader trend in development studies to encourage the 
participation of local people in the design and management of programmes that were 
intended for their benefit; a shift from ‘top-down’ to ‘bottom-up’ planning and practice, 
to use the development jargon (Roodt 2001:471; see also Oakley & Marsden 1984; 
Korten 1990; Chambers 1997). Embracing this new approach, conservationists 
emphasised the need to balance the overall goals of protecting wildlife with the needs of 
the people living in and around the parks and protected areas. This involved a shift away 
from the isolating preservationist strategy of old, to a more inclusive concept of 
conservation involving more integrated projects that attempted to “ensure the 
conservation of biodiversity by reconciling the management of protected areas with the 
social and economic needs of local people” (Wells & Brandon \992\ix). These calls to 
include ‘local participation’ and ‘community development’ as part of conservation 
projects are now ubiquitous from the level of the World Bank to the smallest NGO, 
although they are often framed in the more contemporary terms of ‘social capital’ and 
‘civil society’. The redistribution of the benefits of conservation projects to the people 
whose livelihoods have been affected is central to this new approach (Neumann 
1997:561). Without involving the “participation and cooperation of the rural people 
whose lives they will invariably alter”, warn Anderson and Grove, “policies for 
National Parks, game reserves, forest production and soil conservation programmes are 
unlikely to be successfully implemented” (1987:9).
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In keeping with these current trends in conservation policy, the management plans and 
publicity material of The Limpopo National Park (and, by association. The Great 
Limpopo Transffontier Park) embrace this inclusive community development approach. 
One of the primary objectives of the Limpopo National Park, as stated in the 
Management Plan, is to:
Ensure the participation of local communities in the development and management of 
the LNP and to ensure an equitable flow of benefits to these communities. Such 
benefits should include equity-sharing in tourism developments and operations, human 
resource development and capacity building, employment creation, the development of 
SMME [Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise] opportunities and improved natural 
resource management leading to improved livelihoods. (LNP Management Plan 2004:9)
The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park website states that the park “will be a world- 
class eco-tourism destination, with extensive private sector involvement, but managed 
to optimise benefits for sustainable economic development of local communities” 
(GLTP 2004). Nelson Mandela, speaking as patron of the Peace Parks Foundation, also 
noted the importance of local participation in the scheme:
If the government unilaterally decides to establish transfrontier parks without consulting 
the community, then the community will not cooperate. But if the community is 
properly consulted and becomes part of the process, then they will cooperate 
—especially if they derive some benefits from the transfrontier park system. (Cited in 
Goodwin 2001 a:30)
All of this rhetoric neatly conforms to the so-called ‘new approach’ to African 
conservation, but how does all of this convert into practice on the ground? In the next 
part of this chapter I demonstrate that those involved in early stages of development and 
implementation of the Limpopo National Park failed to adequately consider the interests 
of the people living within the park boundaries. Far from including or benefiting them, 
the activities, thus far, have compromised and endangered their livelihoods.^^
When I left the field in January 2003 measures were being taken to readdress the issue o f the people 
living in and around the park. I have no means to assess the changes that have taken place during the 
period since I left Massingir, The argument presented in this chapter, therefore, is based on data collected 
during the first 14 months o f the Park’s existence.
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When the Government of Mozambique abolished Coutada 16 and created the Limpopo 
National Park in 2001, the residents living within its boundaries remained oblivious to 
the change. Despite all the calls for the participation of local residents in the planning 
and design of conservation projects, the people living in the Limpopo Park were not 
even informed, let alone consulted, about the redesignation of what they understood to 
be their land into a new national —  soon to be international —  conversation area. Some 
residents were vaguely aware that the region had previously been officially designated a 
hunting concession, but this had made little difference in terms of everyday life. There 
had been virtually no enforcement of the conservation laws and people were free to hunt 
and use the area’s natural resources as they pleased. As one informant put it to me, 
""Coutada 16 means nothing to us; it only exists on their [the Government’s] maps. This 
is our land and we can do what we want with it, as we have always done.” In actual fact, 
initially, the upgraded status of the region had no effect on day-to-day activities and the 
villagers, like me, continued our lives as usual, blissfully ignorant of the fact that we 
were now living in a National Park.
When the news of the National Park was finally announced to the villagers in the 
Shingwedzi basin, they paid little attention. The new park had been described as a new 
‘project’ that was going to be working in the region: a term not unfamiliar to people, as 
since the end of the war in 1992 a whole host of organisations had come to the villages 
with their ‘projects’. For the most part, these had been small-scale programmes 
concerned with rebuilding infrastructure, restocking animals, providing clean water, 
vaccinating children, training agricultural extension workers, or distributing food aid. 
Some families benefited directly from such interventions, but they had little overall 
effect on village life. It was based on this understanding of ‘projects’ that people 
dismissed the ‘park project’ as nothing to be concerned about.
As we saw in the opening section to this chapter, the residents’ initial lack of concern 
was not to last. The situation changed when the park authorities constructed a 
checkpoint, manned by armed guards, to control the traffic to and from the villages of 
the Shingwedzi Basin.
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Transforming hunters into poachers
The two men who had searched my car were part of a contingent of 29 Mozambican 
game wardens who were the first to be recruited and trained to work in the Limpopo 
National Park.^^ The warden positions had been advertised in Massingir, but the 
minimum educational requirement excluded nearly all the residents of the park. Instead, 
the applicants came from elsewhere in Southern Mozambique, either from Maputo, 
Inhambane, or from other districts of Gaza. Many of those whom I spoke to had 
received military training and been soldiers for Frelimo during the civil war. Sixty 
applicants had been short-listed and had attended an assessment process in Massingir, 
where their physical fitness, tracking and bush skills, and basic firearm techniques were 
evaluated. Thirty successful applicants were then sent to the South African Wildlife 
College near Hoedspruit, South Africa, for further training. This training, selection and 
recruitment process was organised and carried out by former members of the South 
African military, now working as conservationists. The transformation of the former 
South African military operatives into conservationists is ironic, not only because there 
is evidence to suggest that the South African Defence Force was heavily involved in 
ivory smuggling and poaching during the war (see Ellis 1994), but also because many of 
the wardens who were being trained were former Frelimo troops who had fought against 
the South African-sponsored Renamo rebels. Once trained, the wardens were organised 
by the anti-poaching coordinator, a former Mozambican Army Major, and posted within 
the Park. These wardens were to become the focus of many of the grievances expressed 
by the Park’s residents.
The primary role of the field rangers was to protect the park’s wildlife. This brought 
them into direct conflict with the local population. Until this point my neighbours and 
informants had never been subject to hunting prohibitions: trapping animals and hunting 
with dogs was a source of meat, a means of protecting crops, and also important in 
terms of making ritual offerings to ancestral spirits (see Chapters 2 & 6). And
When I left the field in January 2003 there were only these 29 wardens (or field rangers). However, 
recruitment and training continued and by the end o f December 2003 there were 73 rangers deployed in 
the Park (PPF 2004a).
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prohibitions, it seemed, had initially been scarcely necessary. Several of my informants 
stated that, although hunting was important to them, only a small number of animals 
were actually killed because of the limited technology available. One man told me, 
“Hunting without guns is not easy. A man cannot kill many animals with only dogs or 
traps. He may kill one gazelle^^ and share it with his family and friends. That will be 
sufficient.” This situation was different during the war with Renamo when the 
government formed civilian militias and began distributing semi-automatic assault 
rifles. “With an AK [AK-47],” my informant continued, “hunting is much easier. In a 
single day a man could kill five or six animals. All we had to do was wait by the river at 
dusk and the animals would come to drink. We had so much meat we all grew fat.” 
Other people also reminisced about the abundance of food shortly after Frelimo had 
distributed weapons in the region. One of the fishermen explained that his job became 
far easier, “All we had to do was row out into the lake and drop in a couple of grenades. 
The fish would just float to the surface.”^^  Such statements might appear to suggest that 
the need for wildlife conservation was, indeed, acute, but the level of hunting was about 
to revert back to something closer to its former state.
This bountiful period was not to last; hunting, even with guns, became more difficult as 
the game populations dwindled and more dangerous as the frequency and brutality of 
Renamo attacks in the area increased (see Chapter 4). At the end of the war firearm 
possession was outlawed and there were several, albeit largely unsuccessful, attempts to 
collect the weapons. Although many guns remained hidden in the area rather than being 
surrendered to the UN or Frelimo,^^ for the most part these are no longer used for 
hunting, largely due to the lack of ammunition and the threat of punishment if caught 
with a weapon. Certainly during my time in Massingir, both in 1997-8 and 2001-3, most 
people hunted only on a limited basis using either traps or dogs.
In mid-December 2001 — soon after the incident with the checkpoint — a contingent of 
field rangers visited Mavodze and organised a village meeting. The guards explained
^  G a z e l l e  was the generic term used locally to refer to all antelope species.
Another fishermen told o f a similar, but more effective, fishing technique that involved attaching a 
grenade to an anti-personnel mine and then throwing this lethal device into the lake.
A number o f informants told me that there were large weapons caches buried in the Park and on several 
occasions I was shown handguns and automatic rifles that were left over from the war (see also Vines 
1998:40-42).
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that they had been trained in South Africa and were going to be patrolling the area to 
protect the wildlife. Hunting — or poaching, as it was now termed —  was no longer 
allowed and their role was to enforce this ban. A similar change occurred in Rhodesia 
during the colonial period, where new laws redefined Afiican hunters as poachers and 
established the white settlers as gamekeepers whose role was to protect the animals 
from the Afiicans (Hill 1996; see also Gibson & Marks 1995). This reclassification 
indicates that the creation of National Parks and other conservation areas is not simply a 
matter of redefining boundaries and establishing protected areas, but also involves a 
redefinition of people’s roles and statuses. However, while the newly-trained rangers 
assumed their anti-hunting message was clear, the villagers interpreted the new 
regulations in quite different terms.
The villagers understood ‘hunting’ as referring to killing large mammals such as 
elephants or rhinos. Since such animals had not been seen in the area for years and 
hunting them without firearms was considered ludicrous, they had no complaints about 
the new prohibition. Nobody considered it to mean that hunting antelope and other 
smaller mammals had become illegal, so people continued to snare and hunt such 
animals as they had done before. They were therefore shocked and furious when the 
game wardens arrested a man for killing an antelope. The ‘poacher’ was taken to the 
ranger station near the new checkpoint and interrogated. During the course of this he 
was badly beaten and fined 4,500,000 MZM (US$195) —  an astronomical amount in 
local terms —  and released.
Corporal punishment was widely used in the process of establishing the presence of the 
park and the authority of its personnel. Over the course of my fieldwork, I spoke to 
three other men who had been arrested, fined and also badly beaten up by the field 
rangers. All four reported that they had received beatings to the soles of their feet and 
one claimed that the rangers had burned his feet using embers from a fire.^  ^The news of 
this abuse spread quickly through the different villages. It did nothing to legitimise the 
enterprise and compounded the atmosphere of fear and general distrust of those working 
for the park. After one man was arrested and fined for fishing in one of the rivers, '^*
Similar reports o f abuse by park rangers have also been reported by Rachel DeMotts (DeMotts 2003) 
The park manager later apologised for this error and returned the money and confiscated nets.
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people became increasingly confused about which activities were permitted and which 
were not.
This sense of confusion was widespread. One of my friends explained, “We don’t 
understand why they [the field rangers] have done this. Why were those men beaten? 
They were not even hunting within the park. They were hunting by the river, a long way 
from the park. We know where the park is; we put up the fence. The gazelles they killed 
were nowhere near that area.” Although people were now aware that a park had been 
created, many understood this to be just the small sanctuary area that had been fenced 
off near the village of Massingir Velho. The animal sanctuary was a 350 km^ enclosure 
that straddled the South African border to the west of the village (see Map 2). The 
creation of the sanctuary was the first part of the process to restock the Limpopo 
National Park with game. The animals that were being relocated from the Kruger 
National Park were brought in by truck and unloaded in the sanctuary. The area was 
designed to provide a secure environment, allowing these animals to reproduce: once 
populations had grown they would be released into the larger park.
It was not surprising that local residents had assumed that the sanctuary and the park 
that everyone had been talking about were one and the same. The sanctuary had been 
the focus of much of the Project Implementation Unit’s work during the first year. The 
villagers had witnessed or, in some cases, been a part of the frenzy of activity that had 
been going on there: vehicles drove from Massingir to the sanctuary on an almost daily 
basis; bulldozers had created a network of new roads through the bush; 45 men from 
Massingir Velho and Mavodze had been employed to erect the fencing; and busloads of 
journalists, film crews and other VIPs had been brought in to witness the game releases 
or tour the area. With very little activity evident outside this reserve, the villagers 
understood the sanctuary, rather than the entire area in which they lived, to be the new 
National Park and therefore considered it perfectly acceptable to continue to hunt 
outside the fenced-off zone.
The prohibition of hunting, and the punishment beatings and exorbitant fines for those 
continuing to hunt, were not the only sources of conflict that had erupted between the 
park authorities and the people living inside it. The annexation of land and water 
sources for the animal sanctuary caused a series of altercations in Massingir Velho,
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which later resulted in several relocations. Four families living within the area were 
forced to leave the enclosure and resettle in the village. Interestingly, the park 
authorities had been unaware of their presence in the area and it had been the chefe do 
paste who had ordered them to move. The chefe do poste, who remained an adamant 
believer in Frelimo’s post-independence policy of villagisation, had disapproved of 
people living outside the communal villages for some time but had been unable to do 
anything about it. The creation of the sanctuary provided him with the means of 
reintegrating these “backward people” into the more “developed villages”. The fact that 
the chefe do poste used the activities of the park to pursue his own personal political 
agenda is by no means unusual for, as Ferguson has demonstrated in Lesotho (1990), 
development programmes often result in the extension of political authority through one 
guise or another.
While the forcibly resettled people were extremely unhappy about their situation, their 
numbers were too small for this to become a major source of conflict. A far greater 
problem was the restricted access to cultivable land and important water resources.
Threatened livelihoods
The animal sanctuary extended from the South Afiican border to the Olifantes River. 
While much of this area had been used only for hunting or grazing cattle, the area near 
the river was important for flood-retreat maize cultivation during the dry season and for 
collecting water. The fences erected for the sanctuary prevented the villagers from 
gaining access to these vital resources. One of the men firom Massingir Velho explained 
that the village borehole did not provide enough water for the entire population and so 
people had to use water fi-om the river, both for their own consumption and for that of 
their livestock. As compensation for the restricted access, the park authorities offered to 
instal a second borehole in the village. While some villagers agreed that this was a fair 
settlement, others continued to oppose the sanctuary. “They promise us a borehole now, 
but when will it come?” asked one old man. “These sort of people always come and tell 
us they will do something and it never happens. All they do is talk. I want to see this 
borehole and pump; only then will I agree to this.” Another man was concerned about
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his livestock, asking, “A borehole is great for the people but what about the cattle? 
There will not be enough water. The cattle must drink from the river.” Ultimately, 
however, the park authorities swept these problems aside, the sanctuary was completed, 
and a new borehole was promised for the village.
At one level the complaints expressed by my informants reflect their fears relating to the 
development of the park, but they are also indicative of residents’ responses to state 
planning in general. The state planners no doubt intend their blueprints to be 
straightforward, but in practice such bureaucrats frequently disregard the messy realities 
of human life (see also Ferguson 1990:194). The residents of the villages of Massingir 
had learned this through experience: boreholes had been dug in the past but left without 
pumps through lack of funds; the cattle diptank had been rehabilitated but nobody had 
been trained to use it; extension officers had been employed but their motorbikes lacked 
the fuel to travel to the villages. It was unsurprising that residents viewed the borehole 
proposed by the park to compensate for the restricted access to the river with some 
suspicion. As it transpired these suspicions were well justified for, although the 
sanctuary was completed in June 2002, the new water source was not unveiled until 12 
months later (PPF 2003).
The fence that had been built around the sanctuary prevented the villagers cultivating 
some of their land and restricted access to the river, yet it did not prevent animals that 
had been relocated from Kruger Park getting out. Shortly after the restocking began, 
small herds of antelope could be spotted grazing by the roadside between Mavodze and 
Massingir Velho. These were readily identifiable as South African animals by virtue of 
their lack of fear of motor vehicles, having been conditioned to their presence in Kruger 
Park. A number of residents reported seeing antelope and other animals, including 
zebras and kudu, in the area near the sanctuary. Although, as mentioned below, these 
animals were easy to hunt, they also constituted a threat to people’s crops. Several 
farmers told me that they had seen animals eating the crops in their fields, both in the 
Shingwedzi and Olifantes Valleys. This enraged local residents because food supplies 
were already very low as a result of the lack of rain; seeing a protected animal eating 
what little they had been able to grow, and being unable to add it to their food stores, 
was too much to bear.
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In addition to animals escaping from the sanctuary and destroying crops, there was also 
a problem of the increasing presence of lions in the area. The implementation unit had 
agreed not to move any predatory animals into the park while people were still living 
there. However predator-free, the sanctuary adjoined the Kruger Park that is famous for 
its lion population. If harmless animals could escape the sanctuary, more dangerous 
ones were equally able to enter it. In December 2002 a number of game guards reported 
seeing a pride of lions entering the sanctuary from Kruger Park by crawling under the 
fence. Shortly after this I received a number of reports from farmers who claimed their 
cattle had been victims of lion attacks. Although I could not substantiate these reported 
attacks, people living in Mavodze and the surrounding villages became increasingly 
worried about this threat to their herds but could do little to protect them.
Predators were not the only threat to the livestock in the area. As we have seen, one of 
the reasons for the shelving of the plans for a cross-boundary conservation area in the 
1930s and 1940s was the objection raised by the cattle-ranching industry in the region. 
The ranchers saw the transmission of disease from game to domestic herds as a threat to 
their business, particularly the risk of Foot and Mouth Disease and Bovine 
Tuberculosis. This risk has not disappeared. Elsewhere measures against the spread of 
diseases have been taken. In Zimbabwe for example the European Union has committed 
€10m for a veterinary fence to protect livestock.^^ In Mozambique, however, the lack of 
such precautions has left the local cattle herds vulnerable to infection. The first outbreak 
of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) was reported in September 2002 and by November a 
ban on the movement of animals within Gaza Province came into effect. Although the 
park authorities attributed the outbreak of the disease to a herd of buffalo that had come 
into the area through a hole in the border fence created by the 2000 floods, rather than to 
the restocking of animals that they had initiated, the local population blamed the 
Limpopo National Park. They were convinced that the animals that had been introduced 
by the park had transmitted the disease. “These buffalo have been in this area for years,” 
commented one cattle-owner, “We have never had a problem with disease until now. 
The disease only arrived when they started bringing in their animals. The park caused
These funds have been put on hold due to pohtical instability and donor concerns (Wolmer 2003: 272). 
An electric fence has been built along the Botswana-Zimbabwe border by the Botswanan Government 
officially to restrict the spread o f FMD, but various parties suggest that it is to limit the influx o f  
Zimbabwean migrants (BBC 2003; Carroll 2003)
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this problem.” Livestock sales, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis, were of particular 
importance to the livelihoods of people in the area and the quarantine regulations 
compounded existing hardships due to the lack of rainfall (see Chapter 1).
The myth of creating employment
Far from benefiting from the creation of the National Park, the local residents saw the 
project as extremely detrimental to their livelihoods, as outlined above. During the first 
14 months of its existence, the Limpopo National Park had forced a number of families 
off their land and excluded others from arable land and water sources in the Olifantes 
Valley. The field rangers had physically assaulted a number of people and 
supplementation of diets with game meat was no longer permitted. People understood 
the relocation of animals from South Afiica to have caused the destruction of crops, 
spread Foot and Mouth Disease among their cattle, and increased the number of 
dangerous predators (especially lions) hunting in the area. It is debatable whether all of 
these problems were a direct result of the creation of the park, but the villagers in the 
Shingwedzi valley were in no doubt about who was responsible: “This park is a very 
bad thing,” my field assistant told me. “It is causing us so many problems. If it carries 
on like this I do not see how we will be able to continue to live here. When they first 
came here, they [the park authorities] said that it was a good thing and would give us 
jobs. They were wrong. They have given us nothing but shit.”
His statement appears to give the lie to one of the primary objectives of the Limpopo 
National Park: that of providing new employment for the local population. But there is 
evidence that this objective itself was unrealistic: contrary to popular belief, in general 
National Parks rarely provide many job opportunities for local residents (Gibson & 
Marks 1995). In the case of the Limpopo National Park, residents were excluded from 
the positions of field rangers because they failed to meet the level of schooling required 
for the job. There was also concern that local rangers would be put under pressure to 
cooperate with, or at least turn a blind eye to, village residents hunting in the area. A 
number of villagers were temporarily employed to assist in erecting the fence 
surrounding the game sanctuary: it is likely that future employment opportunities will
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be limited to this periodic and poorly paid manual labouring. It is unlikely that the 
lodges and safari companies applying for the Limpopo Park concessions will be eager to 
recruit unskilled and poorly educated staff who cannot speak either Portuguese or 
English, for anything but the most menial of positions. The jobs for the residents that 
were promised with the creation of the park do not appear to be forthcoming. This 
situation is not unique to the Limpopo National Park, or indeed Africa. In his work in 
Nepal, Ben Campbell observes that the people living close to the Langtang National 
Park appeared to be paying the highest cost for the creation of the conservation area, in 
terms of loss of livelihoods, and yet were benefiting from very little of the wealth that it 
generated (2000). Similarly, Tanzanians living in the proximity of the Arusha National 
Park have received few of the benefits from the project, and yet, like the villagers in 
Massingir, have suffered from physical violence, crop damage and hampered livestock 
production as a result of the park’s wildlife conservation programmes (Neumann 1998).
Local resistance to the National Park
The resentment that the local residents felt towards the park did not go unexpressed. 
The villagers had repeatedly asked the chefe do paste to bring Major Zineo, the anti­
poaching coordinator and ‘head’ field ranger, to the village so that the hunting situation 
could be discussed. Expecting a rowdy reception, neither Zineo nor the chefe do poste 
had wanted such a meeting to take place. Zineo thought that such meetings were not his 
responsibility but that of the recently appointed Community Liaison Officers. The chefe 
do poste knew that an angry public meeting would reflect badly on his leadership. After 
a different instance of the field rangers beating and fining a man caught hunting in the 
area, another public meeting was held in Mavodze. One of the men attending this 
meeting stood up and asked the village leaders why the meeting with Zineo had still not 
taken place. The meeting grew increasingly more heated as other people voiced their 
concerns. When the chefe do poste attempted to calm things down, a number of the men 
stood up and shouted that they would set their own roadblocks by felling trees and 
lighting fires on the road, forcing the park vehicles to stop and give the residents a 
chance to voice their objections directly to project staff, a tactic also adopted in 
Zimbabwe as a response to unpopular conservation schemes (Alexander & McGregor
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2000:621). Another man, a former soldier, told the meeting that the villagers did not 
have to put up with the park. They had fought to protect their land from Renamo. They 
still had guns. They could fight again; this time against the park.
As the antagonism between the park authorities and the villages continued, I heard such 
threats of violence on numerous occasions. Although these were never carried out, 
people employed less dramatic means of confrontation, more akin to the everyday forms 
of resistance described by James Scott in his work among Malaysian rice farmers 
(1985). Scott notes that large-scale, organised peasant uprisings have been relatively 
uncommon and argues that it is more important to understand everyday forms of 
resistance. By this he refers to “the ordinary weapons of [...] powerless groups: foot 
dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, 
sabotage, and so forth” (Scott 1985:29). Crucially, resistance utilising these “weapons 
of the weak”, as Scott terms them, requires little coordination or planning, avoids direct 
confrontation with authority, and can be instigated by individuals rather than organised 
groups. Mozambican villagers employed such tactics in resisting the park. Several of the 
villagers who were employed by the Project Implementation Unit to build the fence 
around the animal sanctuary told me that they were deliberately doing as little work as 
possible. They laughed as they explained how people would arrive late and leave early 
and take a break whenever the boss—a portly Afrikaner they had nicknamed ‘The 
Warthog’—  turned his back. Theft was another common means of ‘getting back’ at the 
park. Two of my neighbours managed to steal a large coil of the wire used to make the 
fence. This was hidden in the scrub until they found a man who was prepared to 
exchange it for an ox. Other villagers started stealing the solar panels used to generate 
the electric current that ran through the animal sanctuary fence.
The most common response to the efforts of the park authorities to preserve the wildlife 
was, ironically, to escalate hunting activities. Increasing levels of hunting have been 
observed as a tactic used in response to conservation projects by people throughout the 
world: for example by the Maasai in the 1960s (Lindsay 1987), by Zambians living near 
game management areas (Gibson & Marks 1995), or by people near the Langtang 
National Park in Nepal (Campbell 2000). The local response to the Limpopo National 
Park was no different. To my delight, as by this stage I had acquired a taste for it, the
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amount of game meat available in the village began to increase after the game guards 
had started abusing local residents. On one occasion, while eating roast antelope in the 
fields near the Olifantes River, I asked my host if he was worried about being caught by 
the rangers. “Ha!” he snorted, “Those park people know nothing. Look how many of 
them there are and look at how much land there is. They can’t catch all of us. We will 
show them. The more they beat us, the more animals we will kill. They are helping us 
by bringing in these stupid South Afiican animals. These are easy to catch.” He gestured 
towards our next course roasting on the fire, “This one didn’t even know to run away. 
Easy. Those park people think we are stupid. Ha! They are the ones who don’t know 
what is going on.”^^  Rather than using the organised violent uprisings that they had 
threatened, local residents engaged in more surreptitious, individualistic forms of 
protest. By using everyday forms of resistance the local residents felt that they were 
able to counter, at least in some way, the Limpopo National Park’s growing 
encroachment into their lives.
When considering Scott’s concept of everyday resistance there is always a danger that 
an over-zealous ethnographer can read resistance into actions which the people 
themselves might not consider to be an attempt at subversion at all. My friend’s gleeful 
comments made whilst eating his roast antelope clearly demonstrate that this is not the 
case in this instance. He was explicit in explaining that the hunting was a protest against 
the actions of the park wardens and the fact that by killing the animal he considered 
himself to have taken a swipe at the park authorities appeared to allow him to enjoy his 
meal even more.
Another, more practical, problem with Scott’s analysis is that if everyday resistance is 
too everyday, it becomes invisible. In other words if the actions that are intended to 
impede unequal power relations are too subtle, they may go unnoticed by the force that 
people are attempting to subvert, thus rendering the resistance useless. Initially this was 
the case with the residents’ actions against the Limpopo National Park. While the 
villagers understood the actions to be a protest against the park, the park authorities
^  Due to the high number o f visitors, the animals in the Kruger National Park are used to human activity. 
Unlike the Mozambican animals, the animals in KNP rarely run away from people or the noise of 
vehicles. This lack o f timidity made the South African animals relocated to Massingir far easier to hunt 
than their more wily Mozambican counterparts.
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considered these activities as opportunistic criminality and endeavoured to clamp down 
yet further. However, as this response did little to ease the tensions or curtail the thefts 
and poaching, the authorities began to change their behaviour. The growing resentment 
felt by the people living in the park began to be noticed by the park authorities and 
attempts were made to rebuild relations with the residents of the park.
Rebuilding community relations
Members of the Project Implementation Unit began to admit that they had ‘got off on 
the wrong foot’ in terms of community relations and were, I think, genuinely anxious to 
rectify the mistakes that had been made. One of the mechanisms intended to increase 
local participation in the planning and development of the park was the establishment of 
committees in each of the villages. These were to be made up of about seven local 
leaders, selected by the villagers. They would convene to discuss problems related to 
the National Park, and it was envisaged that information relating to the park would flow 
both to and from the local residents through these committees. I was temporarily away 
from the field when the project staff established the committee in the village of 
Mavodze, but on my return I made enquiries as to what had happened. It took me a long 
time to find anyone in the village who knew that a committee had been formed, and it 
was even difficult to establish who sat on this new committee.^^ When I was able to 
track down some of the committee members, not one was clear about what the 
committee was for or why it had been formed. This lack of awareness was not 
coincidental: the National Park committee in Mavodze did not convene a single official 
meeting during the rest of the time I was in the field.
The lack of interest in the newly-formed committee was not unique to the park project. 
Almost every organisation that had come to work in the region had insisted on 
convening public meetings to form village committees that would be involved in their 
new project. People had lost count of the number of committees that had been formed in
Most people assumed that it would consist o f the same group o f  Frelimo leaders who sat on every other 
village committee (see Chapter 4).
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Mavodze: there were water committees, livestock committees, goat-restocking 
committees, women’s committees, agricultural committees, food relief committees. The 
list was endless. It was hoped that convening public meetings and forming village 
committees could ensure local participation in a new project. The reality, however, was 
quite the reverse. There were so many of these events, held by so many different 
organisations, that people were ignoring them. As farmers and fishermen, villagers had 
far better things to be doing during the day than waiting around for hours to see if 
another delegation would show up to talk at them for a few hours. It was hardly 
surprising that local residents took such little interest in the park’s village committee; 
they were ‘committee-ed out’.
In addition to the village committees there were other attempts made to involve people 
in the planning process of the Limpopo National Park. A number of local leaders were 
invited to attend meetings in Maputo and Massingir, but the villagers expressed their 
dissatisfaction about their involvement. One man told me that the problem was that the 
wrong people were going to these meetings. “It is always the school teachers or the 
chefe do paste. They are like you,” he said, “they live here but they are not one of us. 
They just work here. They do not care what happens to us as they collect their salaries 
every month and soon will leave for a job somewhere else. They do not represent us and 
they do not tell us anything about what is going on.” On the occasions when other 
village residents attended meetings, logistical problems, such as the lack of translators, 
severely hindered their involvement. A number of times one ‘community 
representative’ explained that he felt unable to voice his opinion at these meetings 
because it was too daunting being surrounded by more powerful people: “Men had 
come fi*om South Africa, from America, from all over the world. The Minister was in 
the room with his directors and other chiefs. Who am I? What could I tell them?” In 
spite of the efforts made by the park management to instigate a more ‘participatory 
approach’, the residents of the Limpopo Park continued to feel uninformed and 
excluded from the decision-making process.
The evidence from the first 14 months of the Limpopo National Park’s existence clearly 
shows that the people living in the area were not benefiting from the development in 
any way. Despite the supposed dawn of a new era of integrated community-based 
conservation management in Afiica, the residents of the Limpopo Park were
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inadequately informed and barely consulted abcout the development of the project. In 
terms of local participation in the planning and mianagement processes, the people living 
inside the park were not even informed about its creation, let alone asked for their 
opinions and concerns. The creation of the park Ihas done nothing to improve residents’ 
lives. Indeed, far from it. Since the park was estatblished people’s livelihoods have come 
under increasing pressure and people have beeen subjected to serious human rights 
abuses, including torture. In response, and quiite understandably, individuals have 
retaliated by mounting covert resistance in thae form of petty theft and increased 
poaching and have threatened to resort to organissed violence in order to obstruct further 
infringements on their way of life.
Conservation and the expansion of state poweir
It comes as no surprise to anthropologists i that conservation programmes, or 
development projects in general, often fail to mteet their objectives and in some cases 
may actually have a detrimental effect on the péfople’s lives that they were intended to 
benefit. The creation of national parks in EthiopJia’s Lower Omo Valley in the 1970s, 
for example, threatened the pastoral activities cof the Mursi people who lived in the 
region and left them far more vulnerable to ffamine during periods of low rainfall 
(Turton 1987). Similarly, the evidence from the: early stages of the implementation of 
the Limpopo National Park also suggests that, ffar from benefiting the local residents, 
the development is having a negative impact oni their lives. Although in this case it is 
particularly important that these problems are borought to light, as the park is widely 
heralded as a showcase project for transfrontier cconservation areas throughout Southern 
Afiica, I think it is too early, not to mention unpiroductive, to dismiss the whole project 
as a failure. Instead, in this final part of this chapter I will follow James Ferguson in his 
analysis of a development project in Thaba-Tsekca, Lesotho (1990), and concentrate on 
some of the broader political consequences that ] have resulted from the creation of the 
Limpopo National Park.
Ferguson concludes his study by arguing that thbe principal outcome of the Canadian- 
funded agricultural development programme waas not to raise levels of production in 
local farms, but to increase state control in the; area. The infrastructures built by the
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programme allowed a host of government services to become available in the previously 
remote region. These included a new post office, a food-for-work programme, seed 
supply, livestock marketing, a police station, immigration control office, a taxman and 
new healthcare workers. The provision of such services is often regarded as an indicator 
of ‘development’, assumed to be of unquestionable benefit to people, but, as Ferguson 
points out, the role of a government is not only to serve its people but also to govern 
them. The introduction of this local government machinery, Ferguson argues, cannot be 
disassociated fi*om the issue of power; indeed the arrival of each institution expanded 
and strengthened state power throughout the district (1990:253).
Similar processes have been observed in Afiican conservation projects. In a critique of 
the internationally acclaimed CAMPFIRE programme (Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources), Kevin Hill argues that the initiative has 
increased the power and presence of the state in marginal areas of Zimbabwe (1996; see 
also Alexander & McGregor 2000). Through introducing a locally-managed 
conservation policy that derives revenues fi*om hunting, the Zimbabwean government 
has succeeded in gaining legitimacy and recognition fi-om the participating communities 
and at the same time has created a rural taxation programme on a commodity that would 
have otherwise provided no financial benefits at all. Exposing a darker side to this 
phenomenon, Nancy Peluso notes that some states, or state interests, also appropriate 
the conservation concerns of international environmental groups as a means of 
controlling productive natural resources (Peluso 1993). This, she argues, can include the 
use of violence and coercion in the name of conservation, allowing the state to control 
people living in marginal areas or minority groups that challenge the state authority 
(1993:47; see also Neumann 1998).
If we return to the example of the Limpopo National Park, the use of coercion and 
violence to control resources that Peluso (1993) describes is apparent in the behaviour 
of the field rangers. The rangers, who were trained by former military operatives, and in 
many cases had been soldiers themselves, enforced the anti-hunting laws by the threat 
or use of violence;^^ those villagers caught hunting were subjected to beatings and/or
The widespread use o f military-trained scouts and military-style tactics to enforce the law in protected 
areas or National Parks is also noted by Gibson and Marks (1995:941).
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torture. The expansion in control was not limited to the poaching laws. One of the local 
shopkeepers complained to me that since the park had been created he had been forced 
to buy a commercial licence from the district administration. He had never been 
required to have one before, but unfortunately an official from the provincial capital 
who had been visiting the park had stopped to buy a cold drink and noticed he was not 
displaying the required paperwork. Several days later he had been forced to purchase 
the licence, which he had framed and now hung on his shop’s mud wall. Such instances 
were inconvenient and expensive to those concerned, but did not really affect most of 
the village residents. A far more widespread and serious problem was to arise when it 
became apparent to the residents that game wardens were not only controlling poaching 
but were also attempting to control the illegal movement of people across the 
Mozambique/South Afiican border.
Bringing down borders?
The Limpopo National Park spans the Mozambican/South Afiican border, a frontier that 
for a long time has been used by illegal migrants to cross between the two countries (see 
Chapters 2 & 3). Throughout my time in Massingir groups of young men could be seen 
walking through the villages within the park, heading towards South Afiica in the hope 
of finding work. Shortly after the field rangers were deployed, a number of the migrants 
reported that rangers were harassing, robbing or arresting them as they attempted to 
cross the border. One man explained to me that his son had left with some fiiends to 
find work in South Afiica and he had been stopped by some of the game guards. They 
had threatened to beat him if he did not give them money. The man’s son had given 
them what little money he had on him and had been forced to return to the village. A 
group of rangers had accosted another man on his way back from South Afiica. They 
had stolen the goods he had purchased with his wages. He had been particularly 
alarmed, as he was unaware that the LNP had been created while he was working in 
South Africa and was thus unaware of the identity - and source of authority - of the 
group of armed men who had robbed him. Other migrants, rather than being robbed, 
were arrested by the field rangers and taken back to the district capital. The game 
wardens’ harassment and ability to arrest people created another obstacle on the already 
difficult route for those wishing to enter South Afiica illegally.
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The dual role of the park rangers as both game and border guards was accepted by the 
local government officials. The Director of Immigration in Massingir explained to me 
that the creation of the park had been of great assistance to his department. He was 
responsible for controlling over 175km of border with a total staff of 30, and without 
vehicles or — until the creation of the park — a radio. Since the park had been declared, 
the South Afiican government had given his department a radio and the two 
immigration services now coordinated patrols. The director explained that his 
department and the park wardens had joined forces and were “fighting the same fight. It 
is much easier now,” he explained. “The park has more men, more vehicles, weapons 
and radios. We work together.”
The South Afiican interest in coordinating and expanding border controls was clear. 
The region has long been known as ‘Crooks Comer*. While some smugglers were 
relatively harmless, transporting household goods across the remote and poorly 
controlled frontier (Chapters 2 and 3), others used it to smuggle less legitimate materials 
in and out of South Afiica. I had seen guns, drugs and gems leaving Mozambique and 
stolen cars and motorbikes coming in (see Chapter 3; see also Vines 1998; Synge 1997; 
Connor 2003). The South Afiican authorities were anxious to stem this illegal trade and 
also to reduce the number of illegal migrants coming in search of work. The cross- 
border cooperation as a result of the park was one means of achieving this (see also 
Wolmer 2003). It is unlikely that the illegal migration will ever be completely 
eradicated, as people have been avoiding the controls on the South Afiican side of the 
border for years. And, as mentioned in Chapter 3, there are at least some employers in 
South Afiica for whom the access to cheap and vulnerable labour power fi*om 
Mozambique is a great advantage. But expanding this control and increasing the number 
of wild animals on the Mozambican side of the border will make it increasingly more 
difficult for people to cross without using official border posts.
For the people living in and around the park, the attempt to increase border control was 
a double blow. As we have seen above, the creation of the park limited the potential of 
agricultural and livestock production through which most families made a living. Now 
the park was threatening to interfere with the labour flows on which most households 
were economically dependent. In Chapter 3 I argued that, as the gold-mining industry
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has reduced its foreign force, young men from Massingir continue to cross into South 
Africa to find work. Without proper documentation, rather than migrating legally 
through border posts, as the generations of miners before them had, the young men 
today are forced to cross the border illegally through the dangerous Kruger National 
Park. The creation of the Limpopo National Park and the Transfrontier Project has 
increased the dangers faced by these young men. There will be more animals, more 
armed patrols and more cross-border cooperation. Migrating to South Africa will 
become increasingly difficult.
The new park, heralded as opening the way for ‘an Africa without borders’, is bringing 
down the barriers for the animal populations but erecting new ones for the people who 
had been crossing back and forth for generations. This irony was not lost on the 
residents of the park. A number of villagers, myself and representatives of the 
Mozambican, South Afiican and international media were invited to witness the release 
of another group of elephants that were being relocated from Kruger National Park. 
During one of the many speeches, a government official proclaimed that the 
Transfrontier Park would “open the border”. At which point one of the villagers laughed 
and said to me, “Open the border? What is he talking about? When was this border ever 
closed? For us they are not opening the border; no, they are building a bigger one.” The 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park was tearing down the boundary for animals and 
wealthy passport-holding tourists in four-wheel drive vehicles, but was creating a new 
and larger one for people living in the area, to whom crossing the border was a crucial 
part of their daily lives.
Expanding state power: Which state? What state?
The creation of the Limpopo National Park undoubtedly restricted the activities of the 
people living in the area and, as I have argued above, brought with it a greater level of 
control and regulation than had previously existed in this marginal area. Unlike 
Ferguson’s example from Lesotho, however, it is not sufficient to label this as an 
extension of state power or control. Ferguson demonstrates that the overall effect of the 
Thaba-Tseka development project was an influx of state institutions such as the police
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force, taxman or government agricultural service into a previously marginal region. 
These institutions were clearly recognisable as a part of the Lesotho state. This is not the 
case with the Limpopo National Park in Massingir. The creation of the park has not 
brought institutions clearly associated with the Mozambican state into the area. Instead, 
the area is being managed and developed with the assistance of a South African-based 
NGO (Peace Parks Foundation) that is contracted to the Mozambican Ministry of 
Tourism and largely funded by the German state development bank (KfW). On first 
glance this distinction may appear pedantic, for the Peace Parks Foundation works for 
Mozambique’s Ministry of Tourism and it is the Mozambican Government, therefore, 
that is responsible for the National Park. The reality on the ground, however, suggests 
something different. The roles of the Peace Parks Foundation, the Mozambican 
Government and the South African authorities appear to overlap and this ambiguity, 
coupled with the overall lack of information about the project, has resulted in much 
confusion among the residents about who is responsible for the new park. Exactly which 
forces or institutions are gaining control over them, therefore, is unclear.
The presence of NGOs in the region was nothing new to the people of Massingir. As 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis, many of the services were provided by non­
governmental organisations, including agricultural and livestock extension, some of the 
health care provision, the construction of the school, borehole, cattle dip tank, and other 
infrastructures. Indeed, it could be argued that the state was retreating from the more 
remote rural areas and ‘outsourcing’ the service provision to non-governmental 
organisations. However, although the NGOs may have become the service providers, 
due to a lack of information — or indeed misinformation —  people living in the region 
often understood these organisations to be a part of the Mozambican state or Frelimo 
itself (see Chapter 4). This was not the case for the Peace Parks Foundation and the 
Limpopo National Park. Rather than being seen by local residents as a part of the 
Mozambican state, the park was perceived as a South African project.
One of the main reasons why the Limpopo National Park was considered to be a South 
African project was that all of the senior members of the Project Implementation Unit 
appeared to be white South Africans. In fact this was not the case. While the Project 
Manager and Finance Manager were South Africans, the Park Director was a
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Mozambican. Nevertheless people living in the region understood the director to be 
working for the South Africans. This misunderstanding was due to the Mozambican 
staffs habit of wearing green military-style uniforms, while the South African staff 
would wear civilian clothes. From their experiences of military service during the war, 
many of the villagers understood that the people wearing the civilian clothes were 
usually responsible for making the decisions and those in uniform simply carried out 
their orders. The same, many local residents thought, must be true with the park 
personnel. It was the South Africans who were in charge of the project; the uniformed 
Mozambicans were merely their subordinates.
It was not only the difference in staff clothing that led local residents to understand the 
park as South African. During the first stages of the park’s development, fimding for the 
Mozambican-registered vehicles had not yet arrived. Members of the project 
management, therefore, used their personal. South Afiican-registered, vehicles. As 
discussed earlier in this thesis, the vehicle in which an outsider arrives is an important 
means of identifying him. For the most part people could usually establish the identity 
of a person and what they wanted from registration plates, logos embossed on the side, 
colour, make, and overall condition of the vehicle they were driving (see Chapter 4). 
The people working for the park drove new South Afiican-registered vehicles with no 
logos and thus local residents assumed that the park was a South Afiican project. These 
suspicions were only further confirmed when people established that the park personnel 
were arriving in Massingir having driven through the Kruger Park (a border crossing 
restricted to all other vehicles), rather than the road from Chokwe that everyone else had 
to take.
The final reason why people thought of the project as South Afiican was that they 
understood the establishment of the Limpopo National Park and the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park, not as the creation of a new park, but as an expansion of the existing 
Kruger National Park. There was a general feeling that the South Afiicans were taking 
Mozambican land so that they could have a bigger game reserve. One of my informants 
at the elephant release explained:
They [the South Africans] say that they are giving us their animals. This is not true.
Those are our animals. They are Mozambican elephants. The South Africans stole them
198
Photo 27: Elephants being released into the Limpopo National Park
Photo 28: The international media at a Limpopo National Park elephant release
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at independence. When the South Africans were building their border fence they waited 
until it was almost finished and then flew helicopters over this region. The helicopters 
herded up all our animals and drove them through the gap in the new fence. When the 
animals were in the Kruger Park, the boers [a generic term used for all white South 
Africans] closed the fence and our animals could not come back. Now they are giving 
us back our own animals. We are not stupid. We can see what they are doing. They tell 
us that they are giving us something new but really they are just taking our land. Soon 
they will have our animals and our land.^ ^
This idea that the National Park was a means by which the South Afiican government 
could annex Mozambican territory was commonly held throughout the villages in the 
park. People were puzzled why the Mozambican government had allowed this to 
happen. It was initially thought that Renamo must have been responsible. This was 
partly because Renamo had received South African support during the civil war and 
local residents feared that the problems related to the park were a form of revenge being 
inflicted by their former enemies. There was also a general feeling among people living 
in the region that tiieir party, Frelimo, would never engage in a project that would cause 
such disruption to their lives. Nevertheless, as the activities of the park increased, it 
became increasingly clear to the residents that it was not Renamo but the Frelimo 
government that was responsible for their ills. They could not ignore the signs: the 
governor visited the area; high-ranking government and party officials toured the area in 
the park vehicles; the Mozambican Minister of Tourism was discussing the project on 
South Afiican radio; and eventually President Chissano met the presidents of South 
Afiica and Zimbabwe in Xai Xai and personally signed the tripartite transfrontier 
agreement. One of my informants, Luis Zitha, summed up village opinion during one of 
our conversations:
hi Mavodze we are all soldiers; most us didn’t run away to South Afiica or Chokwe 
during the war. We stayed here and fought with guns; some of us died. We had tactics: 
we left the village and lived on top of that mountain in the bush. We carried AKs [AK- 
47 assault rifles], posted sentries and planted mines to protect ourselves. When the
^  I was told the story about the South Africans rounding up the game in the region and driving across the 
border at independence a number o f times. Although I cannot confirm that this did actually occur, the 
same event is also referred to in PAWS (2001).
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bandits came, we would fight back. They could not beat us. We fought and suffered 
with Frelimo, but what are we getting back? Look at my old clothes, people are hungry 
and that lot [the Frelimo leadership] fill their pockets. They have food and clothes. We 
fought for them and we haven’t had anything back from them. They tell us that they 
will do this or they tell us they will do that, but they do nothing. In reality, it is worse 
than nothing. Now the government has made this park. We will have nothing but 
problems. We will not be able grow crops, our cattle will be taken by the wild animals, 
it will be impossible to live here anymore. They have let us down.
There was a widespread sense of betrayal among the residents of Mavodze. Since 
capturing the local imagination after independence, people had considered Frelimo as 
‘their’ political party. Through its involvement in creating the park that was threatening 
people’s livelihoods, Frelimo had let their rank-and-file supporters down. The local 
Frelimo leadership could no longer represent them. Residents knew that the leaders who 
occupied the lower ranks of the party hierarchy would never contradict their seniors (see 
Chapter 4) nor act to promote village interests in the face of centrally-determined 
pohcy.
This shift of support away from Frelimo did not translate into support for the other 
national party, Renamo; for no matter how badly Frelimo had let them down it would be 
unthinkable for people in this region to back the former rebels (see Chapter 4). Later 
that year (2002) the local residents were given an opportunity to vent their anger 
through ‘the ballot box’. As a result of much national and international debate, the 
Mozambican government was pressured into passing a decree that allowed rural 
‘communities’ to appoint their own leaders. Many commentators assumed that 
throughout the Frelimo stronghold of the southern provinces people would simply instal 
an existing party leader to fill this new position. In the villages of Massingir, however, 
the tensions generated by the creation of the Limpopo National Park promised a quite 
different outcome, as the following chapter will demonstrate.
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Conclusions
I want to draw this chapter to a conclusion by returning to the work of James Ferguson 
that has been cited a number of times throughout the argument. As I have indicated 
above, Ferguson argues that the lasting effect of the Canadian-funded Tsaba-Tseka 
development project that he studied was the expansion of state control into a previously 
marginal area (1990:253). In this case the development of the Limpopo National Park 
brought the apparatus of governance closer to the remote villages of Massingir: border 
controls have been tightened; wardens have enforced a hunting ban; and checkpoints 
have been erected in an attempt to control the movement of illicit goods. While there 
has been a similar expansion of the mechanisms of control, the case of the Limpopo 
National Park is quite different from Ferguson’s work because in Massingir the 
expansion of control has not been achieved by expanding the state institutions. In 
Lesotho it was the state institutions such as the army, police, or treasury which arrived 
with the development programme. With the Limpopo National Park, although the 
Mozambican state retains sovereignty, the day-to-day control has been the responsibility 
of a private organisation. The men patrolling the park, manning the checkpoints and 
arresting poachers are not employed or managed directly by the state but through the 
Project Implementation Unit, directed by the Peace Parks Foundation.
There is of course nothing novel in the outsourcing of functions that have formally been 
the domain of the state. In Chapter 4 we saw how a number of different NGOs have 
been responsible for the supply of a variety of services to outlying rural areas, such as 
Massingir, since the end of the war. Such services have included agricultural and 
veterinary extension work, supplying sanitation infrastructure, assistance in providing 
healthcare, building schools and distributing food aid. However, as Ferguson notes, 
government is not just a machine for delivering services, but is also a device for 
governing people (1990:225). The functions of the state that have been previously 
carried out by NGOs in Massingir have all been related to service provision. In the case 
of the Limpopo National Park, the Mozambican state has begun to outsource some of its 
responsibilities that are more directly associated with the more coercive aspects of 
governance, such as policing and border control. Interestingly, in a recent article 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot notes this increasing ‘privatisation’ —  as he terms it —  of state
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functions but suggests that the duty that remains entirely the preserve of national 
government is guarding national borders (2001:132). The case of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park refutes even this: this chapter clearly demonstrates that the 
maintenance of the Mozambique-South Africa border is becoming the responsibility of 
the various different groups involved in the transfrontier conservation initiative.
While the development of the Limpopo National Park in Massingir has -resulted in a 
significant change in the way the Mozambican state operates in the area, the residents of 
Mavodze and the surrounding villages were concerned with the way in which this 
affected them on a day-to-day basis. One of the primary objectives of the park was to 
ensure that the project benefited the local residents. This chapter has argued that, far 
from benefiting the villagers, the park is threatening their livelihoods. The introduction 
of game animals and appropriation of land limits agricultural and livestock production. 
This problem is set to worsen as the activities of the Project Implementation Unit 
expand beyond the animal sanctuary. The conduct of the game wardens has resulted in 
growing animosity between the park authorities and the local residents, with villagers 
that have been caught hunting being punished with beatings and heavy fines. Finally, 
although the creation of the park has been publicised as dismantling Africa’s borders, 
paradoxically, for the residents of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin, the park further 
impedes their access to neighbouring South Afiica, which —  as we have seen elsewhere 
in this thesis —  is crucial to this borderland economy and fundamental to local social 
and cultural relations.
The outsourcing and dominant position of South Afiican institutions in developing the 
Limpopo National Park initially created confusion among the residents over who was to 
blame for their misfortunes. The park project was identified by most as a South Afiican 
initiative. However, people were not clear about why or how the Mozambican 
government had allowed the South Afiicans to move onto its land and cause so many 
problems. In the early stages of the park’s development it was widely held that it was all 
Renamo’s doing, but over time it became increasingly clear to the villagers that ‘their’ 
Frelimo party was actively involved and supported the development of the park. They 
felt angry and betrayed.
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Local residents threatened violent protest to halt the development of the park. While this 
did not materialise, I have argued in this chapter that people mounted a campaign of 
what James Scott terms everyday forms of resistance such as theft and increased levels 
of hunting. In addition to this form of protest, the residents of Mavodze were presented 
with an opportunity to voice their discontent in quite another way. Ferguson argues that 
the development process strengthens state bureaucracy and has a depoliticising effect; 
he terms it an “anti-politics machine” (1990:256). This was not the case for the residents 
of Limpopo National Park. At the same time that the park was being developed, the 
Mozambican government was reforming part of the political system in rural areas. A 
new position of ‘Community Leader’ was created. The holder of this new role was to be 
appointed by the people of the villages. In the next chapter I outline how the residents of 
Mavodze were able to use the appointment of this new official as an opportunity to 
demonstrate their opposition to Frelimo’s support of the Limpopo National Park.
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6. Decree 15/2000 in Massingir: local politics, local protest
Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the abandonment of the single-party state and adoption of 
multiparty democracy in Mozambique did little to alter the realities of local politics in 
Massingir. Frelimo continued to dominate local political life and, although there were 
sources of local discontent such as the creation of the Park, there had been no noticeable 
separation of the party and the state. While little changed at the local level, the move 
towards liberal democracy initiated a number of public debates at a national level, 
including that of the role of so-called ‘traditional authorities’ in local governance. 
During the 1990s a wide range of interest groups put the Frelimo government under 
considerable pressure to formally recognise the authority of the ‘traditional leaders’, 
many of whom had lost their positions when Frelimo came to power at independence. In 
response to this, the government passed a decree in 2000 that created a new political 
position in rural areas, known as the ‘community leader’. This individual would be 
appointed by the people living in his area and would be responsible for governing that 
region.
This chapter examines the appointment of the community leader in the village of 
Mavodze. The multiple threats that the Limpopo National Park posed to people’s 
livelihoods, and other changing local circumstances, had led people to question their 
loyalty to Frelimo. Although supporting other political parties remained unthinkable, the 
election of a Frelimo-backed candidate was no longer inevitable. All three of the main 
candidates who stood for election attempted to appropriate ‘traditional’ issues in order 
to bolster their support, but ultimately the village residents backed a candidate who was 
neither from Frelimo nor could be identified in any way as ‘traditional’. Indeed, the 
elected candidate’s qualities were neither ‘traditional’ nor ‘modem’ in the terms laid 
down by the national debate: his salient quality, instead, was his perceived capacity to 
represent their interests in the continuing conflict with the National Park.
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The chefe da terra: A traditional leader or colonial relic?
In the process of deciding where to locate my ill-fated house my friend Jaime suggested 
that I should talk to the chefe da terra (chief of the land), as he could allocate me a plot 
of land on which to build. However, when I met the chefe da terra, he said that I could 
build my hut wherever I wanted to, as it was nothing to do with him; he no longer 
decided these matters. He suggested that I should ask Chauque who, he claimed, was 
the village secretary, for a plot of land. Knowing that Chauque was not the village 
secretary and not wanting to get passed from one village leader to another as I had done 
on earlier occasions, I instead opted to ask the advice of Joaquim, the director of 
education for the administrative post. Joaquim said that the following year the school 
would need another house for a new teacher. If I were to donate my house to the school 
when I went back to England, I could build it on the ground designated for state 
amenities in the centre of the village. This suited me perfectly and, several weeks later, I 
dismantled my tent and moved into my newly built mud hut.
I continued my research from the comfort of my new accommodation. However, 
following the process of obtaining the land for my house, I remained curious about the 
role the chefe da terra played in the village. Earlier enquires about what he did had 
yielded little apart from the fact that he was the former régula (chief of the area during 
the colonial period) and his current responsibilities included carrying out certain 
‘traditional’ ceremonies during the year. To my frustration, further questioning 
produced no additional information. I decided to pursue my investigation along different 
lines: 'chefe da terra"' literally translates as ‘chief of the land’ and I speculated that he 
might play some part in land distribution. I began to ask people how they had acquired 
the land used for cultivation and what, if any, role the chefe da terra had played in this 
process. One informant, Xavier, told me that when he had wanted to cultivate a new 
field in the Shingwedzi valley he had walked along the river until he found a section of 
uncultivated, overgrown bush. He had asked the people who farmed the adjacent land 
whether the area he had selected was being used by anyone. As it was not, Xavier began 
to clear the trees, bushes and undergrowth and the following season he ploughed the
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land and produced a maize crop. “It is much easier these days,” Xavier explained, “Now 
we have democracy, we can do what we want.”
In the old days, during the time of the Portuguese, we had to consult the chefe da terra. 
He was the head of the village at that time. We would go to him and ask him where we 
could make our fields. The chefe da terra would allocate the land he wanted to give us. 
Now, all we have to do is find an area with good soil and clear away the bush. It is also 
better now because in the old days we had to pay taxes to the chefe da terra. That was a 
lot of money. These days, all we have to pay is 10,000 MZM (US$0.43) each year to 
Armando [the government tax collector]. Recently, however, the chefe da terra has 
been asking us for money again. Sometimes I fish in pools that are left when the River 
Shingwedzi runs dry. The chefe da terra wants to charge me 300,000 MZM (US$13) to 
fish in these ponds. This is crazy. It only costs 67,000 MZM (US$2.91) for an annual 
government licence to fish in the reservoir, where there are more and bigger fish. That 
old man is crazy. There is no way I’m going to pay him anything and there is nothing he 
can do about it. His days are over; he is no longer in charge. He just wants money for 
beer.
Showing somewhat more deference for the position of chief was the account given by 
Jaime, who had originally suggested that I visit the chefe da terra. When I asked him 
about how he had arranged his fields he said that he had inherited some of the land firom 
his brother, but more recently he had brought another maize field into production in the 
Shingwedzi Valley. Unlike Xavier, Jaime had approached the chefe da terra and asked 
him where he could start a new field. Jaime explained that the chefe da terra knew 
about the land. The chefe da terra knew the location of the best soil and it was the chefe 
that was in charge of these ‘traditional things’.
In the colonial times the chefe da terra was called the régula and he worked with the 
Portugese. When the Portuguese left, our government came to power and the chefe da 
terra was told that his work had finished. The Party said that he still had colonial ideas 
and could not be a part of the new Mozambique. The Party said that we should have 
new leaders and we agreed. The war came and there was a lot of confusion. After the 
war the chefe da terra was allowed to control the land and the traditional things—he is 
not allowed to control people. The chefe da terra also has to run certain ceremonies, for 
example if the rains do not arrive, he has to talk with the spirits of the ancestors and 
they tell him what to do to bring the rains. He knows about the land and farming. When
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there is a harvest we should bring him some of our crops, but many people don’t do 
this.
Jaime’s description of the chefe da terra was accurate, for, as we will see, he did 
organise the first-fruit ceremony in the village and some village residents continued to 
consult the chefe da terra in matters relating to the land or to ancestral spirits. Yet, as 
Xavier’s testimony demonstrates, not everyone thought of the chefe with such 
deference. Although Jaime and Xavier are both recounting the realities of life in 
Mavodze, their differing opinions are also representative of two sides of a broader 
debate. Xavier regarded the chefe da terra as a relic of the past who had no official 
capacity to influence village life; his role had been replaced after independence by the 
‘modem’ state apparatus. Jaime, on the other hand, understood the chefe da terra to 
have regained some authority at the end of the war and to have become, once again, 
responsible for land allocation as well as other spiritual and ceremonial duties, such as 
maintaining harmonious relations with the ancestral spirits. The importance and new­
found legitimacy of these activities had, from Jaime’s perspective, reinstalled the chefe 
da terra as an important player in local politics. These opposed positions reflect the two 
sides of a debate central to conceptions of politics not only in Mozambique, but also 
throughout much of sub-Saharan Afiica. It is a debate about the role and position of 
‘traditional’ authority in contemporary Afiican society.
The modernist and custom-orientated tendencies, alluded to by Jaime and Xavier, lie at 
the heart of Afiica’s current political predicament (Mamdani 1996). The liberal 
solution, Mamdani argues, has been to “locate politics in civil society, and the 
Afiicanist solution is to put Afiica’s age-old communities at the centre of Afiican 
politics” (1996:3). The former is advocating a system ensuring civil rights and the latter, 
defending cultural heritage. This dichotomous view not only results in a deadlock in 
terms of practical politics but it is also “a paralysis of perspective” (Mamdani 1996:3). 
In his book Citizen and Subject, Mamdani suggests that the way out of this impasse is 
not through passionate argument for either side, but by investigating both the language 
of rights and that of culture in their historical and institutional context. Through a 
process of simultaneous critique and affirmation it is possible to arrive at a synthesis 
that transcends the polarity between the two positions.
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Mamdani’s underlying argument is that contemporary forms of African power and 
authority fragment resistance and continue to reproduce the ‘bifurcated’ institutional 
legacy that was principally forged through the colonial experience. While this may be 
the case, Mamdani fails to achieve his initial objective of formulating a synthesis that 
transcends the traditional/modem dichotomy that he claims is responsible for Africa’s 
political woes. In fact, by shaping much of his analysis in terms of dualisms such as 
traditional/modem, savage/civilised, or rural/urban, Mamdani weakens his argument by 
reproducing the dichotomy that he attempts to transcend. Too little attention is paid to 
the way in which many of the boundaries between such concepts are overlapping and 
blurred; as a result Mamdani sharpens the divides that he is attempting to transcend (see 
also O’Laughlin 2000; Greenstein 1997).
Part of the problem with Mamdani’s argument is his pan-African approach; his case 
studies are drawn from situations as far apart as Zimbabwe and Libya. Drawing on a 
range of ethnographic material, Harry West and Scott Kloeck-Jenson present the 
debates that Mamdani addresses in the context of the post-war political reforms of 
contemporary Mozambique (1999). They argue that many of the tensions relating to the 
issue of ‘traditional authority’ stem from the way the debate is framed. To understand 
the matter in terms of black and white, traditional and modem, is too simple and ignores 
the historical variations and local circumstances. Only by applying the ‘local lens’ can 
we begin to understand the intricacies of the role ‘traditional authority’ is playing in the 
contemporary political environment.
In this chapter I argue that the national debate on traditional authority is masking the 
problems that exist at a local level in Massingir. The national political debate continues 
to be framed in the terms of civil society and democracy in urban areas and traditional 
authority in rural communities.^^® From this assumption, two contrasting political 
systems are being conceived under the single banner of decentralising state power. In 
(some) urban areas political reforms are bringing about local elections and real changes, 
however, in the rural areas debates on political reform are limited to contestations about 
the so-called re-emergence of traditional authority. As a result of this, in Massingir local
Although people living in rural areas are aware that the one-party state was replaced by a democratic 
system at the end o f the war, in practice the one-party system continues to operate in many areas (see 
Chapter 4).
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political actors are actively seeking to appropriate ‘tradition’ as a means to their own 
ends. While this might well have been expected, the specific local circumstances have 
resulted in this appropriation occurring in a way nobody had anticipated. As it turned 
out, the appointment of a ‘traditional’ leader^ ®^  ultimately had nothing to do with 
tradition or any link with the past whatsoever. The people of Mavodze used the 
language and technologies of power that they had at hand to appoint a new leader who 
they considered had the capacity to represent them and deal with the problems that they 
faced at the time.
Tradition as a national debate
Following the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late 1800s, the European powers, primarily 
Britain, France and Portugal, began to consolidate their newly annexed territories. 
Beginning in British territories and quickly adopted in other colonies, including 
Mozambique, colonial administration was established based upon the principle of 
indirect rule;'°^ local government was run through indigenous political institutions and 
the representatives of these were subservient to colonial administrators. Thus there 
existed a dual system of law: the customary law to which native Africans were subject 
was counterposed against the civil law that had jurisdiction over European residents 
(Comaroff & Roberts 1981; Roberts 1984; Roberts & Mann 1991; Hamnett 1977). This 
system assumed “the existence of self-governing tribes as the underlying units of native 
political organisation” (Moore 1994:18). Chiefs and leaders were selected from these 
units to rule their peoples according to traditional laws and customs.
Indirect rule, however, was not the continuation of the status quo but a fundamental 
transformation in the nature of the chiefship. The Mozambican colonial administration
The position created by the government in response to the sustained pressure to recognise so-called 
‘traditional’ leaders was known as the ‘community authority’. The legislation states that this individual 
need not necessarily be in anyway ‘traditional’, however, it was generally understood—  both locally and 
nationally— that this was the government’s way o f recognising ‘traditional leaders’. See below.
The Portuguese, Belgian and Italian colonial powers adopted the system o f indirect rule. The French 
used a system o f direct rule (see Mamdani 1996:82-90),
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adopted the system known as the indigenato (native labour code) to control and extract 
forced labour from rural communities. Key to this was the system of indirect rule that 
gave customary authority in the rural areas to local ‘chiefs’ or régulas, while urban 
dwellers were governed by civil law (Coissoro 1984; Sachs 1984). As one Portuguese 
colonial official commented, “the common law should be applied by a qualified jurist 
... the questions relative to usage and customs should be judged by the administrator 
because it is he who is conversant with local customs and the dominant mentality” 
(Moneira 1956:231). As well as presiding over disputes, from the 1930s onwards the 
régulas were also responsible for allocating land and collecting hut and head taxes for 
the Portuguese administrators (see Honwana 1988; Isaacman 1985; Isaacman & 
Isaacman 1983; Vail & White 1980). Their other task was to arrange the six months of 
compulsory labour {chibalo), in plantations, on roads, rail and other public works, 
which the overwhelming majority of African males had annually to undertake in order 
to pay their taxes (Isaacman & Isaacman 1983:41; Hanlon 1990).
When Frelimo succeeded the Portuguese administration in 1975 it swiftly adopted a 
Marxist rhetoric in which feudalism and capitalism were neatly encapsulated as the twin 
enemies. The indigenata not only encompassed both of these categories, embodying the 
process of colonial capitalist extraction through the mechanisms of feudalism, but was 
also based on traditional values that stood in the way of the progress and modernisation 
of the revolution (Hall & Young 1997:65). At independence the new government 
abolished the colonial administrative structures and introduced a highly centralised 
party-state framework through which to govern the country. The régulas were dismissed 
and party secretaries appointed in their place (see Chapter 4). Grupas dinamizadares 
(activating groups) were created to mobilise the population to ‘continue the struggle’ 
and overcome the legacies of colonial rule. However, it was not only the political 
system that was overhauled. Frelimo’s new state was to be built on scientific socialism. 
Traditional beliefs in ancestral spirits and the power of witchcraft were dismissed as 
irrational and backward: such ‘superstitions’ would hold back the development of 
Mozambique as a modem state. Traditional practices were branded ‘obscurantism’ and 
were banned. Offerings to ancestral spirits, rainmaking ceremonies and speculation 
about witchcraft were no longer tolerated. Only through ‘modem’, ‘rational’ thought 
would Mozambique overcome its problems.
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The abolition of the traditional political system and dismissal of the chiefs, like 
Frelimo’s policy of villagisation (see Chapter 4), appears to have been deeply unpopular 
in some areas of the country (Geffray 1990). As I outlined in Chapter 4, Geffray argues 
that the resentment triggered by Frelimo’s mismanagement of rural affairs caused the 
population to support Renamo during the civil war. Geffray thus presented the war in 
terms of an ideologically motivated struggle between the socialist modernisers of 
Frelimo and Renamo, the defenders of tradition. While there is little doubt that some ex­
chiefs did support Renamo’s fight against Frelimo, much of the evidence suggests that 
Geffray’s conclusions, based on research conducted in the northern province of 
Nampula, cannot be applied throughout the country (see Chapter 2). Both Minter (1989) 
and Gersony (1988) counter the argument that Renamo was a legitimate political 
movement that generated grassroots support through recognising the former chiefs, by 
citing evidence from refugees who fled areas of fighting and by interviewing former 
Renamo soldiers. Both researchers come to the conclusion that Renamo was, primarily 
(and certainly initially), an externally-supported force that generated internal 
participation through coercive force, terror and violence. This debate between the 
‘traditionalists’ and the ‘Renamo-as-an-extemal-force-brigade’ has generated much 
academic discussion (Hoile 1994; Vines 1996; Bowen 2000; Hanlon 1991), but will not 
occupy me here. Whether or not Renamo had any political justification during the war 
is, for our purposes, purely academic. What is clear, however, is that during the early 
1990s Renamo transformed from a fighting force to a legitimate political party. 
Capitalising on the widespread rural discontent with Frelimo was a means for Renamo 
to gain support, and playing the traditionalist card was a key part of this. The success of 
this policy was demonstrated when Renamo secured over 30% of the national vote in 
the 1994 elections (Vines 1996; Wood & Haines 1998). As the official opposition, 
Renamo has continued to pressure the Frelimo government to recognise traditional 
authority and to officially reintegrate traditional leaders into the system of government.
At the same time that the opposition was arguing for the reintegration of traditional 
authority, the Frelimo government was coming under mounting pressure from the 
international donor community to instigate further political reforms. Since joining the 
IMF in 1986, foreign aid to Mozambique has increased from US$360m in 1985 to 
US$700m in 1987, reaching US$1000m in 1990 (Hanlon 1996:16). This has remained 
at roughly the same level for the last decade: in 2001 Mozambique received US$935m
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of foreign aid, accounting for almost 26% of the total gross domestic product (World 
Bank 2003). This external support comprises such a large sector of Mozambique’s 
economy that the government has become dependent on further assistance. Such 
dependence severely weakens the autonomy of the state, for to maintain the influx of 
foreign aid the government must be seen to adhere to the policies being promoted by the 
donor organisations (see Hanlon 1991 & 1996; Plank 1993). During the late 1980s the 
main thrust of such policies was for the government to abandon the single-party state 
and adopt a pluralist democracy. With elections in 1994, the international community 
heralded the transfer to democracy as a great success (see Chapter 4). However, in 
keeping with the rhetoric of the day, international organisations have continued to push 
for further political reform to ensure sustained ‘good governance’.
A key component of this notion of ‘good governance’ has been the idea of 
decentralisation. With the underlying premise that “good governments are closer to the 
people” (Litvack et al. 1998:5; World Bank 1997), decentralisation, in this context, is 
defined as the process by which central government shares part of its power with other 
groups within the country (Mawhood 1993). This is a highly ambiguous concept, for in 
practice it can mean anything from devolving power — successfully transferring control 
from central government to locally representative and autonomous individuals and 
institutions — to merely deconcentrating central control by relocating officers at 
different levels and points in the national territory (Crook & Manor 1998). Nowhere is 
this ambiguity more clear than in the case of political decentralisation in Mozambique; 
its definition is completely dependent on context. In urban areas it usually refers to the 
creation of formally-elected municipal governments; in rural areas it is associated with 
the recognition of traditional leaders. The package of nine laws (2/97 & 3-11/97) — 
covering the structure of local government, finance and elections —  applied only to 
urban areas. These reforms were originally envisaged to apply to 139 towns and cities 
(Law 3/94), but this was eventually reduced to 33 elected councils in the first local 
elections held in 1998. Despite the large number of problems encountered in the 1998 
elections (and again in the recent 2003 local elections), voter registration lists were 
updated, a civic education campaign launched, polling stations staffed by independent 
observers, and the local councils were ultimately elected. While these reforms resulted 
in an elected local government and the decentralisation — albeit limited — of political
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power in some urban areas, no such reforms were discussed for rural areas 
(Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 1997; see also Diniz 2003). Rather than 
discussing democratically-elected municipal councils, the debate over political 
decentralisation in rural areas has centred on the issue of traditional authorities.
Thus, the pressure on the Frelimo government to recognise the authority of traditional 
leaders was coming not only from the opposition parties, but also from a broad range of 
international donors advocating ‘good governance’ and ‘decentralisation’ as solutions to 
all Mozambique’s problems. As Harry West observed: “Everyone in Mozambique —  
from the United Nations to the World Bank to USAID to NGOs such as Oxfam, CARE 
and Save the Children — was talking about traditional authorities and their role in a 
democratised Mozambique” (1998:70).
While there is evidence of the increased importance of re-traditionalisation, to borrow 
Chabal’s term (1996:32), in debates about Mozambican local governance, the term 
‘traditional’ is highly problematic. In respect of Africa more generally, Coquery- 
Vidrovitch asks when this so-called traditional period was. Was it before the colonial 
era? Before the Islamic expansion? Before the Bantu expansion? She concludes, “the 
static concept of ‘traditional’ society cannot withstand the historian’s analysis” 
(1976:91). Similarly, political institutions in Mozambique, West and Kloeck-Jenson 
argue, have been subject to so many transformations it is futile to search for a coherent 
traditional political entity emerging phoenix-like from the ashes of the civil war (1999; 
see also West 1998). One cannot simply revive a system of ‘traditional authority’ as an 
authentic, age-old form of African governance because such a thing does not exist. 
Politics —  whether it is lineage-based, autocratic, or democratic — is a dynamic 
process, and participants respond and adapt to social and cultural change. Those who 
are claiming to represent traditional values must be considered modem political actors 
who are negotiating their position and relationships in the contemporary political 
landscape, rather than living fossils of a romanticised (mythical) African past.
Ironically, it was not only the proponents of a recognition of traditional authority that 
had romanticised ‘tradition’, but also Frelimo, the party that had attempted to eradicate 
traditional leaders and the values that they represented. Frelimo hardliners argued that
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“colonialism irrevocably disrupted historical continuities between ‘genuine’ African 
political institutions and today’s claimants” (West & Kloeck-Jensen 1999:480). As a 
consequence, as we have seen in Chapter 4, on coming to power Frelimo dismissed the 
system of régulos as backward and an obstacle to the development of a modem 
Mozambican state, and replaced it with a new party-based system of local government. 
Nevertheless, by the 1990s and despite their antipathy towards ‘traditional authority’, 
the Frelimo government eventually conceded to the pressure to address the issue of 
‘tradition’. As Luis Honwana, a former cabinet minister, said, “we didn’t realise how 
influential the traditional authorities were, even without political power...we are 
obviously going to have to harmonise traditional beliefs with our project” (cited in 
Finnegan 1992:125).
This ‘harmonisation’, however, was a gradual process. The acceptance that traditional 
authorities have a legitimate role to play in local politics and government was initially 
referred to in the 1991 constitution and in articles in subsequent legislation (see for 
example, articles 1, 10 & 11 of the Land Law GOM 1997). Until recently, however, the 
recognition of traditional authority remained little more than a gesture, taking the form 
of minor clauses or articles in legislation that primarily deals with other matters. 
Although ‘traditional authority’ was referred to in new laws, the whole concept 
remained ambiguous. Nowhere was it made clear either what values traditional 
authorities might represent or how they were going to be incorporated into the existing 
socio-political stmctures (i.e. the local version of the one-party state, as laid out in 
Chapter 4). It was not until June 2000 that, as a result of considerable pressure, the 
Mozambican Council of Ministers directly addressed the issue with a single piece of 
legislation and created the position of community authorities in Decree 15/2000.
The decree establishes a link between ‘community authorities’ (autoridades 
comunitidrias) and local state bodies^°  ^ and aims to extend the state apparatus to levels
Eventually, in 2001 the Ministry o f State Administration (MAE) proposed a new law that would give 
more power to administrations at the lower levels o f districts and administrative posts. However this 
separate law, known as the law for ‘Local State Bodies’ (Ôrgâos Locais do Estado), has yet to be passed. 
The drafts that have been circulated show that officials will continue to be selected rather the elected and 
the process appears more akin to the déconcentration o f state power than any meaningful decentralisation 
similar to that seen in the urban areas (draft copy with author; see also Mozambique Peace Process 
Bulletin 2001).
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below the localities (Buur & Kyed 2003). The community authorities are expected to 
work with the other local state institutions (i.e. the chefe do paste and district 
administration, see Chapter 4) to “mobilise and organise the participation of local 
communities in the realisation of plans and programmes for economic, social and 
cultural development” (Decree 15/2000). These ‘community authorities’ are defined as 
being “traditional chiefs and other leaders recognised as such by their respective local 
communities”. This rather vague definition not only allows recognition and state 
formalisation of traditional leadership (required in the 1991 Constitution), but also, as 
Joseph Hanlon points out in the Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, allows the 
inclusion of the other leaders introduced by Frelimo since independence, as well as 
religious leaders, teachers, nurses and traditional healers (MPPB August 2000).
The Decree lists the many specific duties that are the responsibility of the community 
leader, including conflict resolution, peace keeping, crime prevention, 
facilitating/encouraging justice and social harmony, registration of the population, tax 
collection, facilitating/encouraging civic education, land distribution, securing 
employment opportunities, securing food, facilitating housing construction, seeing to 
public health and education, protection of culture and the environment, and road 
construction. In return for carrying out these numerous duties, the leader is entitled to 
use the symbols of the Republic, to use a uniform, flag and badge, and to receive an 
income calculated on the basis of the amount of tax he has collected.
The duties and responsibilities associated with the new position are not dissimilar to 
those of the former régula. Much like his colonial predecessor, the community leader is 
responsible for the key tasks of administering local justice, land distribution and tax 
collection—of which, it must be noted, he receives a share as salary. Indeed, on closer 
inspection it is not just the position of community leader that is reminiscent of the 
colonial system of indirect rule, the entire process of decentralisation could be viewed 
as being based on a colonial blueprint. The political reforms in Mozambique have, like 
the policies of the Portuguese, widened the urban-rural divide. Decentralisation in the 
urban areas is based on civil law and electoral processes. Decentralisation in the rural 
areas is founded on customary law and a return to ‘traditional’ leadership.
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While this argument may be proven correct, if the analysis is left at this we leave 
ourselves open to the same criticisms that have been applied to Mamdani’s Citizen and 
Subject. In order to understand the complexities of what is occurring, we need to go 
beyond the debate as it is being discussed in the national press, academic literature and 
the corridors of power. We need to see how this process of decentralisation and the 
recognition of so-called traditional leaders is being played out locally. How was the 
Decree 15/2000 received and implemented in the villages of Massingir?
Decree 15/2000 in Mavodze: The return of the régula?
In the village of Mavodze, the first that I had heard about any possible changes to the 
political system was when I was sitting with a group of men who were complaining 
about the chefe do paste. One of the men was angry because he had not been allocated a 
place on the ‘food-for-work’ programme that had been launched in response to the 
continuing drought. “The problem,” he explained, “is that those people fi*om the 
government only give the opportunities to their friends. They only help each other. They 
don’t care about anyone else.” The other men in the group nodded in agreement. One of 
them shrugged and said, “Soon, it won’t matter. We will be able to choose our own 
leader. One of our own people.” His companion frowned and shook his head, “What are 
you talking about? Don’t believe any of it. They tell us that these things will change, but 
you know what will happen, it will stay the same. One of that group^ °"^  will take the job. 
Nothing ever really changes.” They were talking about the new position established by 
the decree.
The chefe do poste later explained to me that in November 2000 all the district 
administrators and chefes do postes had been summoned to a meeting in Xai Xai. At this 
meeting the provincial officials told them about Decree 15/2000. In response to pressure 
from the opposition, the government had created a new position in the village 
leadership, to be known as the ‘community leader’ (autoridade comunitdria). The 
community leader would be the new head of the village, replacing the village secretary.
The Frelimo-dominated village leadership —  see Chapter 4.
217
who would, with the other existing village leaders, assist this new community leader in 
his duties.
In January 2001 the chefe do paste received a letter from the provincial administration 
instructing him to call meetings in each of the villages within his administrative area to 
inform the residents of the new legislation. I arrived in Mavodze shortly after this 
meeting had taken place and the residents were in the process of putting forward names 
of candidates that they wished to fill the position. Initially, there were dozens of names 
being presented to the chefe do poste; almost every extended family in the village had 
nominated a member to become the new village leader. Eventually, however, over the 
following few months, the list began to shrink. People began to discuss the attributes of 
potential candidates when walking to their fields or while drinking beer in the 
afternoon: Fernando, who made charcoal, was dismissed as he spent most of his time 
away from the village; Filamone was considered too lazy; Domingos was too old; 
Alexandre untrustworthy; Almao had died of malaria; and Julio had gone back to South 
Afiica. By April 2002, the fist had been whittled down to three candidates: Antonio 
Machungel Valoi, David Fabian Nuquer and Joao Amos Valoi.
Of the three, two had already had some experience of village leadership. Antonio Valoi 
was the chefe da terra and former régula. In terms of the national debate, Antonio 
would be regarded as the ‘traditional leader’ of the type that Frelimo had initially 
repudiated and Renamo had campaigned to reinstal into a position of authority. He was 
in his late sixties and had, with the exception of several years spent working in the 
South Afiican gold mines, lived in the area his entire life. Antonio had no formal 
education, was illiterate and spoke no Portuguese. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, at 
independence Antonio had been stripped of his position as village leader. He then lost 
much of what was left of his political influence when most of the arable land he had 
formally controlled was flooded due to the construction of the Massingir Dam. Antonio 
was not particularly affluent: he owned three head of cattle and three goats, cultivated 
one field in the Shingwedzi Valley, and his son ran a small shop in the village selling 
cold drinks and minor household goods.
For much o f my time in Mavodze this shop was closed dile to lack o f stock.
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David Nuquer was the president of the locality and deeply entrenched in the existing 
leadership structures. He was a staunch Frelimo supporter and attended all the various 
public and private meetings held in Mavodze and the other surrounding villages. David 
was in his early sixties and, unlike the chefe da terra Antonio Valoi, had not been bom 
in Mavodze but had moved into the area in 1978. He could read and write in Shangaan, 
but spoke poor Portuguese. In contrast to the chefe da terra, David was one of the most 
affluent men in the village. There were seven houses within his homestead and he 
owned two motorcycles, an ox-drawn cart, several bicycles and a fishing boat. He had a 
herd of 123 cattle and well over 20 goats. David loaned cattle, on an annual basis, to 
eight different families living within the locality in return for manual labour in his 
fields. He cultivated four large fields that had produced over 100 sacks of maize that 
year (the average household harvest was 28 sacks)..
Of the three candidates, Joao Valoi appeared to be the wild card. In contrast to the other 
two, neither Joao nor any of his family had held positions of responsibility within the 
village. Being in his mid-forties, Joao was much younger than the chefe da terra, David 
Nuquer, and the rest of the existing village leadership. Up until this point he had not 
shown any interest in getting involved in local politics. He was loosely connected to the 
Frelimo state system as he was married to the village nurse and lived in one of the state 
houses in the centre of the village, but this was a distant connection and until this point 
Joao had done little to involve himself in political affairs. Joâo was not particularly 
wealthy. He had, like most men in the village, been to work in the South Afiican 
goldmines—his father had been bom in South Afiica— and had used his wages to build 
a homestead. Like all the households in the village, Joao had a number of fields in 
which he grew maize and other food crops. While the agriculture was for consumption, 
unusually Joao eamed an additional income by trading cattle. He had used some of his 
wages from the gold mines to buy cattle fi’om other farmers in the region and had taken 
them to sell in one of the markets in Maputo. As a trader, he was well known in villages 
throughout the area and he was identified as a person who had fi*equent contact and 
could negotiate with ‘outsiders’.
The final decision on which of the three candidates would become the community 
leader was to be made at a public meeting in July 2002. The decree itself is vague as to
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how the community leader should be appo in t ed . I t  does not refer to a model of 
elected local government, but if several individuals compete for the position, a system 
must be established for making a decision. In Mavodze voting with a show of hands at 
the public meeting would make the appointment. Although I did not establish who made 
this choice, I suspect that it was the local Frelimo party members, who dominated the 
local political scene, who had done so. On another occasion the chefe do paste had 
explained how other leaders are usually appointed to public office: “we [the Frelimo 
leadership] usually nominate the person whom we want and say to the people: ‘Do you 
want this man to be your new village secretary?’ They usually agree with us and it is 
decided.” It was by adopting this technique, amongst others, that the village leadership 
had been able to dominate political life for the last 30 years (see Chapter 4). I assumed 
that the same thing would happen with this new position; Frelimo would manipulate the 
process to instal its own supporter, David Nuquer, as the ‘traditional leader’.'®^  After 
all, the party dominated all other facets of local political life. Why would this be any 
different?
If, for some reason, the Frelimo-supported candidate did not become the community 
leader, then the only other possible result I envisaged was that the Qx-régulo, now chef 
da terra, Antonio Valoi, would win. Perhaps I had misread the situation: perhaps, as the 
opposition and other organisations had argued, there was far more support for the 
former leader than I had imagined? Perhaps Geffray’s theory was correct and abolition 
of the ‘traditional’ system of leadership was deeply resented by the rural population and 
the lineage chief would be reinstalled?
I was therefore shocked when, on the day of the ‘election’, Joao Valoi—whom I had 
dismissed as a non-starter—gained the most support and was subsequently elected as 
the new community leader. The Frelimo-backed candidate, David Nuquer, was second
The term ‘community’ is also problematic. A community is not a monolithic, homogenous, settled 
entity, however this is the meaning iiiq)lied in the decree, A community will contain categories o f people 
differentiated along many lines including sex, age, and economic status. If it is defined by geographical 
context it will have to include immigrants, those with no ancestral ties to the land or to each other (Buur 
& Kyed 2003; Ribeiro 2001; Western & Wright 1994). In the case o f the villages o f Massingir, 
community was defined geographically in terms o f the communal villages and therefore included the 
entire adult population.
Opposition parties and others had also raised concerns about this at the national level (Buur and Kyed 
2003).
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and the former régulo Antonio trailed in third. The winning candidate represented 
neither the ‘traditional’ nor the ‘modem’ side of the dichotomy. Neither the Frelimo 
candidate who supposedly represented the modem state, nor the candidate who would 
have been supported by the traditionalists, had carried favour with the people of the 
village. A ‘third way’ had been triumphant. But it was unclear in my mind why the 
residents had given their support to Joao Valoi.
I was later able to find an answer when I interviewed people about the circumstances 
that led up to this public meeting of July 2002. We must understand the context in 
which the appointment was made and how the three candidates had attempted to gain 
the support of the other village residents.
A tale of two ceremonies
If we retum to Jaime and Xavier’s contrasting perspectives on the role of the chefe da 
terra we can see that, while Xavier dismisses the old man as an obsolete relic, Jaime 
stresses the importance of the various ceremonies that the chefe was expected to 
perform. Jaime explained that the chefe da terra was responsible for maintaining 
harmonious relations between the villagers and the ancestral spirits. A chief ought to 
manage this by performing certain ceremonies, one of which was the first-fruits 
ceremony. The performance of this ceremony that year was to be of great importance in 
influencing the election of the new village leader.
At the beginning of February 2002 a young boy arrived at my house and said that I 
should come to the chefe da terra’s house. When I arrived, a crowd of people had 
gathered around a tree in the centre of the family compound. The men sat on seats 
arranged around a large clay urn filled with caju juice (an alcoholic drink produced 
from the fruit of the Amarula tree), the women sat on mats on the ground behind them. 
More people were arriving. Each guest carried a plastic container or clay urn filled with 
drink. To one side of the tree four women sat on reed mats peeling the bright yellow 
skins off the fruit and scooping the juicy fruit into plastic buckets; tomorrow’s batch of
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caju. My friend Matthias explained that this was a xivula ceremony. The ceremony 
marked the official start of the caju season (this usually ran from late January until early 
March), when the fruit was ripe and the drink could be produced. People would present 
an offering of their first batch of caju juice to the chefe da terra. The chefe da terra 
would make an offering of the juice to the ancestral spirits to ensure that they were 
content and had not been forgotten.
As people arrived, calabashes were filled with drink and passed around. Each person 
drank their portion and then refilled the calabash and passed it on to the next person. As 
people got drunk, the women began to sing and clap. Several of the old men got up and 
began a stamping dance. A part of the dancing had a transvestite theme: men would take 
a capulana (a patterned cloth used by women as skirts, headdresses or for carrying 
babies) from one of the women and wrap it around their waists, they would then stick 
their backsides out, mimicking the women, and dance the women’s dance. These 
performances resulted in much jeering, laughter and clapping. As the drinking 
continued there were repeated calls for food. However, no one was willing to contribute 
meat or maize. Within two hours the drink had run out, many men and women had 
fallen asleep, and those left standing began to stagger home.
The most remarkable aspect about the xivula ceremony was the complete lack of 
ceremony. No speeches had been made, there was nothing to signify the start or the end 
of the proceedings, nor had there been any solemn ritual offering of drink to the 
ancestors —  in fact the chefe da terra played no part in the proceedings, he simply sat in 
his chair, positioned slightly away from the main gathering of men, and had a few 
drinks (the chefe da terra later told me that he made the offering to the ancestors in 
private). People arrived, drank themselves paralytic, and left. While this absence of 
ceremony was disappointing to a young anthropologist in search of elaborate rituals, the 
events at the chefe da terra’s house clearly demonstrated that Frelimo had not 
succeeded in its quest to eradicate the traditional beliefs that it saw as an obstacle to the
Junod documents a ceremony called “7%e l u m a  o f  b u k a n y e ” in which drink produced from the first 
fruit o f the n k a n y e  tree is offered to the ancestors and the chief (Junod 1927 [1912] I: 369-377). The 
ceremony described by Junod, although containing more elaborate rites, appears to be very similar to the 
x i v u l a  ceremony that I attended.
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Photo 29: Drinking caju at the chefe da terra xivula ceremony
Photo 30: Caju brought to the chefe da terrais xivula ceremony
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country’s development/^^ The xivula ceremony had been well-attended and almost 
everyone had brought an offering of caju. It would be easy to dismiss the popularity of 
the event as an excuse to have a good time, rather than carrying any other significance. 
However, as I shall show below, such a dismissal would misrepresent the facts.
I was not the only one to notice how well-attended the chefe da terra’s xivula ceremony 
had been. As I was walking home from the chefe da terra’s house, I bumped into the 
chefe do paste. He had not been invited to the ceremony, but had come along in the final 
half-hour. The chefe do poste had been amazed how many people had been there but 
despaired that the ceremony had been so unorganised and, as he put it, so uncivilised. It 
was terrible, he thought, that it had taken place on a Sunday. The ceremony should have 
been an official state function, properly arranged with food and drink, to which he could 
invite the District Administrator (his immediate boss). “These events,” he said, “should 
be done properly. They should be organised.” The chefe do poste decided that, with 
David Nuquer (the locality president and one of the three candidates for the position of 
community leader), he would organise the ‘official’ xivula ceremony the following 
Saturday. He would borrow a rifle from the police in town and shoot some antelope. 
There would be meat, people would bring drink, and the ceremony would be performed 
‘as it should be’.
The next Saturday, when I returned to Mavodze after visiting informants in the 
neighbouring village of Bingo, I found a group of people beside the chefe do poste's 
house, waiting expectantly. A table, complete with tablecloth, had been laid and about 
25 people dressed in their best clothes sat on plastic chairs and benches in the shade of 
the chefe’s caju tree. The chefe do poste’s wife and several other women were preparing 
food in the cooking hut. The chefe explained that he had been unable to obtain a rifle 
from the police station in town, and given the area’s recently declared status as a 
National Park, had not been allowed to hunt the antelope. However, he had informed so 
many people that there would be meat at the ‘official’ xivula ceremony (“because there 
had always been meat at such events in the old days”), that to save face he had been
I saw evidence o f this in other villages throughout Gaza Province. In one extraordinary case, in a 
village near Xai Xai, Frelimo had told residents to stop believing in the ancestral spirits that were said to 
inhabit a nearby forest. When I visited in 2002, the forest had grown to be completely impenetrable. The 
residents told me that nobody had entered the forest since 1975. Despite the lack o f firewood and other 
forest resources in the surrounding areas, nobody had so much as touched the sacred forest. The people’s 
beliefs in the ancestral spirits had continued in defiance o f Frelimo’s attempts to eradicate them.
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forced to buy a goat to feed his guests. The chefe do paste had invited the District 
Administrator from Massingir and they were awaiting his arrival. I took the seat I was 
offered at the table and waited with them.
The crowd of people who sat waiting was much smaller than the number who had 
attended the xivula ceremony at the chefe da terra’s house, and had a very different 
social profile. Those attending the previous ceremony were mainly the older men and 
their wives, the village healer and his fiiends, and people who played little part in 
political life in Mavodze. Few of these people were present at the ceremony hosted by 
the chefe do poste and David Nuquer. Instead this event was patronised by the village 
leaders and their families: all four of the bairro leaders, the village secretary, the various 
Frelimo party officials, and all of the schoolteachers.
The administrator was expected at 10 o’clock. When, by 11:30, he had still not arrived, 
it was assumed he was not going to come and so the chefe do poste stood up to begin 
the ceremony: “Viva Frelimo!” he shouted and punched his fist in the air. “Viva!” 
responded the crowd. “Viva Présidente Chissano!” “Viva”. David Nuquer stood up and 
gave a speech. He announced that they were gathered to hold a ‘traditional ceremony’ to 
ensure the sustained prosperity of Mavodze. The chefe do poste had been unable to 
provide game meat, but instead had provided a goat. For the next ten minutes David 
recited a long and detailed list of the achievements of Frelimo.^ He recounted how the 
party had fought the Portuguese and gained independence, how it had built the village 
and provided the school, the health post and the water point. He told how they had 
fought and defeated the Renamo bandits and how under President Chissano the country 
was developing. He concluded his speech with another triumphant round of ‘vivas’.
The chefe do poste thanked David and began his own speech. He re-emphasised the 
many achievements of Frelimo and then explained that the administrator had been 
invited to attend the ceremony, but had for some unfortunate reason been delayed. The 
chefe do poste asked the chefe da terra (who had been asked to attend) to publicly offer 
some meat and alcohol to the ancestors. The chefe da terra stood and walked to a 
nearby tree. He knelt down and poured a libation on the ground and then returned to his
A technique adopted by the Frelimo leadership to maintain popular support (see Chapter 2).
225
seat. The chefe do paste aimounced there was meat for everyone to eat and sat down at 
the table. Those of us sitting around the table were served with goat stew and rice, and 
then the rest of the crowd were offered the rest of the meat. Unfortunately, very few 
people had brought any caju and so there was far less alcohol available than there had 
been during the previous ceremony. As a result, the chefe do poste had little success in 
his attempts to get people to dance. Once the food ran out people began to disperse 
home, leaving the chefe do poste and David alone on the porch looking dejected. The 
xivula ceremony had not gone to plan: the administrator had not arrived; most of the 
village had ignored the event altogether; and even those who had attended had not 
brought any food or drink.
While one might seek partial explanation for the failure of this ‘official’ xivula in the 
presence or absence of alcohol, or in the contrast between spontaneous custom and 
‘invented tradition’, there were other issues at play here. That the second xivula 
ceremony had been such a disaster came as no surprise to people in the village. “Why 
did they [the chefe do poste and David Nuquer] think we would come?”, one of my 
informants commented. “That lot [Frelimo] have been telling us not to do these things 
for years. We shouldn’t believe this and we shouldn’t believe that. And now they decide 
to host a xivula ceremony. What did they expect?” The Frelimo leadership’s turn­
around, and new embracing of the very concepts it had described as ‘backward’, was 
viewed with suspicion by many of the village residents. The xivula ceremony was 
regarded as a transparent stunt that been organised to bolster support for the Frelimo 
candidate. The party’s blatant attempt to appropriate local tradition had backfired.
The second xivula ceremony had been a crass attempt by the local Frelimo leadership to 
demonstrate the national party’s change in policy and show that the party was now 
willing to recognise ‘traditional’ values and beliefs. This sudden and unexpected u-tum 
was greeted with suspicion. The ceremony isolated the existing Frelimo supporters who 
had spent years contemptuously scorning others’ belief in such ‘superstitions’. By 
staging a public ceremony, the leadership had conceded that Frelimo had been wrong to 
deride these ‘traditional beliefs’. While this had served somewhat to humiliate those 
hardline Frelimo supporters who had formerly campaigned so vigorously against 
tradition, the ceremony did nothing to attract those villagers who continued to practise
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Photo 31: The chefe da terrais xivula ceremony
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Photo 32: The second xivula ceremony organised by Frelimo
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ancestral rituals and thereby potentially subscribe to notions of traditional authority. For 
them one ceremony was not going to erase all the years of abuse and persecution. They 
were suspicious of the Frelimo leadership’s motivation for suddenly embracing 
everything it had previously scorned. They ignored the event entirely.
At the same time as the Frelimo leadership’s clumsy attempt to incorporate traditional 
values as a political tool, Joao was proving to be a far shrewder political operator. A 
series of witchcraft accusations began to dominate village affairs following the death of 
one woman during a thunderstorm in 2001. During the months following this incident, 
Joao was able to show that he was attuned to local values and beliefs and skilfully used 
this knowledge to demonstrate his capacity for leadership.
Fear and loathing on the campaign trail, 2001-2002
At the end of December 2001 a massive thunderstorm hit the village of Mavodze. Inside 
my tin-roofed hut it was impossible to sleep with the noise of the heavy rain and violent 
thunderclaps and so I got up and watched the storm from my doorway. Flashes of 
lightning repeatedly lit up the night sky, turning the dark clouds a deep pink. The 
occasional bolt of forked lightning would hit the ground nearby and the air filled with 
the smell of the singed soil. Eventually, the storm passed and I went back to bed. The 
next morning I awoke to find the village in a state of noisy confusion. The lightning 
during the storm of the previous night had killed a woman who had lived in bairro 3. 
She had been sleeping in her hut with the rest of her family when the lightning had hit 
the roof. There was a loud bang and she had been found dead. None of the other 
occupants of the hut were harmed and the hut itself looked as though it had not been 
touched. The other residents of Mavodze found this incident very strange and rather 
alarming. Nobody could understand why, when the entire hut had been hit by lightning, 
only one person had been killed and nothing else had been damaged. Witchcraft was 
suspected.
Witchcraft beliefs and accusations have been a key concern of anthropology, and 
especially African anthropology, since the infancy of the discipline. A comprehensive
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review of this material would be a thesis in its own right (for a useful summary of the 
key arguments see Moore & Sanders 2001): rather than embark on such a quest, I 
explore some of the more recently published anthropological work relating to the 
association between witchcraft and politics. Much of this emphasises that, far from 
being embroiled in a sense of tradition, witchcraft is concerned with decidedly modem 
political dilemmas. While I agree that witchcraft cannot be confined to notions of 
tradition, neither is there anything quintessentially modem about its use in the political 
arena. Referring to the contemporary state in Cameroon, Rowlands and Warmer (1988) 
and Geschiere (1988) argue that sorcery is cmcial to modem African politics and often 
lies at the centre of state-building processes. Following Bayart (1986—see chapter 4), 
they argue that, in a one-party state where it is difficult to express political dissent, 
sorcery constitutes a popular mode of political action. It is the inherent ambiguity of the 
concept that allows the occult to be readily incorporated into modem discourses (see 
also Geschiere 1997:13). Although this work demonstrates that accusations of 
witchcraft can be both a counter-hegemonic force that can resist authority and a force 
co-opted by the elites to assert power, there is nothing to suggest that witchcraft must be 
considered either exclusively modem or exclusively traditional. In order to understand 
the events that occurred in Mavodze in the run-up to the election, we must, once again, 
move beyond the traditional/modem dichotomy and consider what happened within the 
local context.
I found Joao deep in conversation with my neighbour, Luis. He told me that this was a 
serious incident that concemed the entire village and he was going to call a meeting. 
Luis explained that this was the first time that someone had been killed by lightning in 
Mavodze. Several years ago a similar incident had occurred in Kanyane (a village on 
the southem bank of the Massingir Reservoir) and it was found to be the result of 
witchcraft. If this death too had been caused by witchcraft, people could no longer live 
in safety within the village until the witch had been identified.
Several weeks later Joao arranged a meeting in the centre of the village to discuss the 
woman’s death. About 30 people attended the meeting and the conclusion was reached 
that the death must have been as a result of witchcraft. People were unsure who was 
responsible and Joao wamed against relying on curandeiros (diviners or healers, 
depending on the context) in the village to investigate the matter, as they might be a part
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of the problem. It would be sensible, Joao argued, to consult a more powerful 
curandeiro from another town. He knew of a man in Chokwe who was regarded as 
being very powerful. Joao proposed that he should travel to Chokwe and arrange for this 
curandeiro to visit Mavodze and find out who was to blame. The other people attending 
the meeting agreed to this and it was decided that Joao should contact the curandeiro on 
his next trip to Chokwe.
During the next month two more incidents occurred that were suspected to be the result 
of witchcraft. A young boy who lived in bairro 2 had complained of a sore leg and then 
the affected limb had suddenly become red and had swollen up. There was no sign of an 
external wound and the family suspected that he had been another victim of the witch. 
Then, in January, Sr. Piosse, the dip-tank attendant, complained of a headache and died 
the following day. The atmosphere in the village was turning hysterical and allegations 
of witchcraft were being made over the most banal of matters: Filemone, one of the taxi 
drivers, attributed a puncture he had incurred on the road to Bingo to witchcraft and 
complained to Joao that he had still not consulted the curandeiro in Chokwe.
Eventually, Joâo made the trip to Chokwe and brought back the curandeiro. The 
curandeiro inspected the site of the lightning strike and heard the other allegations that 
had been made. He concluded that, while the other incidents could be attributed to 
malaria and misfortune, the lightning strike was a result of witchcraft. Although I was 
not at this meeting, Luis told me that the curandeiro had explained that a particular bird 
that fell from the sky during storms caused lightning. This bird could hit a tree and set it 
alight, or strike a person and kill him.^ *^  A witch could use a magical potion to summon 
such a bird and cause a person to get struck by lightning. In this case the curandeiro 
found that the chefe da terra’s wife had accused the dead woman of stealing her maize. 
The chefe da terra’s wife had bought the plants needed to generate the lightning from 
Sr. Bambani, the village curandeiro. She had given these to a woman named Maria who 
was an outsider from a village on the other side of the Limpopo River. Maria was a
Jimod describes a similar belief and states that among the 'Northern Tribes’ (referring to the area 
where I carried out my fieldwork) magicians could summon this bird and use it to harm other people 
(1927 [1912] II: 290, 403-405), Interestingly, Niehaus, working nearby but in South Afiica, states Aat 
lightning strikes were attributed to witches “manipulating objects rather than sending lightning birds” 
(1993:504).
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Photo 33: A village meeting in the central square of Mavodze
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friend of the chefe da terra and had lived in Mavodze for three years. The Chokwe 
curandeiro discovered that although Sr. Bamhani and the chef da terra’s wife had been 
involved it was ultimately the outsider, Maria, who was the witch responsible for the 
fatal lightning strike.
This explanation appeared to satisfy the concemed residents of Mavodze. In April Joao 
arranged another meeting to decide what should be done with the guilty individuals. 
Some of the younger men argued that the three should be taken out of the village and he 
stoned to death. However, the other villagers present said that such punishments could 
no longer be administered, the police would come from town and create problems. 
Instead it was agreed that Sr. Bambani's and Maria’s personal possessions should be 
taken outside the village and burned. All three of the guilty individuals would be 
expelled from Mavodze and forced to live elsewhere.
With those responsible exposed, things became calmer, but several months later I 
noticed that both the chefe da terra’s wife and Sr. Bambani were still living in the 
village. Luis explained that another meeting had taken place and it had been decided 
that the chefe da terra s wife and Bambani should be given time to harvest their crops 
and make alternative living arrangements; they could not be expected to go and sleep in 
the hush. The other woman, Maria, had left Mavodze and returned to her home village 
in Mabalane. By August, Bambani and the chefe da terra’s wife were still living in the 
village. Joao told me that since the main protagonist, Maria, had left the village there 
had been no further problems. The whole matter had now passed and it was assumed 
that it was safe to allow the other two, who had only played a minor role in the affair, to 
remain.
This verdict was of great political benefit to Joao. The witch-hunter summoned by Joâo 
implicated the chefe da terra in the whole affair, as it was his wife and close associate, 
the village curandeiro Bambani, who had been partially responsible for the death of the 
girl. In discrediting those from the chefe da terra’s household, Joâo had —  through 
stark contrast —  bolstered his own credibility as a leader. However, the most important 
aspect of Joâo’s involvement in the witch-hunt was the manner in which the matter was 
resolved. The eventual outcome was that Maria (an outsider) was held as the major
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perpetrator and banished from the village. The guilt of the two insiders —  Bambani and 
the chefe da terra's wife —  gradually, in the eyes of the villagers, diminished over time; 
they were therefore permitted to stay in Mavodze. This negotiation was down to the 
timing and manner in which Joâo convened the public meetings. He had arranged the 
banishment of the outsider but eventually, and —  crucially —  after Joao’s appointment 
as community leader, the role of the insiders was forgotten. As we shall see below, 
Joao’s ability skilfully to manage this insider/outsider negotiation is of particular 
significance to understanding Joao’s political support in the village during the 
leadership election.
Although Joâo was able to turn the witchcraft allegations to his own political advantage, 
it is important not to overemphasise the instrumentality of witchcraft. From ethnography 
gathered in the Lowveld area of South Afiica (close to my fieldsite), Isak Niehaus 
argues that simply concentrating on the instrumentalist dimension ignores witchcraft’s 
existential dimension as a personalised explanation of misfortune (1993). If one 
understands witchcraft as a valid means of explanation in itself, the act of seeking out 
those who commit witchcraft becomes a powerful medium of generating political 
support. People will pay attention to efforts to alleviate a potential threat where they 
might ignore ceremonies organized to generate political support. With Niehaus’s 
analysis in mind, we can view the witchcraft allegations in Mavodze in a new light. 
Joâo successfully positioned himself as the witch-hunter in this case. Although he did 
not do the divination himself, he assumed the position of leader and organised the 
involvement of the powerful curandeiro from outside the district. It was Joâo who had 
organised the village meetings and had led the discussions on how the situation could be 
resolved and the threat removed. By directly addressing a clear threat, these events were 
of far more interest to, and carried more weight for, the villagers than yet another 
ceremony of state hosted by the chefe do poste.
While we have seen how the appeals to tradition in the two xivula ceremonies failed as 
political ploys for both the chefe da terra and the Frelimo candidate, the witchcraft 
allegations provided Joâo with an opportunity to assert his place in the leadership race. 
Rather than engaging in the village debates over modernity and tradition, in terms of 
whether the witchcraft was rational or not, Joâo demonstrated his leadership capabilities
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by organising a solution to the problems which attributed responsibility to someone 
outside the village. Through diffusing internal tensions, Joao bolstered his standing as 
an alternative leader among the local residents.
Park politics: The leadership contest in a broader context
While many of the differences between the candidates were exposed during the 
witchcraft allegations and the xivula ceremonies, throughout this period there were other 
pressing issues concerning the residents of Mavodze. At the same time that Decree 
15/2000 was being introduced, the development of the Limpopo National Park was 
beginning to get under way. As we have seen in the previous chapter, initially the park 
had made relatively little impact on the daily lives of the people living in the Lower 
Shingwedzi Basin. By the time the new community leader was due to be appointed in 
mid-2002, the activities of the Project Implementation Unit were creating significant 
problems for the local residents. The control post and barrier had been erected across 
the road near the dam; a section of land near Massingir-Velho had been fenced off as a 
game reserve and animals were beginning to be relocated from the Kruger National 
Park. Hunting (now termed poaching) had been banned and although the local residents 
largely ignored this, the park authorities had begun administering harsh punishments to 
those who were caught. In addition to this, as I have argued in the last chapter, the fact 
that the park was a transfrontier project had led to increased cooperation between the 
South African and Mozambican authorities on the matter of border control. The extra 
logistical capabilities of the border patrols, coupled with an increase in the number of 
animals on the Mozambican side, was making it immeasurably more difficult for people 
to cross into South Africa to find work. The Limpopo Park was thus a double blow to 
the people of Mavodze and the surrounding villages: it both threatened the agricultural 
basis of their livelihoods in Mozambique and disrupted the labour migrations upon 
which households were also dependent.
As the last chapter demonstrated, the local residents sought to obstruct the continued 
development of the park by employing practices that James Scott has termed forms of 
‘everyday resistance’ (1985). While this provided one way of opposing the park, the
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residents of Mavodze also sought a political avenue through which to express their 
discontent. The coincidental implementation of Decree 15/2000 provided them with just 
this opportunity.
The residents of Mavodze wanted a community leader who would be able to assist them 
in dealing with this new and alarming threat. There were a number of reasons why, in 
the circumstances, the chefe da terra was unsuitable for this role. Firstly, his 
involvement in the witchcraft allegations had tarnished his reputation. His wife had 
been implicated in the death of a woman by witchcraft and people assumed that Antonio 
also must have been involved in, or, at the very least, had been aware of the witchcraft. 
As a result, many people no longer trusted him. Secondly, his former role as the régula 
during the colonial era counted against him. The part he had played in the Portuguese 
regime had not been forgotten,'people referred to the taxes he’d extracted, the periods 
of forced labour (chibalo) being forced to grow cotton rather than food over which he 
had presided, and the punishment beatings administered by his cabas de terra (local 
police employed by the Portuguese to assist the régula). His association with witchcraft 
and the colonial past thus severely damaged the chefe da terra‘s chances of regaining 
political power. In addition many of my informants expressed a third and more 
pragmatic reason why he would not have made a good leader: he was an old, illiterate 
man who could not speak Portuguese. Without a basic education and the ability to 
confront the authorities running the park, people thought the chefe da terra was not well 
equipped to do the job they required. In this sense, at least, ideas of ‘modem’ leadership 
were becoming predominant over ‘traditional’ ones.
There was a different set of reasons for David Nuquer’s non-selection. Although David 
had enough status throughout all four of the villages that comprised the locality of 
Mavodze (Bingo, Massingir-Velho, Maccavane and Mavodze) to be appointed 
President of the Locality, his influence in the village of Mavodze alone was not strong 
enough to generate sufficient political support. David Nuquer’s prestige stemmed from
Frelimo did not allow this memory to fade. The overthrow o f the bmtal colonial system, o f which the 
r é g u l o  had been the village representative, was the Party’s crowning achievement. The Frelimo elite 
reminded people o f the evils o f the colonial regime and the movement’s war o f liberation at any public 
occasion (I even witnessed a party leader discussing the atrocious nature o f Portuguese colonial rule in a 
speech at a child’s first birthday party).
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his large herd of cattle. He loaned teams of animals to 12 families in Mavodze and the 
three surrounding villages. The cattle were loaned on an annual basis in return for one 
week of labour in David’s fields. The families that hired his cattle could use the animals 
for traction and draught power in their own fields and could also, once their own fields 
were prepared or harvest gathered, loan the team to relatives or fiiends who, like them, 
did not own animals. Thus each of the original 12 families that rented David Nuquer’s 
animals would hire them out to two or three other households in their respective 
villages, and in this way his influence was spread far more widely than to the 12 cattle- 
hiring households. The problem for David Nuquer in relation to the election of 
community leader was that his influence and these clientelist ties were dispersed 
throughout the locality rather than being concentrated in the village of Mavodze where 
the election was taking place. Added to the diffuse nature of his influence, it was his 
long association with the now much-resented Frelimo elite that played a definitive role 
in losing David Nuquer the position of community leader.
When the problems caused by the creation of the Limpopo National Park were first 
becoming apparent to the residents of Mavodze, they assumed that the problem, like all 
other problems, was due to Renamo. One rumour was that the opposition must have 
infiltrated the park management team and were now causing the problems as revenge 
for the fighting during the war. However, as the activities of the park increased, it 
became increasingly clear to the residents that it was the Frelimo government that was 
responsible for the ills. There was a widespread sense of betrayal among the residents of 
Mavodze. In creating the Park that was threatening people’s livelihoods, Frelimo had let 
their rank-and-file supporters down. David Nuquer had long been a part of the local 
Frelimo elite and was therefore implicated in this betrayal. In addition to this betrayal, 
the residents knew that the local leaders who occupied the lower ranks of the party 
hierarchy would never contradict their seniors or act to promote village interests in the 
face of centrally-determined policy. As one such yes-man, David Nuquer was 
considered unable to represent the villagers in their fight against the park.
It was in the light of all this that the residents of Mavodze chose Joao as their 
representative. In some way Joao’s appointment could be regarded as the result of 
elimination: David Nuquer was an obsequious member of the now unpopular local 
Frelimo elite; the chefe da terra was an old man associated with witchcraft allegations
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and the colonial regime; relative to the opposition, therefore, Joâo was the only viable 
option. While this was the case at one level, this analysis ignores the positive attributes 
the villagers thought Joâo could offer as the new community leader, joâo was 
independent of the Frelimo hierarchy. One man told me that Joâo could say what he 
wanted because he did not have a boss. He could express his opinions without having to 
worry about stepping on the toes of higher-ranking officials. Joâo had a reputation for 
being outspoken in village meetings and would fi-equently express opinions that 
opposed the existing village leadership with a combination of forceful rhetoric and a 
not-so-subtle sense of humour.
It was not only his ability to present popular sentiments at village meetings that 
endeared Joâo to the villagers. He also had the potential to represent them in meetings 
outside the village. Some of the villagers who had attended workshops or meetings 
organised by the park authorities had not been able to follow the proceedings. Joâo on 
the other hand was relatively young, well-educated by local standards, and was literate 
and fluent in Portuguese. People thought that he would have a better chance of 
understanding what was happening and, as he was not part of the Frelimo leadership, 
would report this information back to the villagers. He was known as a man who could 
‘deal with outsiders’. The threat of the park was coming from outside the village and 
Joâo had shown that he was able to negotiate with outsiders: drawing them into local 
issues where necessary, but on his own terms. He had demonstrated this during the 
witchcraft affair and also during his work trading animals in the Maputo cattle markets.
Interestingly, Gluckman describes a similar instance whereby a village headman was 
fireed of playing the intercalary role between the colonial authorities and the people 
(1949). While this independence was initially an advantage, in Gluckman’s case this 
eventually turned out to contribute to the headman’s failure as he no longer ‘had the ear’ 
of those at the top. I was unable to establish whether Joâo suffered the same fate as I left 
the field too soon. However, the LNP continues to pressure the village residents and 
there continue to be problems between the park authorities and the local residents. As 
the community leader, the residents of Mavodze looked to Joâo to protect them firom the 
threat posed by the Limpopo National Park.
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Conclusions
By way of concluding this chapter I want to return to Mamdani’s analysis with which it 
began. Mamdani’s argument is that the post-colonial state in Africa was essentially 
constructed on the same principles that underlay its colonial predecessor (1996). He 
argues that the colonial powers administered their African territories through a 
bifurcated system of indirect rule, or ‘decentralised despotism’, for the African majority 
in rural areas and direct rule for the colonial minority in the urban areas. At 
independence, although the African governments claimed to adopt systems of 
governance, they failed to fully dismantle the underlying system of colonial rule and the 
colonial legacy of a bifurcated state has remained long after the European powers left 
Afiica. In the case of Mozambique, I agree with Bridget O’Laughlin’s argument that 
Mamdani underestimates Frelimo’s attempts to overhaul the system and create a unified 
socialist state (2000). Whatever the flaws in Frelimo’s post-independence policies — 
and there were many —  the party, for the most part, succeeded in abolishing the 
colonial form of indirect rule and replacing it with a single nationwide system of 
governance.However, what this chapter has shown is that Frelimo did not succeed in 
abolishing the ‘traditional’ beliefs and practices that the party understood as having 
underpinned the colonial system and that it considered to act as an obstacle to the 
country’s development.
Recently, following the end of the civil war, these two concepts have been confused 
once again. A wide range of interested and influential parties —  including major 
international donors —  have assumed that, because the so-called ‘traditional’ beliefs 
and practices have been shown to be of continued importance to many Mozambicans, 
the same must be true for the old political system. As some Mozambicans continue to 
value ‘traditional’ beliefs, they must —  it is assumed —  continue to value the former 
system of ‘traditional authority’. This argument has gained almost universal acceptance 
and as a result political reforms have been pushed through parliament under the banner 
of decentralisation. While Mamdani’s analysis may not have been wholly accurate in
The system o f government and administration that Frelimo introduced after independence may have 
differed in its application in outlying rural areas in comparison with the urban centres, but it was at least a 
single system that, in theory, should have been applied in the same way across the country.
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Mozambique immediately after independence, it would appear to have increasing 
resonance today, more than a quarter of a century later. The current system of local 
governance appears to be constructed on the philosophy of the bifurcated state: there is 
one system applied to urban settlements and another to the rural areas. Urban politics 
should be run by civil process, rural politics by customary process.
This chapter has added to the body of literature that demonstrates the fallaciousness of 
this construct. The election of Joâo Valoi as the community leader in Mavodze reflected 
the residents’ wish to appoint a leader whom they felt would be able to represent their 
interests in the face of continuing regional changes that threatened their livelihoods. It 
was also a protest vote against Frelimo. Rather than being conceived simply in terms of 
modernity and tradition, in the way that shaped the national discussion. Decree 15/2000 
in Massingir was concemed with a growing local resistance to Frelimo coupled with a 
continued refusal to support other political parties. The villagers did not — as many had 
anticipated — simply select one of the existing Frelimo leadership for the new position, 
but neither had there been any return to ‘tradition’ through the recognition of the 
authority of the former régulo. Joâo Valoi was elected because of his awareness of local 
issues, his experience of dealing with outsiders and his distance from the existing 
Frelimo-dominated leadership, who had, it was considered, betrayed their former 
supporters.
The Frelimo government’s involvement and support of the Limpopo National Park not 
only threatened to evict people fi*om their land but also hampered their ability to migrate 
to South Afiica. Although residents of Massingir had been strong supporters of Frelimo, 
until this point the party had done little to threaten their livelihoods. The considerable 
changes that had occurred with the installation of a one-party state at independence had, 
for the most part, been of benefit to local people. Mozambique’s shift to a multiparty 
democracy at the end of the war had, initially, made little difference to either political or 
everyday life in Massingir. However, the end of the war and the move to multiparty 
politics in Mozambique were part of wider changes that were occurring in Southem 
Afiica. Over the same period, and not unrelatedly, the apartheid regime in South Afiica 
was being dismantled and a majority government was elected. The distinction between 
apartheid and frontline states no longer existed; former enemies were becoming fiiends. 
Frelimo’s involvement in the creation of the Limpopo National Park was a part of this
239
changing regional situation. No longer wanting to overthrow each other, the 
Mozambican and South African governments are now working together, fronically, it is 
this cross-border cooperation that threatens the livelihoods of those who live in this 
border area.
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7. Conclusions
This thesis has examined state-societal relations in the Mozambique-South Africa 
borderland. It has explored the social, economic and political processes that have shaped 
the lives of the villagers of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin. In this conclusion I draw the 
themes of the thesis together and return to some of the broader questions that were 
raised in the introduction. What can the case of Mavodze and the surrounding villages 
teach us about theories of state and society? What does it tell us about one-party states 
in Africa and their transition to pluralist political systems? In what way have the 
experiences of the villagers of Massingir added to our understanding of the intersection 
of tradition and modernity? How has this research contributed to our understanding of 
the role international borders play in the lives of those living close by? Does it help 
clarify the debates about borderland cultures and identities?
Rethinking the state in Massingir
This thesis has argued that the Frelimo Party has dominated local political life in 
Massingir for the last three decades. Although the party was relatively unknown in this 
area before Mozambican independence, it was able to capitalise on anti-Portuguese 
sentiments, regional affiliations and other local circumstances, quickly establishing 
strong grassroots support. In particular, Frelimo boosted its local prestige by assisting in 
rehousing the local residents that were being forced off their land by the Portuguese 
regime’s dam-building project. Under guidance and with assistance from the local 
Frelimo representatives, the residents constructed a new communal village overlooking 
the new reservoir, complete with school, clinic and a borehole for water. The physical 
layout of the village reflected the hierarchically structured local political system that 
Frelimo introduced at the same time to replace the colonial system of indirect rule. New 
leaders were appointed from the local population and were therefore neighbours, 
kinsmen and people with whom everyone was familiar. By living with the political 
structures and among the local state officials, the ‘state system’ —  if we return to 
Abrams’ analysis (1988) —  was a part of the lives of the village residents. As post­
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independence Mozambique was a single-party state, there was no differentiation 
between the state and the party systems: those who worked for the state were 
automatically identified as being part of Frelimo. The state/party system was therefore 
not seen as an abstraction, but as something local, familiar, and indissolubly identified 
with society. These ties were further solidified during the war against Renamo as it was 
locally experienced. When Mavodze was attacked, the villagers were armed by Frelimo 
and fought off subsequent enemy raids. The residents regarded themselves as much of 
the fighting forces as the Frelimo troops in the vicinity; together they had fought off the 
Renamo attacks.
Although my informants conceptualised and discussed this era as one of close state- 
societal relations, this was not accompanied with a nostalgic romanticization of the past. 
People were well aware of the limitations of the Frelimo party-state and would 
fi-equently recall the hardships that they had been forced to endure. For example, one 
old woman was describing the recent crop failures and the widespread lack of food. She 
commented that, although the rains were worse and the yields were worse in 2002 than 
in the great drought of 1982/3, at least there was food in the shops: “In those days, even 
if you had money you would still starve because there was nothing in our party shops. 
Imagine that, a man could have pockets full of money but he would still die of hunger.” 
Yet although this woman was complaining about the poorly-stocked cooperative stores 
that were run by Frelimo, she continued to refer to them as “our party shops”. Despite 
the problems, of which undoubtedly there were many, my informants would always 
discuss the state-party system with this sense of local ownership.
An internationally brokered peace accord between Frelimo and Renamo brought the war 
to an end in 1992. Under the terms of this agreement multiparty elections were held in 
1994 and the Frelimo single-party state was replaced with a pluralist democracy. This 
transformation of national politics made little difference to local political life in 
Massingir. As I have argued in Chapter 4, Renamo was never a viable political force in 
the region due to the local experiences of the opposition forces during the war. Frelimo 
remained the only active political party and the one-party state continued to operate in 
Massingir in all but name. Although the state and party systems remained 
undifferentiated and there were few other signs of pluralist democracy in Mavodze and 
the surrounding villages, the changes that were occurring at the national level were
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beginning to affect local political life in Massingir in other ways. The change that was 
frequently commented on was, as one of my informants explained, “the increase in the 
number of foreigners working with the state after the war”.
In fact there had been a gradual increase in the number of international organisations 
working in Mozambique since it joined the Bretton Woods Institutions in the mid- 
1980s. The continuing war, poor economic policies and drought had brought the 
national economy to crisis point and the government sought economic assistance from 
the IMF in return for undertaking economic reforms under the terms of a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). Under pressure from the international donors the 
Mozambican government cut public spending and gradually reduced state service 
provision to rural areas such as Massingir. However, with more international 
organisations operating in the country, NGOs and other international organisations 
began to assist in providing some of these services through development projects and 
aid programmes. For the residents of Mavodze, however, this change was not gradual 
but sudden. During the late 1980s and early 1990s their lives had been disrupted by the 
war. Some had fled to South Africa and those who had remained were forced to leave 
the village and take refuge in the surrounding countryside, from where they fought the 
Renamo guerrillas. Village life, including the provision of healthcare, education and 
other services, was virtually non-existent. When, at the end of the war, the villagers 
began to return to the village to construct their homes and livelihoods, they found that 
foreign organisations were among the groups that offered them assistance. One NOG 
rebuilt and equipped the school, the health clinic, the teachers’ and nurse’s 
accommodation. Another repaired the cattle dip-tank and assisted with the restocking of 
animals. The borehole was equipped with a solar-powered electric pump. Another 
distributed food, seeds and agricultural tools.
In theory the partial withdrawal of the state from outlying areas and the handing over o 
of many of its functions to non-state organisations constituted significant 
transformations in the way the state operated. In practice, however, these changes were 
not as dramatic. As I have argued in Chapter 4, the local party-state officials were able 
to control access to the resources provided by the NGOs and claim much of the credit 
for the work done, giving the impression that the NGOs were a part of the Mozambican 
state. Frelimo thus continued to claim responsibility for the services provided to the
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village, but were only partially successful in doing so. Even with the assistance of the 
NGOs, living conditions in the rural villages remained poor, especially relative to those 
of state officials in the provincial towns and Maputo. Many people were unhappy and 
disillusioned with the government: as one of my informants said, quoted in Chapter 5, 
“We fought and suffered with Frelimo, but what are we getting back?”
This thesis has suggested that this general discontent came to a head with the 
development of the Great Limpopo Transffontier Park. The Mozambican section of this, 
the Limpopo National Park, was initially received by the residents as ‘just another 
project’, similar to the previous NGO interventions in the area. For the most part these 
had been small-scale projects concemed with the provision of services and, as such, 
made little impact on everyday life. It quickly became clear to the residents that the Park 
was a very different type of project and, as I have argued in Chapter 5, people began to 
recognise the development as a threat to their livelihoods. The animals being introduced 
from South Africa hampered agricultural production, the increasing number of armed 
guards restricted migration across the border, and there were rumours that people would 
be moved off their land to make way for tourist developments. While the 
implementation of plans for the park interfered with the daily economic activities of the 
local residents, the process by which the park was being developed also represented a 
further transformation of the way in which the state operated in this area.
This project ushered in a new mode of operation for the Mozambican authorities. 
Unlike previous state interventions and the activities of NGOs in Massingir, the local 
Frelimo leadership had little involvement with the Limpopo National Park. This project 
was on a very different scale from both governmental and non-govemmental ventures 
that had gone before. Those involved in the development of the park had little need to 
consult with local leaders as they were working with the ministries in Maputo. Vehicles 
passing through the villages rarely stop and therefore the local state system was left out 
of the loop. This represented a marked change in the role of the local party-state system. 
As the convoys of vehicles, ministerial delegations and buses of journalists passed 
through the villages in clouds of dust, local leaders were left as unaware as the rest of 
the villagers of what was happening. Unlike before, the local leaders were unable to 
escort or be seen with these visitors and, therefore, were unable to claim any 
involvement in, or appropriate any control over, the project.
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For the residents this was a significant change in their relationship with the state. Before 
the development of the park, all activities of the state had centred on the local leadership 
with whom they were familiar. Although unfamiliar people from elsewhere in 
Mozambique or even abroad had often carried out the work, they were always 
understood to be working under the auspices of the local state authorities. With the 
Limpopo National Park, this was clearly not the case; the local leaders were being 
ignored and outsiders were coming in and doing as they pleased. The understanding of 
the state had changed from a system that was focused on the local structures and 
individuals to a notion that was more abstract. The people who were driving through the 
villages and developing the National Park were unknown individuals working for 
unknown institutions. Residents understood that these people were part of the state, but 
the state was becoming a faceless entity rather than the localised and personalised party- 
state with which they had previously been familiar.
The development of the Limpopo National Park also represented a change in the role 
the state played in the lives of the residents of the Mozambique-South Afiica 
borderland. For the most part, the principal role of the state had been to provide services 
such as healthcare, education and agricultural extension. Following the end of the war, 
more of these services were carried out by NGOs because the state lacked the capacity 
to operate in all of the outlying rural areas. Similarly, much of the management of the 
Limpopo National Park has been contracted to a South Afiican organisation, the Peace 
Parks Foundation. However, while the functions of government that were being carried 
out by NGOs were largely concemed with local service provision, those being carried 
out by other organisations in the Limpopo National Park were of a more coercive 
nature. The field rangers deployed in the park were effectively policing the region. They 
were armed and had the power to detain, interrogate and punish local residents. Very 
often these punishments were in the form of beatings and crippling fines.
The field rangers were employed to protect the park’s wildlife but, as this thesis has 
shown, they were also involved in patrolling the international border. This aspect of 
their work was of particular concern for the residents of the borderland. In Chapters 2 
and 3 I demonstrated the importance of people crossing into South Afiica to find work. 
Rooted in the experiences of generations being recruited into the gold-mining industry,
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labour migration is of both economic and social significance for the residents of the 
Lower Shingwedzi Basin. Although the mining opportunities had became more limited 
and the border harder to cross as a result of political tensions between South Africa and 
Mozambique during the apartheid era, the men of Massingir continued to cross the 
border finding whatever work they could. This thesis has highlighted the irony that 
although the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park is heralded as symbol of a new era in 
regional cooperation and the bringing down of regional borders, for the people of 
Massingir it is proving to be a far bigger obstacle than fences that were there before. It 
may well be the case that the borders have been destroyed from the point of view of 
wealthy tourists in four-wheel-drive vehicles and the animals they have come to view, 
but for the people living in the borderland new and more dangerous barriers are being 
created.
The development of the Limpopo National Park brought many aspects of the state 
closer to the people of Massingir. However, it was a very different type of state from 
that with which they were familiar. The power of the state was no longer vested in the 
local leaders and institutions, but was controlled by anonymous outsiders. These 
outsiders were inaccessible to the residents of the borderland and people felt disengaged 
and betrayed by the party-state that they had once regarded as their own.
It is another irony of this situation that the people of Mavodze were able to express this 
sense of betrayal through the very mechanism that the Frelimo government had intended 
as a form of appeasement: a means to placate the discontent of rural people in Massingir 
and throughout many other areas of the country. Under pressure from international 
donors and the opposition within Mozambique, the Frelimo government drafted Decree 
15/2000 as a means of resolving the long-running debate over the recognition and role 
of so-called traditional authority in Mozambican society and as a part of broader 
reforms that were being made across local government in general. As I have argued in 
Chapter 6, the reified notion of tradition carried little political weight in Massingir and it 
was always unlikely that the former régulo would be selected. But it was certainly 
assumed that the Frelimo candidate would succeed. As the area was considered a 
Frelimo stronghold, many — including the Frelimo leadership —  assumed that the 
status quo would prevail and the party-state elite would have little difficulty in
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manoeuvring ‘their man’ into the new position. This was not to be the case either. The 
local party-state establishment had underestimated the extent to which the state’s 
involvement in the Limpopo National Park had eroded support for the local Frelimo 
representatives. Rather than appoint one of the existing local leaders to the new 
position, the villagers selected a relative newcomer, who they hoped would be better 
equipped and motivated to protect their interests and represent their struggle against the 
new ‘abstract state’ and the development of the park.
States, borders and society
In considering the Mozambican state and how it operates in the villages of the 
Mozambique-South Africa borderland, this thesis has followed Timothy Mitchell’s 
argument that the state and society must not be considered separate entities (1991:95). 
Mitchell argues that, while there is no clear boundary between state and society, an 
apparent distinction is produced by the political processes of the modem nation-state. 
This thesis has substantiated Mitchell’s argument and demonstrated how the 
Mozambican state in Massingir is not a discrete organisation that is separate from 
society, but consists of local individuals who have occupied multiple roles within the 
state hierarchy and society. In looking at the physical layout of the communal villages 
of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin, this thesis has demonstrated that the state is embedded 
within village society, and equally village social relations inform the character of the 
local state. While Mitchell emphasises that political processes produce an apparent 
distinction between the state and society, this example demonstrates that such processes 
can also be instrumental in maintaining unity between society and state.
In a recent return to the theoretical exploration of the state, Mitchell (1999) builds on his 
earlier argument against considering the state and society as separate entities to 
incorporate Abrams’ (1988) consideration of the state in terms of a ‘state-system’ and a 
‘state-idea’. Mitchell argues that we should not “separate the material forms of the state 
from the ideological, or the real from the illusionary. The state-idea and state-system are 
better seen as two aspects of the same process” (1999:77). However, if we are to 
investigate how people interact with the state in their everyday lives, and how this may
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change over time, it is helpful to maintain the analytical distinction between the 
structures of the state and the ideology of state. This thesis has demonstrated that people 
do not think of the state as a single process, rather they separate its different facets. In 
this case, the people of Mavodze and the surrounding villages distinguished between a 
state system, comprising local structures, institutions and individuals with which they 
were familiar and engaged with on a daily basis, and an idea of the state that, although it 
affected their lives, was altogether unfamiliar and remote.
This thesis has explored the political processes that have produced this distinction and 
has considered some of the political consequences associated with it. As the state has 
become less familiar to the people living in Massingir, they have lost their sense of 
ownership over it. Having initially considered the Frelimo party/state as ‘theirs’, as the 
system becomes further removed from peoples’ daily lives and the individuals with 
whom they are familiar, it becomes perceived as less accountable and even potentially 
threatening. A second consequence is that, as the state becomes less familiar, its borders 
become less well-defined and it can encompass a broader range of institutions and 
organizations. In Massingir an array of NGOs and other groups is carrying out functions 
that have historically been associated with the state and, as people are not informed 
otherwise, it is assumed that these organisations are a part of the Mozambican state.
The contracting out of functions that have historically been considered the domain of 
the state to private or semi-private organisations is not unique to the Mozambican 
context, but indicative of the modem state in general. Helmut Willke has argued that the 
new role of the state is to supervise governance by semi-private organisations, local 
authorities, NGOs and other such organisations (1992, cited in Hansen & Stepputat 
2001:16). Similarly, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) suggests that with a general 
movement towards the privatisation of state functions, perhaps the only effective role 
the nation-state has left is to secure its physical and political borders. This thesis has 
questioned if even this remains the case. The development of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park has been widely proclaimed as part of the process of fostering 
international cooperation, dismantling boundaries and sustaining peace among the 
southem Afiican states. However, I have argued that the creation of the park has opened 
the borders to tourists and the animals that they have come to view, but not for the local 
residents.
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This solidifying of the international boundary has, contrary to Trouillot’s assertions, not 
been achieved through the efforts of the Mozambican and South African states alone, 
but with the assistance of a number of private organisations. These have been partially 
responsible for the implementation of the park and, more interestingly, its funding. As a 
conservation project the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park has attracted the attention of 
various international organisations concerned with wildlife protection and 
environmental affairs. Such activities are often assumed by many in the west to be 
relatively benign. I have questioned this assumption and considered the political 
dimensions that all conservation projects inevitably entail. Far from being benign, 
conservation — often carried out by private organisations — can be appropriated by the 
state to assert control over previously marginal areas, in this case the Mozambique- 
South Africa borderland.
As a consequence of living in the borderland, the lives of the residents of Massingir 
have been shaped by both the Mozambican and the South African states. It has been the 
two states in interaction with each other that have produced the social, economic and 
political processes that have been explored in this thesis. Most recently this interaction 
has been seen in the development of the transfrontier park, but the thesis has stressed 
that this been a long-standing feature of life in this region, as demonstrated by the South 
African and Portuguese colonial states’ involvement in male labour migration to the 
South African goldmines.
While the border has played an important part in the lives of generations of the villagers 
of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin, I question the notion that these people have developed 
a ‘border identity’. Rather than reduce identity to a single feature, I have shown that 
people’s affiliations arise out of the specific social, economic, and political processes 
taking place within the historical context of the borderland. The villagers understood 
their Shangaan ethnic identity to stem from the Zulu invasions of southern Mozambique 
that occurred in the 19^  ^century. This ethnic identity, as Harries (1994) has argued, was 
sharpened during their experiences of migrating to the gold mines in South Afiica. 
While most studies concerned with migration and identity tend to concentrate on how 
identity becomes sharpened through the migrants’ experiences whilst away, in this 
thesis I have demonstrated the need to understand also how this is consolidated at home.
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The local political processes that have occurred in the villages of the Lower Shingwedzi 
Basin and the residents’ experiences of the civil war have fostered a strong sense of 
national identity. So although the migrants from Massingir use official identities — 
Mozambican and South African —  opportunistically, I have argued that while the 
residents are Shangaan, they insist on being Mozambican Shangaan.
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Postscript
I have not been able to return to Massingir and therefore cannot provide an accurate 
ethnographic account of the developments that have occurred since I left the region in 
January 2003. Nevertheless, I remain in telephone and email contact with a number of 
people who have made more recent visits to the area. From information received 
through them, and other secondary sources, I have been able to gain an impression of 
the current situation facing the residents of the Lower Shingwedzi Basin.
The development of the Limpopo National Park continues unabated. Over 3000 
animals, including over 38 elephants, 50 buffalos, 349 zebras and 250 wildebeests, have 
been relocated from the Kruger National Park since 2002 (AIM 2004b). The transfer of 
another 3000 is planned. A further 44 game wardens have been trained and deployed 
within the park, bringing the total to 73 (PPF 2004a). The reports of beatings and hefty 
fines continue. Tenders have gone out for a range of tourism developments, including a 
four-wheel drive trail through the Shingwedzi Basin.
Despite the increased number of wardens and the efforts of the park authorities, 
poaching continues within the park and, according to one source, appears to be on the 
increase. Interestingly, there have been several reports of larger animals, including 
elephants, having been killed. Although I am unable to confirm whether these incidents 
have been the work of professional poachers or local residents, if any were the work of 
local people it would represent an escalation from local hunting for food to what was 
locally recognised as illegal hunting of game and trophy animals. Other reports indicate 
that active local resistance to the park is continuing and that the political response has 
been sustained. In Mavodze Joao Valoi has solidified his position as community leader 
and maintains his vocal anti-park stance.
However, although the local resistance continues, it appears that the position of the park 
residents is set to deteriorate further. The Mozambican Government and Peace Parks 
Foundation have drafted a resettlement policy that aims to begin ‘voluntary’ 
resettlement of 6500 residents (the estimated population of the villages in the 
Shingwedzi Basin) at the beginning of 2005. While the authorities have gone to great
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lengths to emphasise that this resettlement is not forced, it is difficult to imagine how 
people would be able to continue living and farming in the park as the number of 
animals increases and large areas are set aside for tourist developments.
Having been moved due to the Portuguese colonial regime flooding their valley, and 
having fought and died protecting their land and property fi*om the South Afiican- 
backed Renamo rebels, it is bitterly ironic that the villagers of the Lower Shingwedzi 
Basin face eviction fi*om a European-fimded conservation project that aims to promote 
peace and regional cooperation.
The popular Afncan adage, ‘when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’, often is 
used to illustrate the fact that it is the civilian populations that incur the most suffering 
during times of conflict between states or powerful groups. This thesis has demonstrated 
what is less firequently noted: even when elephants walk together, it is still the grass that 
suffers.
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